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ABSTRACTS

New Perspectives on Appeasement: some implications for international relations

By J. L. RICHARDSON

Historical research since the opening of the British archives in the late 1960s has brought about a substantial revision of the image of appeasement that had generally been accepted after World War II. Yet the traditional image has scarcely been questioned in contemporary writing on international relations. This article examines some of the central themes in recent studies relating to appeasement: the "structural" approach, which offers a new overall interpretation; the economic, military, and intelligence "dimensions" of British foreign policy in the 1930s; and the breaking down of traditional stereotypes of the roles of Chamberlain and Churchill. This reappraisal has important implications for the discipline of international relations, its view of the origins of World War II, and theories of international structural change.

Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation

By R. JERVIS

Recent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses—e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power—are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.

Trading Places: industries for free trade

By H. MILNER

Many scholars expected U.S. trade policy in the 1970s and beyond to look like that of the 1920s and 1930s—i.e., to be marked by widespread and high levels of protectionism. The American market, however, remained relatively open. One central reason was the growth of antiprotectionist sentiment among American firms. Firms now opposed protection because they had developed extensive ties to the international economy through exports, multinational production, and global intrafirm trade. The development of these international ties by the 1970s reduced protectionist pressure by American firms even when they were faced with serious import competition: protection had become too costly. The preferences of these firms also seemed to affect trade policy outcomes, turning them away from protection.

Paradigm Lost: dependence to democracy

By D. H. LEVINE

Analysis of transitions to democracy is marked empirically by democracy's own resurgent vigor, and theoretically by shifts away from focus on global political economy to concern with such political variables as organization or leadership, and study of their expression within national arenas. Contributors to *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead) explore these issues with special emphasis on how regime transitions begin and on possibilities for

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social, cultural, and economic democratization. The collection focuses more on the transitions than on democracy itself, and fails to place transitions in the context of democracy's social and cultural bases. Insufficient attention is given to civil society and to its organized links with politics. This theoretical and empirical position obscures the appeal of liberal democracy to elites and masses, and hinders understanding of why popular groups accept pacts and back the leaders who make them.

A Search for Identity: the "German Question" in Atlantic Alliance Relations

By J. M. MUSHABEN

Major changes in the postwar global environment have transformed "the" German question into many German questions that continue to complicate the foreign and domestic policy-making processes in the Federal Republic. Inconsistencies between official policy pronouncements and the accepted political modus operandi are explainable in terms of four "paradoxes": (1) the nation/state identity paradox; (2) the reunification/integration paradox; (3) the stability/security paradox; and (4) the lessons-of-history/normalcy paradox. West German commitment to the Atlantic Alliance remains unshaken, but the FRG should not be forced to choose between the U.S. and Europe, between integration with the West and further improvement in relations with the GDR. Normalization of those relations will be best served by a mutual adherence to the principles of balance, territorial integrity, confidence building and greater transparency in matters of inter-German decision making.

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NEW PERSPECTIVES ON APPEASEMENT: Some Implications for International Relations

By J. L. RICHARDSON*

THIS article examines two questions: (1) To what extent have historians, taking advantage of the passage of time and access to the British archives on the 1930s, opened up new perspectives on British policy in those years? and (2) to the extent that new perspectives have been attained, what is their wider significance for the study of international relations? Its findings are that the new writing points to the need for a radical revision of the traditional understanding of appeasement, and that this reappraisal has significant implications for the discipline of international relations.

Substantiation of the first of these conclusions requires the examination of an extensive literature. The sheer magnitude of the documentary sources has not been an unmixed boon for historical research. Donald Watt has deplored the emergence of

> a new group of professional cream-skimmers, "instant historians," the urgency of whose publishers' deadlines made any collation with other sources, let alone any possibility of serious digestion and rethinking of the *idées reçues*, virtually impossible.[1]

Even more damagingly, Robert Skidelsky suggests that

> the release of official papers has led to the writing of some very official history. . . . On any but the most resolute historian, all those memoranda have the same effect that they had on the Ministers for whom they were first produced: to show that nothing different could possibly have been done. A historian who comes, naked, to the corridors of power is almost as likely to *write* conservative history as is the politician who arrives in the same condition to *make* conservative history.[2]

* A draft of this paper was presented to a seminar in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, in August 1986. It has benefited from comments by Christopher Andrew, Peter Dennis, Richard Higgott, J.D.B. Miller, and Ursula Vollerthun.

[1] Watt, "The Historiography of Appeasement," in Alan Sked and Chris Cook, eds., *Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 120-21.

[2] Skidelsky, "Going to War with Germany: Between Revisionism and Orthodoxy," *Encounter* 39 (July 1972), 58.

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The following discussion is based on contributions that are more highly regarded by historians: those that derive most insights from the new sources, offer new interpretations, or cover hitherto neglected aspects of the topic. It does not attempt to evaluate the writing on appeasement published before the 1970s, some of which remains indispensable. Research on France, the United States, and other relevant actors is not included: although the sources are less extensive, the perceived issues differed in important ways in each national capital, and thus a thorough discussion of each would be required. On the other hand, recent research on Hitler's foreign policy is taken into account because questions relating to German intentions are central to any reappraisal of appeasement.

The discussion will focus on (1) the persistence of the traditional view of appeasement; (2) the "structural" approach, which offers a new interpretation; (3) studies of the economic, military, and intelligence dimensions of policy, which provide detailed evidence for (2); (4) contemporary reappraisals of Chamberlain and Churchill, in light of the foregoing and of recent research on Hitler; and (5) some implications for the study of international relations, and for structural theory in particular.

I. The Traditional View

The historiography of appeasement published before the 1970s has been well reviewed by a number of authors. Most notable of these is Watt, who in 1965 foreshadowed themes that were soon to become prominent, and in 1976 provided a masterly survey of the views and formative experiences of changing generations of English historians of the 1930s.[3] Two phases may be distinguished in the literature before 1970, the dividing line being the publication, in 1961, of A.J.P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War*.[4] The first phase was dominated by the distinguished critics of appeasement whose views had been formed by the experience of the 1930s—above all L. B. Namier, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Alan Bullock, and Winston Churchill himself; their principal works were published between 1948 and 1952.[5] They provided the authoritative statement of the traditional view of appeasement as a policy of shameful weakness before the challenge of the dictators, which was doomed to fail. They did not, however, *create* this image, which had become estab-

[3] Watt (fn. 1), and "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School," *Political Quarterly* 36 (No. 2, 1965), 191-213.

[4] Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961).

[5] John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (London: Macmillan, 1948); Lewis B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude* (London: Macmillan, 1948), and *Europe in Decay* (London: Macmillan, 1950); Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (London: Odhams, 1952); Churchill, *The Second World War,* I: *The Gathering Storm* (London: Cassell, 1948).

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lished in the harsh experience of 1939, when the collapse of Chamberlain's hopes for "peace for our time" appeared to bear out the truth of Churchill's warnings and David Low's cartoons. Churchill drove home the "lesson" that the war could have been prevented by a policy of timely resistance to German aggression: "there never was a war more easy to stop."[6] Historians of the 1950s did not challenge this interpretation; nonetheless, readers of Feiling's biography of Chamberlain or Templewood's defense of appeasement were aware that there was a case to be answered.[7]

It was the traditional image of appeasement that influenced the assumptions of Western foreign policy makers during the cold war and that has more recently provided emotional support for opposition to detente. This image is upheld—unquestioned—in influential texts on international relations, in the 1980s as much as it was four decades ago.

Hans Morgenthau, for example, defines appeasement as

> a foreign policy that attempts to meet the threat of imperialism with methods appropriate to a policy of the status quo. . . . One might say that appeasement is a corrupted policy of compromise, made erroneous by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo.[8]

Frederick Hartmann strikes an even harsher note:

> It is precisely when the vital interests are bartered in return for minor concessions, or none at all, that appeasement has taken place. Appeasement may result from weakness or ignorance, either from an inability to fight or a misconception of the effects on vital interests.[9]

Although K. J. Holsti begins by describing appeasement as "a good example of the kinds of conflicting principles and values with which policymakers have to struggle," his further comments reinforce the traditional image:

> Prime Minister Chamberlain was a man of great rectitude. . . . His principles and intentions were above reproach. By surrendering one position after the other through diplomatic negotiations he was able to keep the peace for two years, but in the process he and his colleagues sacrificed the independence of Austria, Danzig and Czechoslovakia. Was two years of "peace" and strict adherence to the League Covenant worth this price? The principles the British observed were commendable, but they did not help to create any effective policies for the Nazi threat.[10]

[6] *Ibid.*, x.

[7] Keith Feiling, *Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan, 1946); Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954).

[8] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 61.

[9] Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 96.

[10] Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 435. Holsti's details are surprisingly inaccurate: there were no diplo-

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That image is endorsed by Kenneth Waltz:

> A small-number system can always be disrupted by the actions of a Hitler and the reactions of a Chamberlain. . . . One may lament Churchill's failure to gain control of the British government in the 1930s, for he knew what actions were required to maintain a balance of power.[11]

A recent general text by Steve Chan suggests that an influential theory of war has been constructed on the basis of the traditional reading of British and French policy at Munich:

> Their concession—made at the expense of their ally Czechoslovakia—appears only to have whetted Hitler's appetite for additional territory. . . . According to the appeasement theory of war, World War II might have been averted if the democracies had been more resolute in their opposition to Hitler's earlier aggressions. . . . The moral of the lesson of Munich is that appeasement discredits the defenders' willingness to fight, and encourages the aggressor to escalate his demands.[12]

The authors differ in their assessments of the morality of appeasement—Morgenthau, like Holsti, distinguishes between "good motives" and "bad policies"[13]—but they agree in generalizing from a historical stereotype which coincides with that held by the original opponents of Chamberlain's policy.

The first challenge to that stereotype came, appropriately enough, from a historian well known for his iconoclastic views: A.J.P. Taylor. Taylor's account of Hitler as a pure opportunist reacting to the initiatives of others, his ambivalent comments on appeasement, and his parting shot that the outbreak of war was due to Hitler's "launching on 29 August a diplomatic manoeuvre which he ought to have launched on 28 August"[14] revived interest in the complex politics of 1938-39 and in the events preceding the final crisis.[15] There was a new awareness that much evidence was not yet available and that many of the decisions were poorly understood. It was in this context that Watt advanced a number of provocative reinterpretations of particular topics such as the role of Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury and a close adviser

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matic negotiations over Austria, and Danzig was not surrendered to Germany. The League of Nations had ceased to count in policy thinking after 1936.

[11] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 175-76.

[12] Steve Chan, *International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare and Justice* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 88-89. Britain and Czechoslovakia were not allies.

[13] Morgenthau (fn. 8), 6.

[14] Taylor (fn. 4), 278.

[15] See, e.g., Christopher Thorne, *The Approach of War 1938-9* (London: Macmillan, 1967) and Esmonde M. Robertson, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations* (London: Macmillan, 1971).

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to Chamberlain.[16] A short time later, W. N. Medlicott and F. S. Northedge attempted more balanced reconstructions of British foreign policy in the interwar years, taking into account the considerations and constraints perceived by decision makers.[17] Although the Cabinet papers and those of the relevant departments were not yet available, the sources for such studies were already voluminous. Each of these scholars in his own way drew attention to the common ground shared by the appeasers and their critics: Medlicott argued that the policy differences between Chamberlain and the Foreign Office had been greatly exaggerated, while Northedge pointed to flaws in the characteristic British foreign policy style.[18]

II. The Structural Approach

Whereas most of the recent British and American research on appeasement has taken the form of specialized monographs, German scholars such as Reinhard Meyers, Gustav Schmidt, Wolf D. Gruner, and Gottfried Niedhart have adopted a "structural" (or "structuralist") approach that seeks to reconstruct the essential features of the situation as a whole; this approach has been further developed by one prominent British historian, Paul Kennedy. The term "structure" is used in a variety of senses in different disciplines and theoretical traditions. There appears, however, to be a common idea: that, underlying the immediately perceived diversity of human action, it is possible to discern configurations of forces that bring about regularities of behavior and that constrain actions and outcomes, thereby opening up certain options while closing off others. Structural explanations are frequently contrasted with volitional explanations, the latter emphasizing choice, the former the limits to choice. Kennedy refers to "the deeper structures and chief recurrent patterns" underlying British diplomacy, but also to "reconstructing the totality of the decision making process."[19] The distinctive feature of the structural analysis of this school of historians is their investigation of the way in which different structural developments—economic and strategic, do-

[16] Donald C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longmans, 1965), 100-116.

[17] William Norton Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy since Versailles* (London: Methuen, 1968); Frederick S. Northedge, *The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916-1939* (London: Bell, 1966).

[18] William Norton Medlicott, *Britain and Germany: The Search for Agreement, 1930-1937*, Creighton Lecture, 1968 (London: Athlone Press, 1969); reprinted in David Dilks, ed., *Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century*, I (London: Macmillan, 1981), 78-101; Northedge (fn. 17), 617-30.

[19] Kennedy, "The Study of Appeasement: Methodological Crossroads or Meeting-Place?" *British Journal of International Studies* 6 (October 1980), 185, 187.

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mestic and international—combined to constrain British foreign policy options and to favor some approaches over others, giving rise to well-entrenched attitudes and traditions. From the standpoint of politicians, these amounted to constraints as intractable as the structures themselves. By employing this perspective, the structuralists have sought to distance themselves from the polemical, participant character of the earlier writing on appeasement.[20]

Many of these structural features, such as the decline in Britain's relative power since the mid-19th century, are in themselves familiar. What is significant is the study of their interconnections—for example, the study of conflicting or mutually reinforcing tendencies. Northedge's theme of the discordance between British foreign policy attitudes in the interwar period and the demands of the international situation provides an early example of this kind of analysis.[21] Other structuralist writings draw attention to unfamiliar continuities, providing, in turn, a new context that highlights the significance of particular changes.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have often been traced back to the early British reaction against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.[22] In the 1970s, several authors introduced a new perspective by postulating a tradition of appeasement in British foreign policy since the mid- or even early 19th century. Paul Kennedy has suggested that, after the death of Palmerston, British diplomacy adopted a characteristic approach that may be termed "appeasement" in its pre-1939 sense:

> the policy of settling international (or, for that matter, domestic) quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly very dangerous.[23]

This tradition became established at the beginning of the long decline in Britain's relative power. It was not merely an expression of liberal optimism concerning man's inherent reasonableness, but was in accord with Britain's strategic, economic, and domestic interests. Although conservative and liberal rhetoric differed, the underlying approach showed continuity from the 1860s to the 1930s. It did not rule out Britain's going to

[20] Theda Skocpol makes a similar point in discussing structural explanations of revolutions: "Any valid explanation of revolution depends upon the analyst's 'rising above' the viewpoints of participants to find important regularities across given historical instances." *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18.

[21] See Medlicott (fn. 18); also Frederick S. Northedge, *Freedom and Necessity in British Foreign Policy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972).

[22] E.g., Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).

[23] Kennedy, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939," *British Journal of International Studies* 2 (October 1976), 195-215, at 195.

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war if the stakes were sufficiently high, but ensured that war would be only the last resort. This central tradition was under constant attack from publicists of the Right and Left: on the one side, as dangerously complacent in its neglect of the primacy of power; on the other, as too compromising and not sufficiently principled. For the most part, the pragmatic center, securely in power, was untroubled by either set of critics, even though they often dominated the public debate. Wolf D. Gruner, in a structural analysis similar in its essentials, traces the roots of appeasement even further back, to the Napoleonic era, seeing it as the foreign policy of a rising as well as a declining industrial imperial power.[24]

Paul Schroeder offers an interesting variation on the same theme.[25] He, too, finds continuity between the 1930s and the 19th century—not in the overall British approach to foreign policy, but in the content of British policy toward central Europe. The predominant British reaction to the emergence of German nationalism was positive: German unification under the auspices of Prussia was perceived as quite natural and in accordance with progress. Moreover, it was seen as being good for the balance of power since it strengthened the center of Europe against the main dangers to stability, the ambitions of France and Russia. The British had a rather mechanical view of the central European component of the balance of power, and assumed that the detailed political arrangements in central Europe were of no vital concern. In all these respects, British policy in the 1930s was in line with the 19th-century tradition.

At the turn of the century, according to the structuralist view, Britain was able to adapt to the loss of primacy and to Germany's increasing power in Europe by reaching accommodations with the United States, France, and Russia. The overall international system was still recognizably the 19th-century European balance of power, augmented by the emergence of the United States and Japan as major actors. In the interwar period, Britain's position became immeasurably more difficult.[26] The Treaty of Versailles, as Trotsky observed, had turned Europe into a madhouse, but had failed to provide the inmates with straitjackets. The old

[24] Gruner, "The British Political, Social and Economic System and the Decision for Peace and War: Reflections on Anglo-German Relations, 1800-1939," *British Journal of International Studies* 6 (October 1980), 189-218.

[25] Schroeder, "Munich and the British Tradition," *The Historical Journal* 19 (No. 1, 1976), 223-43.

[26] In addition to the writings of Kennedy, above, see Gottfried Niedhart, "Appeasement: Die britische Antwort auf die Krise des Weltreichs und des internationalen Systems vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg" [Appeasement: The British answer to the crisis of the world empire and the international system before World War II], *Historische Zeitschrift*, 226 (No. 1, 1978), 67-88, and Reinhard Meyers, *Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934-1938: Studien zum aussen-und sicherheitspolitischen Entscheidungsprozess* [British security policy 1934-1938: Studies of the decision-making process on foreign and security policy] (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976).

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rules of the balance of power were discredited, but the new rules of collective security under the League never won acceptance by the majority of the powers. Britain was not able to reduce the number of its potential adversaries by accommodations such as those it had made before 1914; even if Britain had been more interested in alliances, the United States was not available, and British governments mistrusted France and above all the Soviet Union. With its external assets greatly depleted by World War I, Britain had lost its financial preeminence. Although it was spared the intense ideological conflict of the Continent, the reality of the class conflict was dramatized by the general strike of 1926: Baldwin as leader of the Conservative Party sought to reconcile the opposing class interests, necessitating expenditure on domestic reform and welfare.[27] Following the Great Depression, policy was dominated by attempts to achieve economic recovery and by continued nervousness over class conflict. When, by 1935, the need for rearmament came to be recognized, its scale was limited by the dangers to the economic recovery and to Britain's external financial position. With British power thus drastically curtailed in the face of foreign policy problems that were of far greater magnitude than before 1914, it is not surprising that policy makers continued to follow the earlier appeasement tradition.

In his essay "Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-century Britain," Kennedy postulates that, in view of these changes, a basic contradiction had developed between the requirements of Britain's economic and strategic interests.[28] The economy lacked the material and financial resources to provide for Britain's security in facing all its potential enemies. There was no good or "proper" solution: the demands of military security and economic security were not merely in competition with one another, but were mutually incompatible. This goes far beyond endorsing the government's claim that the economy was "the fourth arm of defence." Kennedy's contention is that rearmament within the limits which the Treasury quite rightly considered necessary for Britain's peacetime stability, and which were observed up to 1938, was manifestly inadequate to meet the military threats, but that the massive increase in armaments on which Britain embarked in 1939 could not be sustained by the economy, which by 1941 was indeed to become dependent on American assistance.

[27] In 1933, the share of social services in British public expenditure was 46.6%, compared with 33% in 1913; the share of defense was 10.5% and 29.9%, respectively. Payment on the national debt had increased from 6.1% to 21.4%. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981), 240.

[28] In Paul M. Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 87-106.

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It was recognized in 1938-39 that Britain could not rearm rapidly enough to defeat Germany in a short war; it was *not* recognized that the economy could not sustain rearmament on the scale necessary to defeat Germany in a long war.

Schroeder draws very much the same conclusion: Britain had no good choices in the 1930s, only a choice of evils and dangers.[29] The Treasury, the appeasers, and the antiappeasers were all correct in their warnings of the negative consequences of the policies to which each was opposed, but they were overoptimistic concerning their own policies. Ultimately, the economic and political consequences of victory were to be almost as damaging to Britain's position as a great power as the consequences of defeat. The German historians Niedhart and Hildebrand even go so far as to suggest that, whereas Churchill's policy of all-out war ensured Britain's rapid decline as a great imperial power, Chamberlain may have glimpsed the one faint possibility of delaying this as long as possible.[30]

Although Northedge goes too far in suggesting that the limitations on British power were not understood at the time, he is correct with regard to the public debate.[31] The perception of limits is very prominent in the archival sources subsequently available, but even so it is clear with the advantage of hindsight that the decision makers did not perceive the full extent of those limitations—hence the remarkable overconfidence that was frequently expressed in 1939. The British could not bring themselves to consider that the situation might be as dire as the structuralists now maintain: they continued to believe that a more measured tempo of rearmament could preserve the fourth arm of defense and place Britain in a position to defeat Germany through blockade in a war of attrition.

To what extent are these interpretations deterministic? Northedge suggests that the margin for choice was extremely narrow: it is *almost* true that British governments could not have acted otherwise.[32] Kennedy and Schroeder suggest that there was indeed a choice, but only between evils. Schroeder notes the cumulative weight of the considerations favoring appeasement up to 1938:

> If one begins to tot up all the plausible motivations for appeasement—fear and horror of another war, Britain's state of unpreparedness, fear for the British economy and the Empire, the unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and the United States, lack of confidence

[29] Schroeder (fn. 25), 242-43.

[30] Niedhart (fn. 26), 86, 88; Klaus Hildebrand, " 'British Interests' und 'Pax Britannica': Grundfragen englischer Aussenpolitik im 19. and 20. Jahrhundert" ["British interests" and "Pax Britannica": Basic questions on English foreign policy in the 19th and 20th century], *Historische Zeitschrift* 221 (No. 3, 1975), 637-38.

[31] Northedge (fn. 17), 628.

[32] Northedge (fn. 21), 3-4.

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> in France, lack of interest in Central Europe, failure to understand Hitler and Nazism, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and Communism, the absence of a viable alternative presented either by the Conservative Opposition or Labour, and more—one sees that these are far more than enough to explain it. It was massively overdetermined: any other policy in 1938 would have been an astonishing, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm.[33]

It should be noted that the structural interpretation is not limited to economic and systemic constraints. These would explain why Britain placed so high a value on avoiding war, but they would not explain the particular strategy for doing so: appeasement, rather than, for example, deterrence. It is here that the influence of tradition and the lessons of experience are relevant. The methods of appeasement had been remarkably effective in defusing conflicts with many and varied adversaries since the mid-19th century. On the other hand, however eloquently Churchill might invoke Britain's traditional balance-of-power policy (the policy of organizing a coalition against the potential hegemonial power), his listeners were aware that the balance had invariably been restored through a great war: Philip of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon had not been deterred from their attempts at hegemony by the prospect of war against a hostile coalition. Why should Hitler be?

III. The Economy, Rearmament and Intelligence

The Economy

The constraint on British policy imposed by public reluctance to contemplate involvement in another great war—a reluctance that was shared by most of the decision makers themselves—has always been familiar to students of the 1930s. What the new literature brings out is the extent to which economic constraints further limited British strategic and diplomatic choices. It is true that one author, Robert Paul Shay, Jr., reaffirms the familiar thesis that the financial limits imposed by the Treasury could have been greatly relaxed if Keynes's advice had been heeded: the government declined to place economic stability at risk, but was prepared to take chances with regard to military preparedness.[34] But the view that the Treasury had good reason to insist on the economic limits to rearmament enjoys stronger support.[35] The most compelling of these reasons related

[33] Schroeder (fn. 25), 242.

[34] Shay, *British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 277-78, 287-88.

[35] Paul M. Kennedy, "'Appeasement' and British Defence Policy in the Inter-war Years," *British Journal of International Studies* 4 (July 1978), 161-77; G. C. Peden, *British Rearmament*

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to the balance of payments. Rearmament, even on the modest scale attempted, increased imports (since Britain could not produce all the requisite equipment and components) and decreased exports by diverting factories from the production of export goods. This reflected the overall weaknesses of the British economy with respect to modern technologies and industrial capacity: steel production was considerably below that of Germany, and the production of machine tools was far below. Excessive borrowing would have been inflationary, placing further strain on the balance of payments; the United States threatened to match any devaluation of sterling, ruling out that option for adjustment. It was generally agreed that Britain's financial strength needed to be husbanded to sustain the nation through the war of attrition that was anticipated if appeasement should fail.

The authors do not contend that the Treasury was always correct in its advice, but that the dilemmas which it perceived were genuine. G. C. Peden has pointed out that Keynes, at the time, differed only marginally from the Treasury.[36] He recognized the same inflationary and balance-of-payments dangers, and he was opposed to "undue influence with the normal course of trade" and to proposals that the government secure priority for rearmament by direct controls over industrial production and labor. On this latter point, critics of the rearmament policy move from the economic to the political constraints accepted by the National Government. In principle, the production of aircraft and other key equipment could have been accelerated by the assumption of direct controls; in practice, the government bowed to the pressure of business lobbies, but also acted in accordance with the prevailing sentiment of its own backbenchers, the "establishment," and Cabinet members themselves. Chamberlain was a stronger leader than most 20th-century prime ministers, but his leadership was asserted within the bounds of establishment consensus. He occasionally took a strong line where there was no consensus, but did not challenge a consensus that happened to accord with his own prejudices.

A similar mixture of economic and political considerations affected the level of taxation as a means to finance rearmament. There were legiti-

and the Treasury: 1932-1939 (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979); R.A.C. Parker, "Economics, Rearmament and Foreign Policy: The United Kingdom before 1939—A Preliminary Study," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (October 1975), 637-47, and "British Rearmament 1936-9: Treasury, Trade Unions and Skilled Labour," *English Historical Review* 96 (April 1981), 306-43; J.P.D. Dunbabin, "British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review," *The Historical Journal* 18 (No. 3, 1975), 587-609.

[36] George C. Peden, "Keynes, the Economics of Rearmament and Appeasement," in Wolfgang K. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 142-56.

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mate concerns that sharp increases in taxation would endanger the economic recovery. Nevertheless, when Chamberlain was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he edged the standard rate upward in 1936 and 1937—back to what was regarded as the crisis rate of 1931: 5s. The highest rate in World War I had been 6s; in 1938, the rate rose to 5s 6d, in 1939 to 7s.[37] Senior Treasury officials were not always in agreement over the effects of projected tax increases, even though they preferred taxation to borrowing; but they were by no means mere protagonists of financial orthodoxy. Sir Warren Fisher commented in February 1938 that he had

> some difficulty in coming to a conclusion whether we should start up now increasing taxation. Would that discourage the now fortunately favourable prevalent mood in favour of rearmament? Would it affect business psychology and help to bring about a depression? It is anyone's guess . . . the world is a lunatic asylum, and unorthodox measures may be unavoidable for a time.[38]

The new sources not only make available the detailed argumentation with which the Treasury influenced the overall scope of rearmament, but suggest that it played a significant part in the choice of priorities within that program. Indeed, it appears that in the absence of a Ministry of Defence, the Treasury in large measure assumed the task of coordinating the separate and increasingly incompatible proposals of the services.[39] Control of the purse strings enabled it to promote the Cabinet's priority—the expansion of aircraft production—while keeping a tighter rein over the expenditures of the other services. In 1937, it sought with some success to change the priorities in favor of air defense, but in 1938-39 it had difficulty in implementing this new priority against the strong preference of the air staff for heavy bombers.[40]

[37] Peden (fn. 35), 89.

[38] *Ibid.*, 92. One aspect of appeasement that has not been discussed above, but that also throws light on the complexities of the nexus between economics and politics in the late 1930s, is "economic appeasement"—the attempt to use economic leverage and incentives to induce Germany to move back from its autarchic policies and, by way of particular agreements, move toward liberal trade relations. This topic has been explored in depth by Bernd-Jürgen Wendt. For a summary of his book, *Economic Appeasement: Handel und Finanz in der britischen Deutschland-Politik, 1933-1939* [Economic appeasement: Trade and finance in British policy toward Germany, 1933-1939] (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1971), see Wendt, " 'Economic Appeasement'—A Crisis Strategy," in Mommsen and Kettenacker (fn. 36), 157-72. See also C. A. MacDonald, "Economic Appeasement and the German 'Moderates,' 1937-39," *Past and Present*, No. 56 (1972), 105-35. For a view that draws attention to British reluctance to favor political considerations over market forces, see David E. Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

[39] Peden (fn. 35), 59 and *passim*; Watt (fn. 16), 103.

[40] Peden (fn. 35), 152-60; Malcolm Smith, *British Air Strategy between the Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 210-26.

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Rearmament in Context

The changing priorities with respect to air power are just one illustration of the magnitude of the problems posed by the rapid changes in the strategic environment. Technological advances such as the development of radar opened up new but uncertain possibilities that ran counter to the hitherto unchallenged assumption of the supremacy of the bomber. The political changes in Europe between 1933 and 1939, and the consequent transformation of the strategic outlook, were unprecedented in times of peace. British policy appeared to be lagging behind events; yet the frequent adjustments of military policy, and the surprisingly good state of preparedness achieved in its areas of priority, explain the more balanced assessments in recent studies of the National Government's rearmament efforts.

The "ten-year rule"—the assumption of no major war for ten years—was in force until 1932; its abandonment coincided with the extreme financial stringency with which Britain responded to the Great Depression. Despite this, the civilian members of the Defence Requirements Committee, established in November 1933 to coordinate Britain's response to the still undefined threats, went beyond the proposals of the services. The Cabinet accepted an expansion of the R.A.F. considerably beyond what was proposed by the air staff, while cutting in half the proposed additional expenditure for the Army.[41] The public commitment to maintain air parity with Germany led to further increases even before the National Government obtained its electoral mandate in December 1935 for its cautious platform on rearmament. From this point, a more familiar pattern began to assert itself, with the services seeking more than the Treasury and Cabinet were prepared to allocate.

Thanks to Britain's new vulnerability to direct attack, priority remained consistently with air power. It has long been recognized that the threat from the air was exaggerated, but it was this perception that explains the scale of the increased expenditure on the R.A.F. In 1934, it had been less than 30 percent of naval expenditure, but it came to exceed the latter in 1938 and 1939.[42] Financial constraints scarcely affected this expansion except in relation to plans for the early 1940s, but production was delayed throughout by shortages of specialized equipment and skilled labor—hence the controversy over direct controls.[43] Major problems also

[41] Dunbabin (fn. 35), 590-91; Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 104-12.

[42] Peden (fn. 35), 205; Shay (fn. 34), 297.

[43] Shay (fn. 34), 92-133, 246-63; Parker (fn. 35, 1981), passim; Keith Middlemas, *Politics in*

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arose over the commitment to parity with a constantly expanding German Air Force, and over strategic doctrine.[44] The definition of parity in "first line" aircraft was even more problematic than the present confusion over parity in the context of the SALT negotiations. The aim gradually changed from seeking to induce the Germans to enter into agreed limitations to deterring a German air attack. Increasingly, however, it was realized that deterrence might fail, one reason being the greater vulnerability, for geographical reasons, of major British cities and industrial centers. By 1938, except within the R.A.F. (which retained its preference for the offensive), air defense had become the central preoccupation: it was the prime military consideration, the salient British weakness, at the time of the Munich crisis.

Naval rearmament illustrates the problems of a service whose preferred equipment, the fleet of capital ships, had been "frozen" due to financial stringency and arms control agreements; new construction and modernization required a long lead time. Existing agreements precluded the construction of new capital ships until after 1936. The Cabinet subsequently approved an accelerated program that included all the new construction of which the shipyards were capable. In the event, only five of the nine approved capital ships could be completed to take part in the war. But throughout 1937-38, there was heated argument between the Admiralty and the Treasury over the ultimate dimensions of the program—in particular over whether the Navy should adopt a "New Standard" that would permit it to oppose Germany and Japan simultaneously—potentially as open-ended a commitment as air parity with Germany.[45] The Navy was the service most insistent that diplomacy should seek to reduce the number of Britain's potential enemies. With the collapse of these hopes in 1939, it had no option but to concentrate its forces in European waters, abruptly reversing the imperial and Far Eastern priorities of the previous twenty years. The scarcity of smaller vessels that became evident during the war was more a consequence of the Navy's priorities than of financial stringency.[46]

The Army, the service at the bottom of the priorities, was the main sufferer from financial limits and changing perceptions of strategic needs.[47] The "limited liability" policy of the mid-1930s, providing for

Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911 (London: Deutsch, 1979), 244-65.

[44] Smith (fn. 40), 140-226; Meyers (fn. 26), 303-32.

[45] Peden (fn. 35), 113-17, 160-167; Norman H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy*, I: *Rearmament Policy* (London: H.M.S.O., 1976), 323-74.

[46] Peden (fn. 35), 160-67.

[47] Howard (fn. 41), 97-122; Brian Bond, *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars*

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only a token force for Europe, was the logical consequence of the agreed priorities. Less understandable, even allowing for the financial pressures, was the decision in February 1938 to downgrade the European theater even further. Yet, because of the extreme pressure on resources and the need to retain some credibility for imperial defense, this was seen as the lesser evil. Only the perceived emergency of 1939 and the subordination of financial considerations could reverse this decision. With the wisdom of hindsight, it can be argued that, even if more adequate resources had been available, the Army would probably not have adopted the kind of strategy and equipment likely to have made a crucial difference to the campaign in France in 1940.[48]

Consistent priorities were essential; yet, given Britain's overextension, they were impossible to maintain—short of abandoning most of the Empire to its fate. Military policy and foreign policy were often at cross-purposes. A startling illustration from an earlier date, which expresses Britain's strategic dilemma with unusual forthrightness, was the Chiefs of Staff's comment on the Treaty of Locarno:

> The size of the forces of the Crown maintained by Great Britain is governed by various conditions peculiar to each service, and is not arrived at by any calculations of the requirements of foreign policy, nor is it possible that they ever should be so calculated. Thus, though the Expeditionary Force, together with a limited number of Air Force Squadrons, constitute the only military instrument available for immediate use in Europe or elsewhere outside Imperial territory in support of foreign policy, they are so available only when the requirements of Imperial Defence so permit.
>
> It follows that so far as commitments on the Continent are concerned, the Services can only take note of them. . . .[49]

The "worst-case" assumption of the Chiefs of Staff in the 1930s—that Britain might have to face war against three hostile powers simultaneously—has been criticized by Williamson Murray.[50] Because that fear became a reality by 1941, however, this would appear to have been one occasion when worst-case analysis was prudent and justified, whatever its weaknesses as a shortcut to intelligence assessments in other contexts.

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Peter Dennis, *Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defense, 1919-1939* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1972).

[48] Bond (fn. 47), 337-38, suggests that there is a case for the contrary view; but he also shows that the senior officers who favored an Expeditionary Force for the Continent held highly conservative opinions on mechanized warfare, while advocates of the latter (such as Liddell Hart) were opposed to creating an Expeditionary Force.

[49] Howard (fn. 41), 95.

[50] Murray, *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 62-64.

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Intelligence

Although much of the source material on intelligence has not been released, enough is now available to researchers to enable them to begin to fill in this "missing dimension" in the history of the period.[51] Financial constraints greatly limited the scope of British intelligence efforts, but many of the problems were due to organizational weaknesses and anachronistic attitudes. The startling absence of security provisions in the Rome and Berlin embassies, for example, left British diplomatic communications freely exposed to the Axis governments. Financial stringency affected the quality of intelligence staffs as much as their numbers: the problems of analysis and use of intelligence material were even more serious than those of obtaining it.[52] There was a spectacular lack of coordination of intelligence activities and findings. The services operated separately, with little integration among them and even less cooperation with the Foreign Office. Political and military intelligence were supposed to be brought together at Cabinet committee level, but without prior coordination this was ineffective. During the crises of 1938-39, a great deal of political and military "intelligence" of uncertain reliability passed across the desks of senior officials, who were keenly aware of the problem of evaluating such information, but too hard-pressed to devise better procedures for doing so. They were also keenly aware that on the crucial question of Hitler's intentions the evidence remained ambiguous.[53]

There were some successes, nonetheless. Intelligence on the size of the German armed forces, for example, which was very unreliable in the early stages of German rearmament under Hitler, became quite accurate by 1938-39; the processes by which this came about are not yet clear. Less was known about the performance of German weapons, and even less about German strategic and tactical thinking. The first of these gaps was caused by the difficulty of obtaining such information. The second, however, reflected the philosophy of the service staffs, which discouraged such inquiries as speculative, and "desired to confine their activities and

[51] See Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Sceptre, 1986); Francis Harry Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, I (London: H.M.S.O., 1979), 3-85; Wesley K. Wark, "British Military and Economic Intelligence: Assessments of Nazi Germany before the Second World War," in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 78-100, 261-65; Wark, "British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-1939," *The Historical Journal* 25 (No. 3, 1982), 627-48; David Dilks, "Appeasement and 'Intelligence,'" in Dilks (fn. 18), 139-69; Donald C. Watt, "British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 237-70.

[52] Andrew (fn. 51), 559, 566-73.

[53] Dilks (fn. 51), 146-49.

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those of their representatives abroad to purely military matters."[54] The distorting effects of preconceptions and the failure to ask the right questions were especially prominent at the time of the Munich crisis. In particular, the immediacy of the German air threat was greatly exaggerated. F. H. Hinsley argues that a study of the training of the *Luftwaffe* and of the physical and logistic requirements for the much-dreaded "knockout blow" against London and the Midlands would have shown that the Germans were not capable of this kind of assault.[55] In the absence of such studies, extreme worst-case assumptions prevailed, and misperceptions of major consequence were not corrected. Although the filling in of the missing dimension may not greatly change the overall understanding of the 1930s, it brings out the extent and the limits of the information that was available, and thus offers insight into otherwise puzzling aspects of policy.

IV. Chamberlain, Churchill, and Hitler

Reinhard Meyers suggests that the weakness of the standard accounts of Munich is that

> the actors in the drama appear only as personified images, no longer as real persons. Those men with the stiff collars appear as the embodiment of character-types reflected in a momentous spectacle—the man of Munich, who confronts the armed might of Germany with an umbrella, draws back in terror and gives way, because he lacks courage and determination. . . . The drama has a villain (Hitler) and a sinner (Chamberlain)—what more does one need to explain the outbreak of war in 1939, especially when the supporting roles are played by lesser villains such as Mussolini and Stalin, and lesser sinners like Beck and Daladier?[56]

The picture of Chamberlain that emerges from more recent accounts is quite different from the stereotype. It is true that he was motivated by his intense awareness of the human cost of war, but he was also acutely conscious of the dangers to Britain's position in the world, and of the need for more adequate military power to provide backing for diplomacy.[57] In its essentials, his policy toward Germany was the same that had been pursued by all British governments since 1919. Far from being deceived as to Hitler's intentions, he was deeply suspicious: his unfortunate promise of

[54] Hinsley (fn. 51), 76.

[55] *Ibid.*, 78-79; see also Wark (fn. 51, 1984), 81-82.

[56] Meyers (fn. 26), 19, 23; translation by the present author.

[57] Watt (fn. 16), 164-66; Keith Middlemas, *Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), 44; Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 178-79.

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"peace for our time" was a momentary aberration after the inhuman stress of the preceding crisis.

Whether or not appeasement was a 19th-century tradition, there is no doubt of the continuity of British policy toward Germany from shortly after 1919: it was a policy of bringing Germany back into the community of nations and negotiating the relaxation of those treaty restrictions that were perceived as untenable. British governments never supported the French policy of enforcing the Treaty of Versailles or the French system of alliances with Eastern Europe. The virtues of appeasement were invoked as early as 1922; as late as 1936, shortly after the remilitarization of the Rhineland, it was Eden who spoke of "the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have constantly before us."[58] From the time Hitler came to power, Britain sought military and political agreements with Germany. On two important occasions, proposals that were to include major concessions to Germany were close to formal presentation when Hitler unilaterally preempted the projected concessions by the reintroduction of conscription in March 1935 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936.[59]

The change of style under Chamberlain as Prime Minister, his readiness to take the diplomatic initiative, has long been noted. The years 1937-38 were perceived as especially dangerous, since Britain's rearmament was not expected to reach a level permitting armed resistance to Germany until 1939; thus, later negotiations would proceed from a position of greater strength. Vansittart wrote at the end of 1936:

> To the Foreign Office falls therefore the task of holding the situation until at least 1939. There is no certainty of our being able to do so, though we are doing our utmost by negotiating with Germany, and endeavouring to regain lost ground with Italy.[60]

Chamberlain frequently referred to the need for adequate military force in order to resist German "bullying," but was even more skeptical than other British politicians of the value or reliability of any of the other powers as potential allies. Working within these constraints, he sought to use Britain's limited freedom of choice to promote solutions to the problems most likely to provoke crises.

Chamberlain does not provide the classic instance of misperception of the adversary's intentions, as has so often been asserted. His diaries and letters were strewn with references to Hitler as "half mad," "lunatic," or untrustworthy, and he believed that British and French firmness had de-

[58] Niedhart (fn. 26), 69; Meyers (fn. 26), 32.
[59] Medlicott (fn. 18), 11-25.
[60] See *ibid.*, 31.

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terred Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia in May 1938.[61] He was by no means confident that German aims were limited to the incorporation of German nationals into the *Reich*. Rather, the premise of British policy in 1938 was that Hitler's intentions were uncertain, and that in the light of this uncertainty, the particular issue at stake—the future of the Sudeten Germans—should not constitute the *casus belli*.[62]

During the Sudeten crisis, the Cabinet gradually moved from favoring Sudeten autonomy within Czechoslovakia to acceptance of a transfer of territory. What the recent sources reveal is a greater divergence between Chamberlain and his colleagues over the terms of such a transfer than had been supposed, foreshadowing a divergence between Chamberlain and the Cabinet majority on many of the issues between Munich and the outbreak of war.[63] Chamberlain acted on the logical consequences of the agreed premises of the Cabinet in 1938; many of his colleagues found the logic distasteful, even though they rallied to his support after the apparent triumph of Munich.

If Munich is coming to appear largely as the logical working out of what had gone before, the developments during the following year have come to appear more problematic. In the light of the many interrelated causes of appeasement, the extent of the acceptance of war in 1939 calls for more explanation than it has received. The occupation of Prague was no doubt the catalyst for what A.J.P. Taylor has termed "an underground explosion of public opinion such as the historian cannot trace in precise terms";[64] but the Hoare-Laval Pact had triggered a similar explosion without altering the fundamental course of British policy. The most committed of the appeasers—Chamberlain and R. A. Butler in England, Bonnet in France—continued their tenacious pursuit of any option that held out even a slim prospect of averting war.[65] The overall military balance was even more unfavorable to Britain and France than it had been in 1938, the Empire in even greater peril, and direct assistance to Poland even less feasible than to Czechoslovakia. Yet, whereas the military had

[61] Feiling (fn. 7), 350, 354, 357, 360.

[62] The assumptions behind British policy in 1938 are discussed in Middlemas (fn. 57), 184-88, and in Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 618-33. Taylor's work offers the fullest account of the Munich crisis. Chamberlain's uncertainty concerning Hitler was expressed frequently. His comment to his private secretary on the Anglo-German declaration signed after the Munich Conference provides a striking example: "If Hitler signed it and kept the bargain, well and good; alternatively, if he broke it, he would demonstrate to all the world that he was totally cynical and untrustworthy" (p. 60).

[63] Cowling (fn. 57), 190-206, 293-352.

[64] Taylor (fn. 4), 203.

[65] For a recent discussion of Butler's views, see Paul Stafford, "Political Autobiography and the Art of the Plausible: R. A. Butler at the Foreign Office, 1938-39," *The Historical Journal* 28 (No. 4, 1985), 901-22.

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tended to "soften" policy toward Germany in 1938, as Dunbabin expresses it, they tended to "harden" it in 1939.[66] The change of attitude of the military and of other key sectors of opinion invites further examination. To what extent, for example, did British decision makers now place their hopes on deterring Germany?[67] The changes in the pattern of influence on decisions, both within the Cabinet and from outside it, have not yet been fully analyzed. Maurice Cowling, among others, offers interesting insights, but his treatment is selective, and his hypotheses are only partially substantiated.[68]

Recent works endorse Medlicott's thesis that, on closer examination, "the lines of distinction between the popular stereotypes, appeasers and resisters, tend to disappear."[69] Neville Thompson, in his study of Conservative opposition to appeasement, presents a number of examples, such as the readiness of Eden and Vansittart in February 1936 to contemplate far-reaching concessions to Germany in the interests of "European tranquillity and economic reconstruction."[70] Similar instances have been noted above. Thompson emphasizes the differences of approach among the Conservative critics of appeasement as well as their inability to work together or to win a substantial party following. A striking example was Eden's failure to consult Churchill after his resignation in February 1938. Instead, he sought the advice of Baldwin (which he appears to have followed), intending to build up his own image as a potential centrist leader, more consensual than either Churchill or Chamberlain, with vaguely worded appeals to idealism, patriotism, and national unity.[71]

The most formidable opponent of the government's policies was of course Churchill; in his series of powerful speeches, he condemned the delays in rearmament and expressed increasing criticism of the whole foreign policy stance. Although recent scholarship does not contest this, the discussion of Churchill in the 1930s has for some time been critical. That is due not so much to Churchill's actual record at the time, but to the influence of his retrospective version of those events in the first volume of his history of the Second World War, *The Gathering Storm*. The polemical tone, selectiveness, and overstatement may enhance the work

[66] John P.D. Dunbabin, "The British Military Establishment and the Policy of Appeasement," in Mommsen and Kettenacker (fn. 36), 186. Wark makes similar observations (fn. 51, 1984), 87-89, 99-100.

[67] See, e.g., Sidney Aster, *1939: The Making of the Second World War* (London: André Deutsch, 1973) for the most satisfactory general account of British policy in 1939, which, however, does not fully resolve this question.

[68] Cowling (fn. 57), 257-352.

[69] Medlicott (fn. 18), 32.

[70] Thompson, *The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 43-44.

[71] Cowling (fn. 57), 235-39.

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as literature, but many scholars now regard it as a contribution to legend rather than to history: the legend that, if Churchill's clear-sighted advice had been followed, the tragic devastation of World War II could have been avoided.

One historian has commented in a different context that to show that the popular stereotype of Churchill "ignores the complexity of this remarkable man and sets him on an unreal pedestal" is not to belittle his greatness.[72] A reader of *The Gathering Storm* would never suspect that, when in office in the 1920s, Churchill, as Michael Howard rather uncharitably expresses it, "having spent five years at the Admiralty building up the Royal Navy was now spending another five at the Treasury trying with equal zest to cut it down again."[73] Far from having qualms over the ten-year rule, Churchill unsuccessfully sought to persuade the Navy to accept a twenty-year rule: "They should be made to recast all their plans and scales and standards on the basis that no naval war against a first-class Navy is likely to take place in the next twenty years."[74]

In the 1930s, Churchill's speeches on German air power contributed to the growing acceptance of the need for rearmament, but they also contributed to the general exaggeration of the destructiveness of bombing.[75] With respect to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia—the issue over the handling of which the National Government destroyed any possibility of a consensus on foreign policy in the mid-1930s—Churchill maintains that, though initially reluctant to alienate Italy, he came to argue against half-measures: "If we thought it right and necessary for the law and welfare of Europe to quarrel mortally with Mussolini's Italy, we must also strike him down."[76] At the time, however, this insight was denied to Churchill as to the other Conservatives. Like them, he sought to straddle the issue, advocating both staunch support for the League of Nations and compromise with Italy, thus provoking Arthur Greenwood's comment: "There are few people in this House who possess his powers of oratory and that highly florid style with which he has succeeded in boxing the compass."[77]

Like many others, Churchill presents the remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936 as the last opportunity for preventing World

[72] David Reynolds, "Churchill and the British 'Decision' to Fight On in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Reason," in Richard Langhorne, ed., *Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War: Essays in Honour of F. H. Hinsley* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 166.

[73] Howard (fn. 41), 89.

[74] *Ibid.*, 89-90.

[75] See, e.g., Robert Rhodes James, *Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), 230-33.

[76] Churchill (fn. 5), 150. For critical comments on *The Gathering Storm*, see James (fn. 75), 221-22.

[77] See Thompson (fn. 70), 85.

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War II, had Britain and France responded to Hitler's treaty violation by using their still overwhelming military superiority against him. At the time, however, he withheld comment in the House of Commons debate that took place two days later and endorsed France's appeal to the League instead of resorting to arms. He delivered his principal speech on the issue on March 26, more than two weeks after any possibility of stronger action had passed.[78] Historians are agreed, however, that such action was not politically feasible in either France or Britain. Eden's cab driver remarked that Jerry could do what he liked in his own back garden. According to Eden, "Academically speaking, there is little dispute that Hitler should have been called to order, if need be forcibly. . . . But nobody was prepared to do it, in this country literally nobody."[79] Even as a backbench critic, Churchill could not free himself from the confusion and uncertainties of the time. Had he been in government, he would have been subject to all its constraints: he could not have greatly accelerated rearmament, still less have resolved the basic dilemmas of strategy and finance. He might have used Britain's margin of choice differently, but if he had sought to construct a coalition against Hitler, he would have encountered formidable obstacles, not least of which was the need to carry with him a parliament and public deeply averse to any prospect of war.

But would such a policy have been likely to deter Hitler? The foreign policy of the Third Reich has been studied by German historians in the context of extensive research on the ideology, institutions, and internal dynamics of the National Socialist regime. The image of Hitler that emerges is remarkably familiar: the interpretations are fuller, some of the details are new, but the essentials are not surprising.

Hitler did not expect to be able to achieve his goal of *Lebensraum* without a great war. While he did not think Britain would fight in 1939, and sought to reduce the risk to a minimum by entering into the Nazi-Soviet Pact, he was resolved to attack Poland regardless of Britain's reaction. Appeasement had encouraged his faulty expectation, but that was not crucial to his decision. His willingness to risk war, possibly even his desire for war, had increased along with the state of German rearmament—indeed, even ahead of it.

If this reaffirmation of the traditional view of Hitler's values is accepted, it follows that neither appeasement nor deterrence could have succeeded in averting war. The fundamental reason for the failure of appeasement was that Hitler's goals lay far beyond the limits of reasonable

[78] *Ibid.*, 106-10; James (fn. 75), 261-64.

[79] Earl of Avon, *The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators* (London: Cassell, 1962), 346, 366-67.

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accommodation that the appeasers were prepared to contemplate. If appeasement encouraged him to increase his demands, it was only in a short-term, tactical sense. Likewise, if a policy of deterrence or firmness had been adopted earlier, it would have changed Hitler's tactical calculations, but there is no reason to suppose that he would have modified his goals.[80]

The main contribution of recent research is that it substantiates the traditional view in greater detail. Those historians who focus on the internal dynamics of the Nazi system rather than on the individual decision maker, Hitler, reaffirm the expansionist tendencies of the system as a whole.[81] Those who seek to explain the specific goals, strategies, and choices of Nazi German foreign policy continue to focus on Hitler. Recent German interpretations have developed the concept of Hitler's foreign policy "program"—meaning something less than a blueprint, but something more than Alan Bullock's thesis that Hitler was both ideologue and opportunist. His opportunism reflected a clear sense of direction, a strategic sense that guided the particular moves.[82]

Hitler's perception of Britain, as it emerges in these interpretations, differed greatly from that postulated in the traditional view of appeasement.[83] Initially, Hitler had hoped to win the support of Britain, the nation that had barred the way to Germany's bid for world power in 1914, for German expansion to the East; but by the time Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937 he sought no more than a free hand. Chamberlain's overtures, however, were exasperating to the Nazis rather than reassuring: England was seeking to play the role of governess, demanding assurances of German good behavior, endeavoring to create a new net-

[80] Cf. Ernest R. May: " 'Anti-appeasers' had their own illusions which were almost equally distant from reality. They believed that Hitler could be deterred from aggression by the threat of war. Few suspected that Hitler *wanted* war." May (fn. 51), 520.

[81] This school of thought, as well as that which focuses on Hitler's goals and program, is discussed in John Hiden and John Farquharson, *Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third Reich* (London: Batsford, 1983), 110-29.

[82] Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (London: Batsford, 1973; published in German, 1970); also "Hitlers 'Programm' und seine Realisierung 1939-1942" [Hitler's program and its realization, 1939-1942], in Manfred Funke, ed., *Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reichs* [Hitler, Germany and the powers: Materials on the foreign policy of the Third Reich] (Kronberg: Athenäum, 1978), 63-93; Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung, 1940-41* [Hitler's strategy: Politics and the conduct of war] (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1965); Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War," in Robertson (fn. 15), 189-224.

[83] Andreas Hillgruber, "England in Hitlers Aussenpolitischer Konzeption" [England in Hitler's foreign policy thinking], *Historische Zeitschrift* 218 (No. 1, 1974), 65-84; Josef Henke, *England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935-1939* [England in Hitler's political calculations, 1935-1939] (Boppard: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1973); Henke, "Hitlers England-Konzeption—Formulierung und Realisierungsversuche" [Hitler's conception of England: Formulation and attempts at realization], in Funke (fn. 82), 584-603.

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work of agreements to promote European stability. By rebuffing these overtures, Hitler hoped to reduce Britain to passive acquiescence, but he increasingly recognized that this might fail. From this perspective, Munich was not at all a diplomatic triumph but the crisis in which Britain rejected Hitler's Godesberg demands and mobilized the fleet, signaling its refusal to grant Hitler a free hand. The outcome was ambiguous, but future planning had to take more seriously the risk that England would intervene. Thus, while the traditional image of Hitler is upheld, it is revised in important details.

V. Appeasement and the Study of International Relations

How is the study of appeasement related to the wider study of international relations? This question may be pursued in two directions: (1) What is the contribution of contemporary theories of international relations and the methods developed within the discipline to the study of appeasement, and (2) what are the implications of the contemporary understanding of appeasement for the study of international relations as a whole?

The answer to the first of these questions is that the contribution of scholars using international relations theories and methods has been disappointingly limited. Only two of the many books on appeasement draw substantially on such theories: Thorne's *The Limits of Foreign Policy* and Meyers's *Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934-1938*.[84] Thorne's widely acclaimed case study draws on theories of decision making and reviews the case in the light of other major theories.[85] Meyers's work, unfortunately not translated into English, is structured in terms of a more thoroughgoing analysis of theoretical issues concerning national security and decision making.[86] A special issue on appeasement of the *British Journal of International Studies* brings together contributions by historians and social scientists, including a quantitative analysis of British decisions in the 1930s and a decision-making analysis of the Munich crisis. Although these illustrate the potential of such approaches, they also demonstrate the

[84] Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933* (New York: Capricorn, 1973); Meyers (fn. 26).

[85] Thorne's work is discussed more fully by R. J. Barry Jones, "The Study of 'Appeasement' and the Study of International Relations," *British Journal of International Studies* 1 (April 1975), 74-75.

[86] In a recent article, Meyers suggests that Thomas Kuhn's concept of the paradigm might be adapted to throw new light on appeasement by viewing it as illustrating a tradition of international political thought—the "Grotian" tradition discussed by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. See Reinhard Meyers, "International Paradigms, Concepts of Peace, and the Policy of Appeasement," *War and Society* 1 (May 1983), 43-65.

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problems as much as the payoffs of interdisciplinary research. They do not go deeply enough into the historiographical issues to establish their interpretations convincingly; there is little cross-fertilization between the disciplines.[87]

A partial exception is to be found in discussions of deterrence; this issue is so prominent in present-day international relations that considerations of deterrence in the 1930s inevitably reflect contemporary thought. Even so, as Barry Jones laments, many discussions of military policy and diplomacy in that period fail to explore the kinds of issues that suggest themselves to those familiar with contemporary strategic analysis.[88] As one exception, he notes Michael Howard's comments on deterrence; he might have added George Quester's *Deterrence before Hiroshima*, which examined interwar doctrine on airpower in light of contemporary strategic theory.[89] There have been several further discussions: Malcolm Smith offers a fuller treatment of the dilemmas of British air policy,[90] and Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance provide an interesting analysis of the reasons for Britain's failure to deter Hitler in 1939.[91] Even though they appear to play down the difficulty of deterring a decision maker with Hitler's values, they introduce an important distinction between short-term and long-term deterrence. This distinction is developed along original lines by John Mearsheimer in the context of deterring a major offensive after the outbreak of war.[92]

The reappraisal of appeasement does not create a problem for deterrence theory, only for its application to the particular case. It does create a problem for what Steve Chan terms "the appeasement theory of war," which appears to assume that any war can be deterred; but contemporary deterrence theorists make no such assumption. One of their major concerns is to establish the conditions under which deterrent threats may be expected to succeed. Thus, the finding that Hitler was unlikely to have been deterred from eventually going to war presents no theoretical problem.[93]

[87] The special issue, *British Journal of International Studies* 6 (October 1980), edited by Paul Kennedy and John E. Spence, includes Kennedy (fn. 19), Gruner (fn. 24), and contributions by Stephen G. Walker, Aaron L. Goldman, and Naomi Black.

[88] Jones (fn. 85), 73-74.

[89] Quester, *Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

[90] Smith (fn. 40), 140-97.

[91] Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 1939," *World Politics* 29 (April 1977), 404-24.

[92] Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[93] Chan (fn. 12). For discussions of deterrence along these lines, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-113; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

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Several aspects of appeasement raise questions that invite theoretical analysis and explanation. As suggested earlier, the pattern of decision making in 1939 is still incompletely understood. This is partly a matter of fuller description, but also one of deepening the analysis. British decision making after the occupation of Prague has been described as incrementalist, but the situation was one in which incremental decisions led to fundamental changes in policy. Such a case, theoretical analysis suggests, may expose basic weaknesses in the incremental style of decision making. Some of the changes in perception and policy recommendation between 1938 and 1939 provide striking illustrations of the phenomena of selective perception and the avoidance of value trade-offs; they invite further examination in the light of cognitive theory.

Although the contribution of international relations scholars to the study of appeasement has been limited, the reappraisal of appeasement is rich in implications for the study of international relations. A full exploration of these would be a topic for another study, but two preliminary suggestions may be offered. The first concerns the discipline's view of the origins of World War II if it can no longer be attributed to the errors of the appeasers. The focus should be on the international system rather than on individuals: the starting point could be Trotsky's comment on the Treaty of Versailles, noted earlier, or Eden's comment in 1938, cited approvingly by E. H. Carr: "It is futile to imagine that we are involved in a European crisis which may pass as it has come. . . . Stupendous forces are loose, hurricane forces."[94]

These forces were loose in an international system that was not merely unstable, but close to breakdown. Many sensed that a great war was imminent. Schroeder's comment, cited earlier, that Britain's policy of appeasement was overdetermined is equally valid with respect to the instability of the international system. The original peace settlement did not enjoy sufficient acceptance, and its beneficiaries were neither able nor willing to enforce it. The League of Nations never won acceptance, and *none* of the great powers acted in terms of the balance-of-power norms of the 19th century. The relatively predictable balancing of the five powers in Europe could not suddenly be replicated by the seven powers in the global arena after 1919. The collapse of the international economic order in the Great Depression, and the transnational ideological strife and confusion exacerbated by it, represented further dimensions of the breakdown of international order. Once the larger setting is established, the internal determinants of the policy of each of the powers can be investigated, as was done by the structural historians in the case of Britain.

[94] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946), 40.

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The second implication concerns structural theory. The structural interpretation of British foreign policy appears to be a theory of quite a different type from the best-known structural theory in international relations, Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*.[95] The latter offers a parsimonious explanation of some of the most general features of international politics; the former is presented as a holistic explanation of a single case. The structural-historical theory can be presented more abstractly, however. But first, it is convenient to note that certain structural analyses of foreign policy have been attempted at a much less general level than Waltz's structural realism. Waltz himself has explained differences in the performance and style of British and American policy in terms of the structure of political institutions; and Peter Katzenstein and his collaborators have compared the foreign economic policies of advanced industrialized countries in terms of certain aspects of the domestic structure: the nature of business-state coalitions and policy networks.[96]

Structural-historical theory focuses on change rather than on continuity, explaining foreign policy in terms of the changing power of the state in question; this, in turn, is explicated in terms of the changing pattern of internal and external structural determinants, both economic and political. Power is understood in relative terms—relative, that is, to the other actors in the overall strategic context. In examining a state's foreign policy in a particular period, the structuralist seeks to identify the main elements in the conjuncture of internal and external structures—in this case, Britain's secular decline in power coinciding with an exceptionally unstable international milieu.

Historians normally explain the relative stability or instability of the international system at different periods in terms of a combination of specific circumstances. There is scope for theoretical analysis of these considerations. Schroeder's recent discussion of structural differences between the 18th- and 19th-century systems, which could explain the greater stability of the latter,[97] has considerable *prima facie* relevance to the interwar period: all three of the changes that made for greater stability after 1815 were reversed, indeed negated, after 1919.

One of these was the "fencing off of the European states system from the extra-European world," such that European and imperial conflicts

[95] Waltz (fn. 11).

[96] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., "Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," special issue, *International Organization* 31 (Autumn 1977), 587-920.

[97] Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics* 39 (October 1986), 1-26.

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did not interact as they had in the 18th century. After 1919, conflicts outside Europe impinged greatly on the European balance, mainly to Britain's detriment. Second, there was a change in the role of the smaller states, which after 1815 had served as buffers or intermediaries between the great powers. After 1919, the smaller states in Eastern Europe, in particular, enhanced instability, forming part of a brittle French sphere of influence vulnerable to a German takeover; insofar as they formed a *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union, they added to the impediments to the latter's resuming an active role as a great power. The third change—normative rather than structural—was the absence in the interwar period of accepted rules of the game and of a common conception of the rights and duties of the great powers, such as had characterized the 19th-century system. This extrapolation of Schroeder's discussion suggests that structural theory at this level of analysis may have considerable potential for explaining some of the larger changes in international politics, a task that is not attempted by structural realism.

The artificial separation between the disciplines of international history and international relations is costly to both. The separation is fortunately not complete: historical case studies are becoming increasingly prominent in international relations.[98] But the foregoing analysis suggests that there remains much to be gained by closer interchange, not least in the challenge and stimulus to theory which the work of historians can present.

[98] In addition to the authors cited in fn. 93, Glenn H. Snyder and Richard Ned Lebow have made substantial contributions. See, for example, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), and Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). For a recent overview, see Christopher Hill, "History and International Relations," in Steve Smith, ed., *International Relations: British and American Perspectives* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 126-45.

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REALISM, GAME THEORY, AND COOPERATION

By ROBERT JERVIS *

EVER since Thucydides, scholars have emphasized that international politics is shaped by the anarchical context in which it takes place. The pernicious effect of what John Herz called the security dilemma—the fact that most of the ways in which a country seeks to increase its security have the unintended effect of decreasing the security of others—also is familiar, and indeed, also can be found in Thucydides: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." In view of such dynamics, how can states cooperate? Recent analyses have formalized these problems and analyzed them by means of modern social science techniques.[1]

The work arises from the intersection of Realism and game theory. Although common interests are stressed more than in some forms of Realism, the basic assumptions clearly fit within this school: the focus is on the state as an actor[2] and on the strategies that can rationally be used to further its interests. The studies use simple game-theory models, or what Barry O'Neill calls "proto-game theory,"[3] in order to gain the insights

* I am grateful for comments by Robert Art, John Conybeare, Jeffrey Frieden, Joanne Gowa, Joseph Grieco, Ernst Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Stephen Krasner, Deborah Larson, Fred Lawson, Helen Milner, Richard Nelson, and Jack Snyder.

[1] John Hertz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (January 1950), 157-80; Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1954), 25. The recent literature is summarized and extended in *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), also published as Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). The framework used grows out of Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214; and Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Related arguments are made by Michael Taylor, *Anarchy and Cooperation* (New York: Wiley, 1976). Although the subject matter is the same as that treated in Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), Bull's approach is different and his work is not cited in this literature. For arguments that Bull provides a better foundation for understanding international politics than does the work analyzed here, see Hayward Alker, Jr., "The Presumption of Anarchy in World Politics," and Richard Ashley, "Hedley Bull and the Anarchy Problematique," both in Alker and Ashley, eds., *After Realism: Anarchy, Power, and International Collaboration* (forthcoming).

[2] See Charles Lipson, "Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 200-225, for an analysis of non-state actors within this framework.

[3] O'Neill, "Game Theory and the Study of Deterrence of War," in Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, Roy Radner, and Paul Stern, eds., *Perspectives in Deterrence*, forthcoming.

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and rigor that stem from formalization. But the formalization is limited: what is most important is the basic structure of the game and the analogies that are provided.[4] Game theory and Realism are generally compatible—both are structural, strategic, and rational—but each has its own vulnerabilities. Thus, some of my criticisms can be traced more to problems with Realism, others more to problems with game theory. But my focus is on the work that exemplifies the intersection of the two; it is not a full-blown critique of the entirety of either approach.

Drawing on the concepts of the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and public goods,[5] the basic question posed by the recent work is how self-interested actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy and important conflicting interests. By taking two actors and positing that each of them has only two choices (cooperating with or defecting from the other), an interesting world emerges in which four outcomes are possible. They are preferred by the actor in the following order: first, the actor defects while the other cooperates (DC), thus allowing the former to gain an advantage; second, both actors cooperate (CC); third, both may defect (DD), thus producing competition; the fourth and worst outcome would be for the actor to cooperate while the other defects (CD) and thereby exploits him. What makes this configuration disturbing is that even if each side prefers CC to DD (and each knows that this is the other's preference), the result can be DD because each is driven by the hope of gaining its first choice—which would be to exploit the other (DC)—and its fear that, if it cooperates, the other will exploit it (CD).

When a good idea like this comes along, our exuberance at finding new insights leads us to extend and apply it widely, postponing a consideration of problems and limitations. To some extent this is functional: as Albert

[4] For contrasting evaluations of the potential of higher forms of game theory, see *ibid.*, and Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 25-57. For an excellent general discussion, see Thomas Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" in Schelling, *Choice and Consequence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 213-14.

[5] The relationship between PD and public goods is technical, complex, and subject to dispute. See John Conybeare, "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemma, and the International Political Economy," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (March 1984), 5-22, and Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 16-30. The essential similarity between the two that is relevant here is that the equilibrium solution is non-optimal. That is, in the absence of devices to avoid this outcome, individual self-interested rationality leads each actor to be worse off than he could have been if all players had acted differently. This is true even though public goods are characterized by non-rivalry of consumption and non-excludability—two dimensions that can be distinguished: see Duncan Snidal, "Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (December 1979), 532-66—in contrast to two-person PDs that have both rivalry and excludability. When large numbers are involved in a PD, as they are in the Tragedy of the Commons, excludability is precluded and the situation can be considered as one of a public good that has the characteristics of non-excludability but not non-rivalry. These distinctions are important in many analyses, but they are not central here.

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Hirschman has noted, in many cases we would not start what will prove to be a fruitful enterprise if we were aware of the difficulties at the beginning.[6] But if we ignore the problems in the early stages, we may overreact and reject the entire approach when they become obvious later. It would be more productive if scholars simultaneously explored the potential of and the problems with the approach. Since the potential has been discussed elsewhere (see fn. 1), I will concentrate on the problems.

Three strengths that have made this research stimulating and important should be noted, however. First, it builds upon central characteristics of international politics—anarchy, the security dilemma, and the combination of common and conflicting interests. Second, the approach is parsimonious and lends itself to deductive theorizing. Third, it seeks to bring together the study of conflict and the study of cooperation, and tries to explain a wide range of phenomena encompassing both security and political economy. The deterring of exploitation may be as relevant to the stability of monetary systems as to arms control; strategies by which states can gain the benefits of mutual cooperation may be as important for nuclear postures as for international trade. Indeed, as the links to the theory of public goods indicate, the propositions produced should apply to a wide range of cases outside of international politics.

It is not a good sign, however, that prisoners confronted by a District Attorney do not behave as the model would lead us to expect.[7] In order to apply the framework, we have to *assume* many of the elements of world politics that in fact are most problematical. The actor's values, preferences, beliefs, and definition of self all are exogenous to the model and must be provided before analysis can begin.[8] If they were straightforward, the analysis of international politics would be much simpler. They therefore need to be investigated and explained, not taken as givens. Adoption of stereotypical Realist assumptions can supply some of the inputs the analysis requires, but I will argue that this is not completely satisfactory.

Choice and Context

Perhaps the most important limitation of the work on anarchy is that it looks at individual actors, their preferences, and their choices, and thus

[6] Hirschman's discussion of what he calls the "hiding hand" is in his *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), 9-34.

[7] Brian Forst and Judith Lucianovic, "The Prisoner's Dilemma: Theory and Reality," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 5 (Spring 1977), 55-64.

[8] The model also assumes that states can fruitfully be considered as unitary actors. The debates over this issue, although important, are so well known that they will only be touched on here.

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blinds us to the broader setting in which behavior occurs. Problems arise in a context and out of a history, and not all patterns are the product of careful or even conscious choice. Just as in most of our everyday lives we carry out routines, so states also continue established policies with little calculation or thought.[9] Each new day does not bring a new beginning; severe restrictions are placed on us by the expectations—including our own expectations about ourselves—that constitute the context within which we must behave.

When clear points of choice occur, they are often structured by the settings in which they arise. The timing of decisions and events is important and at least partially beyond a decision maker's control. For example, the production schedule for new nuclear submarines has periodically presented President Reagan with the choice of whether to abide by the unratified SALT II Treaty and destroy a usable but older missle-launching submarine, or to break at least part of this agreement. The date on which these decisions had to be made was in part an arbitrary product of industrial vagaries.[10] Furthermore, unexpected events may occur at the same time as the decision, and force themselves on the statesmen's feelings and calculations. Thus, by straining the NATO alliance, Reagan's air strike against Libya in April 1986 may have made it harder for him to break the treaty at the decision point six weeks later. In turn, this decision greatly increased the pressures on Reagan to take a tougher position at the next choice point in late 1986.[11] Similarly, the United States might have made more of an effort to cooperate with the Soviet Union in banning MIRVs had it not been simultaneously negotiating over ABMs. Another example is that American cooperation with the Mariel boatlift of refugees from Cuba was reduced by the accidents of a change in relevant laws—adopted for unrelated reasons—and a large simultaneous emigration from Haiti to the U.S.[12]

More generally, issues arise in particular historical contexts that shape

[9] James Rosenau stresses the role of habits in "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986), 861-70.

[10] Michael Gordon, "Air Force's Delay Said to Keep U.S. to '79 Arms Limit," *New York Times*, August 29, 1986.

[11] Michael Gordon, "Reagan Declares U.S. Is Dismantling Two Nuclear Subs," *New York Times*, May 28, 1986; also see Gordon, "U.S. Still Divided on 1979 Arms Treaty," *New York Times*, April 23, 1986. When the U.S. did break the limits, some critics held that one motive was to show that the controversy over the Iran arms deal, which had just been revealed, would not inhibit the administration from acting decisively. Michael Gordon, "U.S. Exceeds Limit Set in 1979 Accord on Strategic Arms," *New York Times*, November 29, 1986.

[12] Jorge Dominguez, "Cooperating with the Enemy: U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba," in Christopher Mitchell, ed., *Immigration Policy and U.S. Foreign Relations with Latin America* (forthcoming). For additional examples, see Glenn Seaborg with Benjamin Loeb, *Stemming the Tide* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 121, 158.

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preferences and behavior. The operating incentives are given not only by the present circumstances, but also by how these circumstances came about. Where the players are is strongly influenced by where they have been.[13] Thus the U.S. decision to respond with force immedately to the seizure of the *Mayaguez* is to be explained largely by the fact that this event occurred shortly after the fall of Vietnam, when U.S. leaders believed that they had to act forcefully to show others that the previous defeat had not undermined American willingness to use force. Similarly, one reason why Britain could not cooperate with Germany and restrain Russia in 1914 was that she had done so in the previous crisis and feared that a repetition would destroy the Triple Entente. In other cases, defection or cooperation in one interaction will lead to more of the same. Cooperation can change the situation the actors face, and their beliefs, in ways that make further cooperation more likely. Perhaps more frequently, the process of mutual defection will lead each side to fear and dislike the other, and to develop distorted views of it, which cannot be quickly reversed if the other suddenly begins to cooperate.[14] Actors do not react merely to the *immediate* stimulus they face.[15]

We often talk of repeated plays of a Prisoners' Dilemma. But this formulation is misleading when the preferences and beliefs of the actors, and the nature of the game itself, change as it is played. What is at stake and the nature of the issue is defined over time, as actors develop their positions, in part in response to the positions taken by others. As one Senator explained his vote to permit the export of advanced arms to Saudi Arabia:

> The whole issue changed in the last week or 10 days. The media began to play it up as a question involving the president's ability to conduct foreign policy. . . . Had it not been for the media hype, the issue would have been strictly the arms sale. And I would have been very comfortable voting against it."[16]

[13] For a nice example taken from the pattern of social relations within a community of chimpanzees, see Jane Goodall, *The Chimpanzees of Gombe* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 337-38.

[14] See the discussion of the "spiral model" in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62-84. For arguments that one or two instances of cooperation are not likely to be sufficient to break these spirals, see Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

[15] For a discussion of a parallel in biological evolution, see Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Necessarily a Wing," *Natural History* 94 (November 1985), 12-25. Also see Gould, "Of Kiwi Eggs and the Liberty Bell," *Natural History* 95 (November 1986), 22-29. The argument that structures shape and limit later development is in sharp contrast to the standard evolutionary assertion that natural selection operates in a way that provides the best fit between organisms and their present environment.

[16] Quoted in Richard Fenno, Jr., "Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1986), 11-12.

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The moves in a game can change it. Chicken can become Prisoners' Dilemma if each side's behavior leads the other to believe that being exploited would be worse than mutual defection. Schelling notes: "When a boy pulls a switch-blade knife on his teacher, the teacher is likely to feel, whatever the point at issue originally was, that the overriding policy question now is his behavior in the face of a switch-blade challenge."[17]

Other objections can be grouped under three headings, each of which has three components. The first set of questions concerns the actors' preferences, which need to be probed and explained. The second deals with the concepts employed by the framework, which may turn out to be ambiguous or troublesome. The third set involves the causes and consequences of the actors' perceptions, beliefs, and values. The representations of reality employed often beg crucial questions. Like many experiments, the models often gain internal validity at the cost of external validity: the order they impose is too rigid to catch the reality they seek to explain.

Preferences and Preference Orders

As noted, the central question for the work on anarchy is how cooperation is possible when actors are in a Prisoners' Dilemma—i.e., when they have the following preference order: exploiting or taking advantage of the other, mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and being exploited. The most important issue may be not what happens after these preferences have been established, but the preferences themselves. Much of the explanatory "action" takes place in the formation of the preferences; we cannot afford to leave this topic offstage. Three questions need to be addressed: How do we know what the actors' preferences are? What is the pattern of distribution of preferences over large number of cases? How are preferences established?

What Are the Actors' Preferences?

The first question is the most obvious one. How do we know whether a situation resembles a PD? The problem is even greater for those variants of the framework that call for cardinal rather than ordinal utilities.[18] The danger, of course, is that we will infer the actors' preferences from

[17] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 265.

[18] This is true for Jervis (fn. 1).

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their behavior. Actors rarely give complete statements of their preferences. In some cases we can use the method of "revealed preferences," but this technique can be used only when preferences are stable and consistent; if it is not to be tautologous, we must examine a large number of instances in order to test the preferences on behaviors that we did not use to derive the preferences in the first place.

Furthermore, while the standard PD model points to four possible outcomes that need to be ranked, decision makers may define the situation differently—most frequently by ignoring the possibility of mutual restraint. In 1914, for example, most leaders did not ask themselves whether they preferred peace to war because they did not think that peace could be maintained. In some cases, a lack of cooperation may be explained in significant measure by the actors' inattention to the possibility of such an outcome.

How Common Is Prisoners' Dilemma?

The second problem lies in determining the relative frequency of various games. How common is Prisoners' Dilemma? Harrison Wagner and George Downs and his colleagues note that states often fail to cooperate, not because they cannot surmount the PD, but because they are in Deadlock and prefer mutual defection to mutual cooperation.[19] For example, were the states in 1914 in PD or in Deadlock? (These are not, of course, the only alternatives.) Are we in PD with the Soviet Union today? Ronald Reagan is not alone in answering in the negative; much of the debate over whether American threats have deterred the Soviet Union or created unnecessary conflict is a disagreement about Soviet intentions and preference orders, not a dispute between two contending general theories.[20]

To put the questions in their most general form: How much of international conflict is caused by the states' inability to make and enforce binding agreements? How much of international politics is driven by this problem? The model of PD may be popular, not because it catches the most important dynamics of international politics, but because it is intriguing and lends itself to interesting manipulations. The "law of the instrument" may be at least partly at work. Furthermore, the model is congruent with the Anglo-American bias of seeing world politics as tragedy

[19] Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 70 (June 1983), 330-46; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 118-46.

[20] Jervis (fn. 14), 84-113. Similarly, many of the arguments about whether the failure of detente was inevitable or a matter of errors can be phrased in terms of whether the relaxation of tensions was Pareto-superior to a high level of competition.

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rather than as evil, of believing that most conflicts can be ameliorated for the good of all concerned.[21]

The empirical problems in answering these questions are relatively clear, although extremely difficult. Perhaps equally troublesome but less obvious are two conceptual difficulties. First, are we concerned only with situations in which the agreements cannot be enforced, or also with those in which no outside agency is available to force the actors to reach an agreement in the first place? Even where enforcement is available, as it is in domestic society, some mutually beneficial outcomes may be missed because of bargaining dynamics and miscalculations. Similarly, the dilemma of public goods is not that actors cannot ensure that others will live up to their commitments, but that it is not rational for anyone to make a commitment to contribute in the first place.

A second problem is that whether or not a situation is a Prisoners' Dilemma depends in part on how we define its boundaries. If we look at Japanese-American negotiations in the summer and fall of 1941, the framework does not apply: both sides preferred mutual defection (in this case, war) to the concessions that would have been necessary to reach agreement. Japan would rather fight than give up the effort to dominate China and South East Asia; the United States would rather fight than permit this to happen. But if we step back and ask why Japan sought its sphere of influence, anarchy and the Prisoners' Dilemma emerge as crucial. Domination was sought primarily as a means to the goal of autarky. Japanese leaders wanted the self-sufficiency that would go along with unhindered access to Asian markets and raw materials in order to become relatively immune from Western pressures.[22] Had it been possible for the West and Japan to make a binding agreement giving the latter economic freedom in Asia in return for renouncing the use of force, a bargain might have been struck.

Sources of Preferences

By taking preferences as given, we beg what may be the most important question on how they are formed. When and why do actors find exploitation particularly attractive, or the danger of being taken advantage of particularly unacceptable? When and why do decision makers see mutual cooperation as desirable? Economic theory treats tastes and prefer-

[21] See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chap. 15.

[22] James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

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ences as exogenous. Analysis is therefore facilitated, but at the cost of drawing attention away from areas that may contain much of the explanatory "action" in which we are interested.[23]

Sometimes we can deduce preferences from the structure of the system, as Realism suggests. But even a structural theory of international politics as powerful as Waltz's has trouble producing many precise deductions.[24] As the endless arguments about the national interest remind us, only rarely can descriptions and prescriptions of what the state will or should prefer be drawn from its objective situation.[25] Conybeare is able to deduce a state's economic interests from trade theory;[26] but this inference only applies if we assume that the state is an actor. Such an assumption is often a valid guide when overriding issues of national security are at stake; but the relevant actors for economic issues are often classes, sectors, and groups, or even smaller and more numerous units. In the security area, the preference for protecting the status quo rather than retreating may be deducible from the external situation, but the choice for expansion is often the result either of preferences of important subnational groups or of internal bargaining.[27] More broadly, one does not have to be a Wilsonian or a Marxist to argue that the goals states seek, the costs they are willing to pay, and the instruments that are believed appropriate can be deeply affected by the nature of the state.

Transnational forces are a third general source of preferences. Thus, James Joll sees the prevalence of Social Darwinism in the early 20th century as a major cause of the preference for competition in world politics, and Van Evera argues that rampant nationalism strongly influenced the utilities that attached to various outcomes.[28] The maddeningly vague "spirit of the times" may help to account for the fact that, during the years before World War I, all the major powers opted for offensive military

[23] See the discussion of tastes in James March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice," *Bell Journal of Economics* 9 (Autumn 1978), 593-604.

[24] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979).

[25] But see Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). Also see David Lake, "Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structure," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), 145-49, and Lake, "Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (June 1987), 221-28.

[26] John Conybeare, *Trade Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

[27] See Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, forthcoming.

[28] James Joll, "1914: The Unspoken Assumptions," in H. W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 307-28; Koch, "Social Darwinism as a Factor in the 'New Imperialism,'" *ibid.*, 329-54; Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 80-117. For a related general argument on the source of preferences, see Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Construction Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," *American Political Science Review* 81 (March 1987), 3-22.

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strategies when defensive ones would have been more likely to make them reach their foreign policy goals.[29]

Preferences also stem from the ideologies and beliefs of individual decision makers. Some are "hard-line," others "soft-line" in dealing with an adversary. Whether these orientations hold across interactions with a range of adversaries we do not know, although some evidence indicates that they do.[30] The effect is that under circumstances in which some statesmen will believe that mutual cooperation is beneficial, others will see it as a trap. Thus, because of their beliefs about the nature of the adversary, Ronald Reagan and his supporters believe that many kinds of cooperation with the Soviet Union are likely to produce greater Soviet pressures on the West rather than further cooperation.

Herbert Simon's argument about Duverger's Law of the relations between voting rules and party systems applies to theorizing in international politics as well: "Most of the work is being done by propositions that characterize the utility function of the [actor] and his or her beliefs, expectations, and calculations."[31] Realism and game theory are of limited help here since the latter must assume the actors' preferences and utilities, and Realism's generalizations, although powerful, are often vague. Furthermore, these approaches imply that preferences are constant when, in fact, they change and thus pose a range of challenges for the anarchy framework.[32] First, and most obviously, a state's preferences change as one set of decision makers replaces another. Thus the dim prospects for arms control throughout much of the Reagan administration are explained by the President's belief that agreements that others saw as advantageous are in fact unacceptable. Game theory focuses on the prefer-

[29] Van Evera (fn. 28); Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984), 58-107; Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *ibid.*, 108-46; Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). For a rebuttal, see Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986), 151-76, and the exchange of letters between Snyder and Sagan, *ibid.*, 11 (Winter 1986/87), 187-98.

[30] For a discussion of this issue in the domestic context, see Robert Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

[31] Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology and Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 79 (June 1985), 298; also see William Riker, "The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984), 1-16. In a different intellectual tradition, Adam Przeworski comes to a similar conclusion: "Marxism and Rational Choice," *Politics and Society* 14 (No. 1, 1985), 379-409.

[32] For a general discussion of changing preferences, see James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), 141; Michael Cohen and Robert Axelrod, "Coping with Complexity: The Adaptive Value of Changing Utility," *American Economic Review* 74 (March 1984), 30-42; Barbara Farnham, "Value Conflicts and Political Decision-Making" (Ph.D. diss. in progress, Columbia University).

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ences that are held at any given time, and therefore simply puts this question to one side; Realism implies that preferences come from the position of the state in the international system, and therefore implies that changes in leadership do not matter. Realism is less troubled by a second source of change: that produced by shifts in the external situation. On the simplest level, a previously desired outcome may become unacceptable because the state would no longer gain by it. Thus, for instance, states begin to resist mutual low tariffs as their competitive position deteriorates. Similarly, in the fall of 1961 American decision makers came to doubt the wisdom of their own nuclear test-ban proposal when they suspected "that the Russians might have drawn even with or even past us in some aspects of thermonuclear weapons."[33]

In other cases, preferences change through the process of the interaction itself. When two states are hostile, one will often assume that anything the other urges must be bad; an outcome that was previously favored will be viewed with skepticism if the adversary endorses it. Similarly, the fact that a state takes a strong interest in an issue can lead the adversary to develop a contrary preference. The conflict process then *generates* interests and preferences rather than being produced by them.[34] It would otherwise be impossible to explain why the United States supports Jonas Savimbi in Angola, or refuses to admit refugees from Cuba. Unlike other communist regimes, Cuba *wants* its internal opponents to leave; so the U.S., counter to its normal policy of accepting such people, keeps them out.[35] Although this interdependence between states' preferences is compatible with Realism, it leads to interests and maneuvers that complicate, if not contradict, the normal prescriptions produced by the anarchy framework. For example, splitting up a large transaction into a series of small ones may be ineffective in these circumstances.

Experience and knowledge can also change preferences. Although such processes account for many important outcomes, they are exogenous to game theory and the anarchy framework. As actors participate in an arrangement, they may come to see that the consequences are quite different from those they expected. Thus the experience of the follow-up conferences on the Helsinki Agreement seems to have convinced the Soviets that the discussion of human rights, while annoying, does not

[33] Glenn Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 120.

[34] Of course, each state wants to limit the other's power and influence and will therefore try to see that any actor the adversary is supporting does not win; but from this we cannot deduce preferences for specified countries or factions to prevail.

[35] Linda Greenhouse, "U.S. Assailed Again on Curbing Cuban Immigrants," *New York Times*, September 27, 1986.

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do as much harm as they once believed.[36] In other cases, the emergence of new scientific information may be the source of change. The U.S. position in the test-ban negotiations was altered when people realized that testing might take place inside a large cavern, thus muffling the blast and undercutting the verification techniques in which the West previously had faith. New information or new beliefs can also lead to preferences for cooperation. Robert Rothstein argues, for example, that North-South conflict over commodity pricing decreased as the developing states came to see that their previous proposals for price stabilization might not increase their income, as they had initially believed.[37] Negotiations proceed not only by bargaining, but also by persuasion; in some cases, that leads to solutions that neither side had previously thought of and that each comes to prefer to its original proposal.[38]

Finally, preferences may be unstable. Because the intellectual problems are great, key decisions are often difficult, and continued thought may produce shifting evaluations. Although such processes are difficult to generalize about, most people know them from their own experience: deciding what car to buy, what job to take, or whom to marry. Most sharply, decision makers may come to prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection, or vice versa. Thus, the Soviet-American negotiations for arms control in the Indian Ocean broke down largely because the Carter administration, after first favoring an agreement, came to believe that it would not be in the American interest. Similarly, in the early 1960s, the United States favored land-mobile missiles, then (in SALT I) proposed prohibiting them, then favored them as stabilizing, and has recently again called for banning them. The same kind of changes have occurred in the U.S. stance toward antisatellite weapons. Those shifts can only in part be explained by changes in technological possibilities or Soviet activities.[39]

[36] John Maresia, "Helsinki," in Alexander George, Philip Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1988). Also see Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 480. For an argument that people's preferences are often formed by their behavior, see Daryl Bem, "Self-Perception Theory," in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, VI (New York: Academic Press, 1972); for an application to international politics, see Deborah Larson, *The Origins of Containment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[37] Rothstein, "Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration: Some Lessons from the Commodity Negotiations," *International Organization* 38 (Autumn 1984), 732-62.

[38] See Mary Parker Follett, *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*, H. C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds. (New York: Harper & Row, 1942); Richard Walton and Richard McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 126-83; Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 86-125.

[39] For a discussion of the ways in which changes in technology influenced American attitudes toward antisatellite weapons, particularly by providing satellites with offensive as well

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In summary, the research on cooperation under anarchy assumes the actors are in PD, which may not be correct. It further takes the actors' preferences as given and ignores how, why, and when they change. Game theory cannot help here; Realism's analyses of these questions are limited at best.

Concepts

The concepts employed by the anarchy framework seem unproblematic at first glance. Cooperation and defection, offense and defense, and power are fairly standard concepts, but the requirements for rigorous analysis within a game-theoretic approach demand that we squeeze some of the richness out of these terms. The admirable gain in precision may have to be purchased at an unacceptably high price.

Cooperation and Defection

The concepts of cooperation and defection are crucial to the framework. These terms work well for a laboratory Prisoners' Dilemma, but most situations are more complex. To start with, are these the only two alternatives? Perhaps we should think not of a dichotomy, but of a continuum. But can we add this measure of realism without sacrificing the parsimony and deductive power of the theory? Furthermore, can most alternatives really be arrayed along such a continuum? Some policies express a high degree of both cooperation and defection simultaneously; others—in some instances, the policy of isolation—express neither.[40] In many cases the most interesting choices are not even on this continuum.

Concrete questions often arise about how to characterize any individual outcome or policy. Sometimes these questions come down to whether the glass is half full or half empty, but even then the answer is not inconsequential. An example of an outcome is the "chicken war" between the United States and the E.E.C. in the early 1960s, which Conybeare sees as mutual defection because Europe raised the tariff on frozen poultry and the U.S. retaliated by raising tariffs on some European products.[41] But one can argue that what is more significant than the deviation from pure cooperation is the fact that the dispute was held to one round of action

as defensive military capabilities, see Paul Stares, *The Militarization of Space* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), and Steve Weber and Sydney Drell, "Cooperation and Discord in the Militarization of Space: U.S. Strategy, 1960-1985," in George, Farley, and Dallin (fn. 36).

[40] Thus it is not surprising that quantitative studies find that conflict and cooperation are not always inversely related to each other.

[41] Conybeare (fn. 26).

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and counteraction. It did not produce a spiral of conflict, and relations between the countries were not embittered. An example of an ambiguous military policy is the question whether the U.S. cooperated or defected in its strategic arms procurements between the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. On the one hand, the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, did not deploy additional missiles. On the other, it did make major qualitative improvements, most notably in the form of multiple warheads.

How we judge a policy may also depend on the time span we examine. Defection in one instance can produce mutual cooperation over the longer run. Indeed, one implication of the theorizing about anarchy is that cooperation is enforced by the possibility of defection. Thus, President Reagan argues that his policy will induce Soviet cooperation, which will then be mutual. If he turns out to be correct, is it more useful to call the whole policy one of cooperation, or to divide it into discrete rounds and label the initial American behavior as defection? And if the Soviets have been conciliatory in order to weaken the West, and will ultimately return to an uncooperative stance from an improved position, should the policy not be characterized as defection? A simpler version of this ambiguity is revealed in the Cuban missile crisis. This episode is often considered an American victory; in fact, *mutual* cooperation greatly increased in the months that followed. If we take an even longer perspective, however, we might label the outcome as mutual defection, because of the Soviet arms build-up that was caused partly by the humiliation in Cuba. In game theory or in the laboratory, we can define what each play of the game is. But in the situations we are trying to analyze, these distinctions, and the answer to the question whether the behavior is seen as cooperative or not, are subjective if not artificial.

In other cases, the very meaning of cooperation is unclear. It usually denotes doing what the other actor prefers, but how do we characterize a response that is undesired but is designed to benefit the other, and/or has that effect? How do we classify behavior when one side desires a high degree of friction with the other and the other responds with the sought-for hostility? What do we say about cases in which neither side thinks about the impact on the other? Does the notion of defection imply something more than, or different from, noncooperation? The labels may squeeze out much of the reality that we are trying to catch. A recent example displays several of these ambiguities. In April 1986, the United States asked East Germany to restrict the travel of Libyan diplomats who might be aiding terrorism in the West. In response—or what they asserted to be response—the East Germans demanded that all diplomats except those of Britain, France, and the U.S. show their passports as they

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crossed from East to West Berlin. (Previously, only special passes issued by the East German Foreign Ministry had been required.) The U.S. took this action, not as cooperation, but as "a clearly unfriendly negative act that is intended to undermine the four-power status" of Berlin.[42] This interpretation is not unreasonable, but neither is it compelled by the facts.

The problem of the subjective and political nature of definitions of cooperation is compounded in the cold war because the two sides have very different perspectives. Most Americans think about cooperating with the U.S.S.R. to maintain the status quo or to bring about mutually beneficial changes, particularly in arms control. But the Soviets not only consider the status quo in the sense of the current distribution of influence as disadvantageous, but believe that it cannot be maintained because it is being moved by the forces of history. Thus, for the Soviets, CC consists of managing the changes in a peaceful way. While the United States would steadily lose ground, the Soviets argue that Washington should accept this process because the alternative would be even worse.[43]

Even when such problems are absent, it is easy to overlook the fact that what is deemed a defection is in part rule-governed. The United States—and most of the world—considered the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba in 1962 as strongly noncooperative; the Soviet arms build-up of the late 1960s, which had a much greater influence on the military balance, was seen as less of a defection. Although what Waltz calls "internal balancing" may not be welcomed by others, it is accepted as a normal part of international politics. It is seen as legitimate; indeed, coercive attempts to block it would be perceived as illegitimate and highly threatening. These distinctions cannot be understood by measuring the objective harm done to the state. The fact that the actors usually give little thought to the rules does not reduce their importance in defining the crucial concepts we use.

Some of these difficulties are summarized by the question a student raised when I played a version of multiperson Prisoners' Dilemma in class: what, she asked, are we to cooperate *about*? For decision makers, the question is never cooperation or defection, but rather what goals to seek and the tactics that will be most apt to reach them. Of course it is not illegitimate to impose our categories on the behavior of actors—and the notions of cooperation and defection are hardly foreign to them—but

[42] James Markham, "Allied Diplomats Defy East German Controls," *New York Times*, May 28, 1986. For parallel discussion of an important case in the late 18th century, see Paul Schroeder, "Old Wine in New Bottles: Recent Contributions to British Foreign Policy and European International Politics, 1789-1848," *Journal of British Studies* 26 (January 1987), 10.

[43] See Garthoff (fn. 36), 38-50, 1069. The Japanese had a similar conception of cooperation with the British in China in the 1930s: see Paul Haggie, *Britannia at Bay* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 126.

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when actors define their problems and choices quite differently from the theoretical model, we may be forcing disparate behavior into an inappropriate framework.

Offense and Defense

Questions can also be raised about the concepts of offense and defense. Both logic and evidence indicate that the prospects for cooperation are increased to the extent that defensive military systems and strategies can be distinguished from, and are stronger than, offensive ones.[44] In principle, the difference between offense and defense is clear: the former involves the ability to attack the other and seize his territory; the latter the ability to repel such an attack and protect one's own territory. The issue of whether attacking or defending is preferable comes down to whether a decision maker who believed that war was inevitable would prefer to attack the other side, as in 1914, or be on the defensive while the other side attacked—which, as the history of World War I shows, would have been a better strategy.[45]

But questions arise. Even if it is possible to say whether the offense or the defense has the advantage, can one distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and strategies? Much of the interwar disarmament efforts were devoted to doing so. The fact that statesmen worked hard on this question indicates that they believed that a positive answer was attainable; that such efforts yield success only occasionally indicates that the endeavor may be doomed—although in the interwar case the reason may have been the refusal to forgo offensive options rather than the inability to make the relevant distinctions. Similarly, George Downs and his colleagues find that arms races are not terminated by the shift to defensive systems[46]—which indicates that statesmen are either unwilling or unable to avoid threatening others while seeking to maximize their own security.

Can the concepts of offense and defense be applied to nuclear weapons? A frequent argument is that the common-sense definitions have to be turned on their heads. That is, offense is the ability to take one's cities out of hostage; conversely, the ability to destroy the other side's population and other values, previously associated with the offense, is now con-

[44] See Jervis (fn. 1), at 186-214; George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977); Jack Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), 219-38; Van Evera (fns. 28 and 29); Snyder (fn. 29); Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Weber and Drell (fn. 39).

[45] See the literature cited in fn. 29 above.

[46] Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 19).

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sidered defensive (as long as the other side has a similar capability) because such an act could be credibly threatened only as retaliation for the other's attack. The obvious implications are that superpower strategies designed to deter war by developing counterforce capabilities exacerbate the security dilemma and make cooperation more difficult, and that countervalue targeting would permit mutual security. But such paradoxical reasoning has not been accepted by all analysts, with the result that there is no consensus about how the concepts fit the current situation.

Even if the distinction between offense and defense works, at least to some extent, in the military arena, can it be transferred to other dimensions of international relationships?[47] To find the answer, one would have to ask under which conditions bandwagoning as opposed to balancing is likely to take place.[48] The former dynamics make the offensive potent; the latter support the defensive. When initial gains are expected to create positive feedback, each state will have strong incentives to defect, irrespective of whether its ultimate intentions are aggressive; moving first may endanger the other, but it is necessary in order to protect the state. As a result, mutual restraint will be difficult to maintain even if both sides are satisfied with the status quo. By contrast, when balancing prevails and gains by one side call up counteracting pressures, states can afford to await developments, making major efforts only on the relatively rare occasions when another power poses a direct threat. Cooperation should thus be more prevalent when bandwagoning is neither feared nor hoped for.

The most obvious example of bandwagoning—or at least the expectation of it—is the "domino theory." When a defeat in one country is expected to have major and deleterious consequences for the state's influence in other areas, then even minor threats must be met swiftly and firmly. On the other hand, when one side believes that the other side's local victory is likely to be contained—for example, by the efforts of neighbors who are alarmed by the new threat—then it can afford to try cooperating with the other because the costs of being taken advantage of are relatively low. The political defensive is potent; the security dilemma

[47] For one effort at doing so, see Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 58-79, at 62-64. For a further discussion, see Jervis, "Cooperation Under Anarchy: Problems and Limitations," in Alker and Ashley (fn. 1).

[48] Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers (fn. 21), 122-24; Waltz (fn. 24), 125-28; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985), 3-43, and *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., *Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Asian Rimland*, forthcoming.

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is ameliorated; and a state can gain a high degree of protection without proportionately undermining the interests of its adversary.

Arguments like these need much more development before we can be sure that the distinction between offense and defense is possible and helpful in the political arena. What we have so far are essentially exploratory probes; the results, while suggestive, are hardly definitive. Furthermore, we have not even tried to apply such an extension to the realm of international economic relations.

The Nature of Power

A third conceptual difficulty is created by the fact that in many encounters the main stake is power—a notoriously difficult concept. But in almost all formulations, power in international politics is relative rather than absolute.[49] When states think about the possibility of an armed conflict, they have to judge how their forces compare to those of their adversaries; the absolute sizes of the forces on each side are irrelevant. This is true for many political conflicts as well. Knowing how much leverage one state has over another tells statesmen and analysts very little unless they also know how much leverage the other state has. Thus, it can be rational for statesmen to act in ways that reduce the absolute level of benefits they receive.

This view is not only compatible with Realism, but is embedded in it. But it shows that, as long as power is central, an element of inherent conflict will be involved, thus complicating statesmen's attempts to establish cooperation and undercutting some of the prescriptions that can be deduced from the anarchy framework. When states care primarily about maximizing their power advantage and not about absolute gains and losses, many of the strategies and conditions that should lead to cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma no longer produce this result.[50] Thus Robert

[49] Nuclear weapons may have changed this, as is indicated by the title and essays in Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).

[50] The implications of the fact that states often seek relative rather than absolute gains have been discussed by Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984), 355-86. Also see Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: *The Evolution of Cooperation* and International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), 176-77, and Joseph Grieco, "Distributional Uncertainty and the Realist Problem of International Cooperation," paper presented to the 1986 APSA meeting. For a discussion of the issues and a summary of the experimental literature, see Deborah Larson, "Game Theory and the Psychology of Reciprocity" (unpub., Columbia University), 25-31. More generally, Fred Hirsch, in *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), brilliantly demonstrates that many goods in society are "positional"—that is, they are inherently competitive. Only a few people can be at the top of an established hierarchy of power or prestige. Certain goods—such as living in an uncrowded area—cannot be shared with large numbers of others. More fundamentally, in many aspects of life we judge how well we are doing by comparing ourselves to others.

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Axelrod points to the irony that the strategy of reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) that proves so effective in computer tournaments of PD can never win any individual game.[51] The strategy works well, however, because it accumulates large numbers of points when matched against fellow cooperators and is not terribly badly exploited when matched against more competitive strategies. But if the main rewards in international politics are for relative gains, a strategy that can, at best, only tie will not be attractive.[52]

The conditions under which states seek to maximize their relative as opposed to their absolute gains need more exploration.[53] These concerns are likely to be greater in the security area than in international economics, but they are present in the latter as well, especially because military and economic strengths are closely linked. Third-world states often seek greater economic equality with the developed countries as well as absolute economic growth. Furthermore, the drive to increase their political power vis-à-vis the developed states would make relative gains even more important.[54]

Even among allies, concern for relative gains is rarely completely absent. For example, would the United States gain or lose (or both) if Japan made new breakthroughs in microelectronics? The U.S. would benefit by importing better goods, but would fall further behind Japan in various technologies. This, in turn, might enable Japan to keep widening the productivity gap with America. More than national pride is involved, especially since no one can guarantee that Japan will maintain its political orientation in the future. Indeed, Stein has shown that the "hegemon's dilemma" operates in the economic arena because a dominant state that cares only about absolute gains is more likely to be overtaken by other powers.[55] Aaron Friedberg has similarly demonstrated the importance of this issue in the debate about the decline of Britain's economic power at the turn of the century. Those who were least concerned stressed the continuing growth of the British economy; those who felt the situation was dangerous concentrated on the fact that other economies were growing even faster.[56]

[51] Axelrod (fn. 1).

[52] See the discussion of strategies in Axelrod's computer tournament in Roy Behr, "Nice Guys Finish Last—Sometimes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (June 1981), 289-300.

[53] The relevant literature from experimental psychology is summarized in Larson (fn. 50), 28-29.

[54] See Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[55] Stein (fn. 50).

[56] Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1988), chap. 2.

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Waltz's argument raises similar difficulties. He denies that states seek to maximize either absolute or relative power. Instead, they try to maximize their security.[57] But since the state's security can be influenced—positively or negatively, depending on the situation—by the power and security of others, this concept is likely to be inherently interactive. Unlike the desire to maximize relative gains, this may increase cooperation, but the result still will complicate the standard proto-game theory formulations.

Perceptions, Values, and Self-Interest

The final set of problems concerns psychology, beliefs, and values. In increasing order of conceptual difficulty, the issues are the psychological impediments to cooperation, the role of values and the autonomy of beliefs, and the question of whether narrow self-interest can explain most international behavior. Realism has generally ignored the decision-making level of analysis; game theory can incorporate the empirical findings in this area only at the cost of parsimony and a revision of many current conclusions. To understand when cooperation occurs, we need to see how different beliefs and values can affect the actors' evaluation of the outcomes. A related question is whether self-interest is defined coolly and atomistically or is driven by passions and care for what happens to others. If the latter is the case, the important factors will be outside of, if not denied by, the anarchy framework.

Psychological Impediments to Cooperation

Robert Keohane has noted that cooperation may be explained in part by the fact that people can operate with only bounded rationality; statesmen need to conserve cognitive resources, and shared norms and principles can be extremely useful in easing the burdens of prediction, choice, and coordination.[58] But cooperation is decreased by other aspects of the way people think. People do not mechanically reciprocate conciliation and defection. Instead, their behavior is mediated by their analysis of what the other did and why it did it. The interpretation of others' action is rarely self-evident, but it is almost always important. Most behavior is ambiguous; even more so are the underlying intentions. Since actors' responses are linked to their predictions of how the other will react to alternative policies they can pursue, their attributions of the causes of the

[57] Waltz (fn. 24); see also Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 334.

[58] Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 110-32.

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other's behavior will be crucial. Thus, how they react is influenced by their inferences as to whether the other intended the results that were produced and whether the behavior is best explained by the transient situation the other was in or by its enduring dispositions.[59] Furthermore, since international politics is an interactive process, a statesman's understanding of the other's behavior is influenced by how he thinks his own state is behaving toward the other. Indeed, perhaps the most important psychological factor that interferes with cooperation is that statesmen—and people in their everyday lives—greatly underestimate the extent to which their actions threaten or harm others. They think they are cooperating when an objective observer would say that they are, at least to some extent, defecting.

Part of the reason is that most statesmen are only dimly aware of the security dilemma. When they are peaceful, they think that their intentions are clear and that others will not be threatened by the measures they are taking in their own self-defense. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle once said that if we are in doubt about Soviet intentions, we should buy arms: if the Soviets are aggressive, the build-up will be needed, and if they are not, the only consequence will be wasted money. Similarly, when U.N. troops were moving toward the Yalu, Secretary of State Acheson stated that there was no danger that the Chinese would intervene out of self-defense because they understood that the U.S. was not a threat to them.[60]

Statesmen who think well of themselves generally believe that their actions are compatible with the reasonable interests of others. For example, Raymond Garthoff shows that, during the period of detente, Americans—leaders and general public alike—believed that their country was restrained and cooperative toward the U.S.S.R.; actually, the U.S. continued to seek unilateral advantage by freezing its adversary out of the Middle East, courting China, and developing advanced military technology.[61] As a result of this faulty self-image, any hostile reaction by the adversary is likely to seem unprovoked.

This problem is compounded by a second and better-known bias: states tend to overestimate the hostility of others and will often see as de-

[59] For further discussion of the inference processes and evidence of their importance drawn from experiments and case studies, see Jervis (fn. 14), 32-48, and Larson (fn. 50).

[60] Daniel Yergin, " 'Scoop' Jackson Goes for Broke," *Atlantic Monthly* 233 (June 1974), 81. (The same error is made, even more crudely, by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1988* [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987], 16.) Acheson's views are presented in John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1965), 97. Similar examples are discussed in Jervis (fn. 14), 67-76, and Seaborg (fn. 12), 30-31.

[61] Garthoff (fn. 36). Also see Van Evera's discussion (fn. 28) of the role of nationalism in preventing statesmen from objectively gauging the behavior of their own states.

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fection actions that a disinterested observer would record as at least partly cooperative. Dulles's view of Khrushchev's arms cuts in the mid-1950s is one such example; Reagan's view of most Soviet arms proposals may be another.[62]

These two biases often operate simultaneously, with the result that each side is likely to believe that it is cooperating and that the other has responded by defecting. Thus, the United States says that while it has been restrained, the Soviet Union has accumulated many more arms than it needs for deterrence. The Soviets probably have a similar perception of the American defense posture and may think they have limited their own arms. The breakdown of detente reveals the same pattern of perceptions (although that may not provide the primary explanation for the inability of the superpowers to maintain cooperation). To take just one example, when Brezhnev told Nixon in the spring of 1973 that the status quo in the Middle East was unacceptable, and when Gromyko later warned that "the fire of war [in the Middle East] could break out onto the surface at any time," they may well have thought that they were fulfilling their obligations under the Basic Principles Agreement to consult in the event of a threat to peace. The Americans perceived the Soviets to be making threats and, by failing to restrain the Arabs or to notify the U.S. of the impending attack, to be violating the spirit of detente.[63] The same effect often appears during bargaining when each side thinks that the concessions it has made are greater than those it has received.[64]

Furthermore, when statesmen realize that the other side has cooperated, they often believe that it did not have much choice. Thus, decision makers underestimate the ability of others to defect, and therefore frequently believe, incorrectly, that they can get away with some exploitation. This factor played a role in the deterioration of the recent detente as well as in the cooling of relations between England and France in the 1840s.[65] The Soviet Union in the 1970s, and both sides in the earlier in-

[62] See the classic essay by Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia," in David Finlay, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 25-96. Michael Sullivan, *International Relations: Theories and Evidence* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 45-46, questions the links between Dulles's beliefs and American behavior, however.

[63] Gromyko is quoted in Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 68. The treatment of the 1973 war is a good litmus test for one's views on detente: compare, for example, the discussions in Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 4; Garthoff (fn. 36), chap. 11; and Alexander George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), chap. 7.

[64] For experimental support for this proposition, see Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, "Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37 (March 1979), 322-36.

[65] Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot, and the Collapse of the Entente Cordial* (London: Athlone, 1974), 81, 93.

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stance, thought they could safely act against the other side's interests because they exaggerated the constraints inhibiting the rival's retaliation.

Because of biases like these, analyses that assume both sides to be perceiving each other accurately are likely to be incorrect; strategies that are based on this assumption are likely to be ineffective. Axelrod shows that the strategy of Tit-for-Tat works quite well when there is a one-percent error rate in the correct identification of the other's behavior.[66] But such a figure is drastically lower than that which can be expected in political interactions; George Downs and his colleagues have shown that when the error rate is higher, this strategy is not likely to yield stable cooperation.[67] It is partly for this reason that Larson argues that Charles Osgood's GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction), which makes a major effort to break through the adversary's perceptual biases, may induce more cooperation than Tit-for-Tat.[68] Strategies that are not tightly conditional on what the other does, and that do not require immediate and matching reciprocation, may produce a change in the other's attitudes, and so may be more effective than game-theoretic analyses would suggest. Strict reciprocity may fare less well than expected. Put in slightly different terms, cognitive biases decrease transparency, thus making regimes harder to establish and maintain.

Cooperation is more likely to come about when actors correct for these conflict-inducing biases or are willing to tolerate a higher level of perceived cheating by the other side. But such conditions and strategies also increase the chances that the other side will, in fact, cheat. One of the reasons why Israel was taken by surprise in 1973 was that its decision makers were highly sensitive to the security dilemma and believed that the most probable cause of war would be Egyptian preemption growing out of an incorrect belief that Israel was about to strike. They therefore interpreted Egypt's behavior preceding the war as evidence, not that Egypt was defecting, but that its decision makers thought Israel might be planning to do so. As a result, Israel did not respond by increasing its own military readiness.[69] The problems of misperception thus heighten the statesman's dilemma in deciding whether to cooperate or not.

[66] Axelrod (fn. 1), 182-83.

[67] Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 19), 133-34. Also see Jonathan Bendor, "In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World," *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (August 1987), 531-58. Downs and Rocke discuss the implications of this finding in "Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 297-325.

[68] Deborah Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987), 30-34.

[69] Janice Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 60-88. This is part of the broader difficulty statesmen face in deciding whether the other side is an aggressor who must

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Strategies that are robust in the face of misperception are extremely valuable, but it is far from certain that they exist.[70] Stable cooperation is most likely to result when the decision makers' preconceptions provide an accurate fit with what the other side is like; that may be as much the product of luck, however, as of sensitivity and statesmanship. It is clearly important to determine the extent to which strategies that would work well when information is accurate can also serve in a world permeated by ambiguity and strong perceptual and decision-making biases. Neither scholars' analyses nor statesmen's policies can safely be based on the assumption that either side understands the other.

Beliefs and Values

Expected utilities are the valuation an actor places on a course of action or outcome; they involve both estimates of consequences and judgments about intrinsic worth. Contrary to the implications of many Realist writings, these estimates and judgments are not objective, and they should not be accepted without investigating their formation, as is done in most of the work on game theory and anarchy. In many cases, what is crucial in determining whether the actors cooperate is their beliefs about the effectiveness of alternative policies—beliefs that often prove to be either lacking in evidentiary support before the fact and/or wrong after the fact. The most obvious and consequential example is the great exaggeration by decision makers of the efficacy of the offensive before World War I, which meant that a crisis was likely to lead to war.

The general question raised by this case is the extent to which (and the circumstances under which) the main impediments to cooperation are rooted in potentially malleable beliefs about the situation rather than in its structure.[71] For example, many historians have argued that there could have been much greater cooperation between Britain and Russia in the 19th century if the former had not greatly exaggerated the hostility and capability of the latter.[72] More generally, decision makers are often un-

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be met with firmness (if not force), or a more reasonable state that can be conciliated or, to use the older term, appeased. See Jervis (fn. 14), chap. 3.

[70] *Ibid.*, 109-13; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is there a Way Out?" in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 69), 180-202.

[71] See Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), 357-405; Robert Rothstein (fn. 37); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 359-60, 373-75; Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1941," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 69).

[72] See, for example, Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War?* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985), and R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question* (New York: Norton, 1972).

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aware of the security dilemma, and therefore act in ways that compound it. Is it possible to alter such perceptions, and thus alter behavior? One reason why the Kennedy and Carter administrations were favorably predisposed toward arms control was that many of the top officials believed that arms races were often driven by action-reaction cycles. Similarly, can perceptions of the relative efficacy of offense and defense be altered without changing technology? If military leaders are driven to favor the offensive because of organizational interests, and if civilian leaders are also disposed to underestimate the power of the defensive,[73] then perhaps the security dilemma and the resulting DD is more a creature of biases and domestic interests than of the structure of the international system.

This question arises with the current concern that World War III is most likely to start through "crisis instability" approximating that which prevailed in 1914. The vulnerability of command, control, and communications facilities might lead statesmen to believe that, even though any nuclear war would be dreadful, there would be real advantages to striking first if the choice were between doing so and being attacked. On closer examination, however, it does not appear that even a well-executed first strike would greatly reduce damage to the state; so the danger of crisis instability may lie less in the objective situation than in decision makers' incorrect beliefs.[74]

Most theorists who use the framework of anarchy take for granted not only people's instrumental beliefs but also the values that they place on outcomes. Although we realize that how the Prisoners' Dilemma is played—and indeed, whether it is a dilemma at all—is deeply influenced by the value each actor puts on the other's well-being,[75] scholars know little about the processes by which this evaluation is established and by which it can change. It is a central tenet in international politics that people value the security and well-being of their own state more than they do that of others. The self is defined as the national self. But this need not

[73] Snyder (fn. 29); Posen (fn. 44).

[74] For a further discussion, see Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 126-29; Jervis, "Psychological Aspects of Crisis Stability," in Jervis, *The Implications of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming); Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).

[75] Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2 (December 1958), 265-79; Deutsch, "The Effect of Motivational Orientation upon Trust and Suspicion," *Human Relations* 13 (May 1960), 123-39. Similarly, rational choice analyses of politicians' behavior would yield very different results if it were assumed that the value being maximized was the individual's economic prospects rather than his power or votes. We would then expect politicians to cater to popular or constituency interests only to amass enough power that could be efficiently traded upon for pecuniary gain.

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be true forever. It may be in the nature of human beings to put first their own well-being and that of others who carry their genes, but it is not inevitable that people will always care more about the fates of those on their side of a national border than they do about similar individuals on the other side.[76]

The issue is often put in terms of self-interest versus altruism, but it may be more useful to think of how the self is defined. Why should our attitudes toward others be based on their geographic location rather than on the values they hold?[77] Shared values can be one reason for national identity, but any individual can have more in common with many people in other countries than with many in his or her own. (Indeed, how Americans regard fellow-nationals seems less determined by their race and ethnicity than by the extent to which they share their values.)[78] Similarly, Alker and Sherman stress the importance of the "scope and depth of insecurity-relevant normative integration" in the international system as a determinant of foreign policy.[79]

The degree of value integration, and therefore the scope of the definition of the relevant self, may sometimes be larger than we assume. Statesmen usually like to present themselves as "hard-headed" and as caring almost exclusively about their own country. But policy is in fact often driven by motives that are hard for Realists to accommodate. For example, how can we explain the fact that the United States did not conquer Canada sometime in the past hundred years?[80] A Realist account would

[76] Some observers have attributed the relative lack of concern in the home country for the German hostages taken in Beirut in January 1987 to the weak German national identity. See James Markham, "West Germans Low-Key About Abductions," *New York Times*, January 19, 1987. Compare the reaction of Japan, a country some describe as "a huge tribal society," in a similar situation: Clyde Haberman, "Japan Outraged at Manila Abduction of Executive," *New York Times*, February 15, 1987.

[77] This question is an ancient one and can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle's advice that Alexander distinguish among his subjects according to whether they were Greeks or non-Greeks rather than according to their personal, individual characteristics; see *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed. and trans. by Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 388. For an attempt to use sociobiology to explain national loyalty, see R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, "Ethnic Mobilization and the Seeds of Warfare: An Evolutionary Perspective," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (March 1987), 21-26.

[78] Milton Rokeach and Louis Mezei, "Race and Shared Belief in Social Choice," *Science* 151 (January 1966), 167-72; Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968). Similarly, in the view of the Ottomans, "the community of true believers, . . . not the state, constitutes the basic Muslim policy, transcending all boundaries." See Thomas Naff, "The Ottoman Empire and the European States System," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 143.

[79] Hayward Alker, Jr., and Frank Sherman, "Collective Security-Seeking Practices Since 1945," in Daniel Frei, ed., *Managing International Crises* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 141-44. This essay draws on the work of Karl Deutsch, esp. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[80] William T.R. Fox, *A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

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be strained, having to conjure up power-based disincentives that are hard to find. American cooperation is better explained by focusing on value integration in three senses. First, the use of force is negatively valued by most Americans unless the object is to remove a menace to American security or to establish a democratic regime. Second, many values are shared between citizens of Canada and of the United States. Even if conquest would have given the U.S. greater wealth or security, the fact that Canadian society resembles American means that most of what we want to see in a country is already in place in Canada. Third, largely because of the common values between the two countries, Americans prize the well-being of Canadians. Thus, using force against them would, by constituting an offense against Canadians, diminish the utilities of Americans as well.

Common and conflicting values also help to explain whom a state will offer to protect and whom it will oppose.[81] Karl Deutsch and his colleagues stress the role of the "compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units" in the formation of what they call security-communities—i.e., groups of nations among whom war is unthinkable.[82] This factor is also important in less drastic forms of cooperation. The American commitment to Europe—and still more, to Israel—cannot be accounted for apart from the common heritage and values that make Americans care about the fates of these peoples. Security considerations are insufficient to explain American ties, which would be deeply affected if Europe or Israel were to become fascist. Similarly, American opposition to communism in the third world is based not only on national security concerns, but also on an identification with human beings in other countries whom we do not want to live under tyranny.[83] It may then be quite wrong to see Realpolitik as the source of the decision to fight in Vietnam and to dismiss as cant the desire to save that country from misery. Is it an accident that the proponents of the war were wrong in their predictions of widespread "domino effects" of an American defeat, but were correct in their argument that millions of people in Indochina would suffer or die from a North Vietnamese victory?

The most far-reaching changes in international politics involve changes in national goals and values. Japan is now a much more suitable partner for cooperation than it was in the 1930s, and not only because ter-

[81] For a discussion of the role of ideology in alliances, see Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* (New York: Wiley, 1973), and Walt (fn. 48), 18-26.

[82] Deutsch (fn. 79), 46.

[83] For discussions of this argument, see Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 244-50; George Quester, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

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ritorial expansion is neither possible nor economically necessary. Something has occurred that is more basic than changes in instrumental beliefs. Rabid nationalism and the drive to dominate have been transmuted. A Japanese nationalist of the 1930s who saw his country today would be horrified, as Mishima was. Because it took a cataclysm to produce such a change, this pattern does not provide an attractive route to a more cooperative world. But it does show both the importance and the mutability of values.

A less dramatic alteration may be a more hopeful model. In the late 1960s, West Germans came to accept the existence of the East German regime. The division of the country, while still deeply regretted, was no longer completely intolerable. With the territorial status quo generally accepted, tensions and the danger of war were reduced, and cooperation in the form of the Quadripartite and the Helsinki Agreements became possible.

In Realism, values are generally taken as unproblematic and constant; they are givens in game-theoretic studies. Thus, although analysis within the framework of anarchy can produce accurate results, it may make our treatment excessively static and distract us from important questions. How values are developed, maintained, and changed may be crucial to international politics, and may strongly influence the extent of cooperation; it is a matter, however, that cannot be explained within the anarchy framework.

Norms: Is Narrow Self-interest Enough? Hatred and Norms

Utilities can reflect passions as well as interests. Considerations of theoretical parsimony speak for ignoring greed, hatred, and envy, as well as morality and self-sacrifice; but that does not mean that such motives are absent in the world. Witness Lord Salisbury's analysis of Prussia's demands on France in 1870 (which, it can be argued, laid the foundations for World War I):

> Unless [the Germans] enjoy the pleasing sensation of witnessing the mortification of France, they will think that the objects of the war are only half-attained. . . . [I]t is revenge that they desire: not a strategic frontier, or the recovery of lost "brothers"—but terms of peace which shall drive the iron well into their enemy's soul.[84]

These are the sort of impulses that older Realist scholars from Thucydides to Morgenthau warn of. They lead to destructive policies and are dif-

[84] Lord Robert Salisbury, "Count Bismarck's Circular Letters to Foreign Courts, 1870," *The Quarterly Review* 129 (October 1870), 553. I am grateful to Marc Trachtenberg for pointing me to this article.

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ficult to theorize about. Although Realism recognizes that cool, narrow self-interest may fail to guide behavior, it provides few grounds for predicting when it will fail or what behavior will follow if it does.

A related issue is the role of norms in furthering cooperation. In one sense, norms indicate behavior that is expected, standard, or normal. In another sense, they indicate behavior that is approved and valued positively.[85] But when do norms in the first sense become norms in the second sense? If they do not, can they really produce a great deal of cooperation? One of the themes of the anarchy literature, of course, is that narrow self-interest is sufficient under many conditions, but the evidence is not very strong and the conditions may be very restrictive.[86] For example, many scholars have argued that in the balance of power, stability can arise out of the interplay of the states' narrow national interests in survival and expansion. The results are not always peaceful, but they do maintain the system. Paul Schroeder's fascinating historical studies deny that this is an accurate picture of European balance-of-power politics, however. He argues that mediating structures of smaller states, a common understanding of international law, and a shared sense of the appropriate behavior were required if war was not to grow from a tool of statecraft to the dominating fact of international politics.[87]

In tracing much of the cause of World War I to the decline in Austria's position, Schroeder points to Britain: although it had a great stake in the

[85] Kratochwil and Ruggie argue that our standard methodology is inappropriate for verifying the existence of norms in the latter sense because pointing to instances in which norms are violated does not establish that they do not exist or are not important. See Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986), 766-69. A more general treatment of norms along these lines is Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1988).

[86] This question is raised, among other places, in Alker's analyses of how people play and think about Prisoners' Dilemma in the laboratory. See Hayward Alker, Jr., and Roger Hurwirtz, "Resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas" (unpub., M.I.T.); Alker, "Reflective Resolutions of Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas," presented at the meeting of the Society for General Systems Research, May 30, 1985; and Alker, "From Quantity to Quality: A New Research Program on Resolving Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas," presented at the 1985 meeting of the American Political Science Association. The incentives and settings of laboratory situations are so different from those operating in international politics, however, that it is far from clear that these experiments tell us much that can be directly transferred.

[87] See the following essays, all by Schroeder: "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System," *International History Review* 6 (February 1984), 1-27; "Containment Nineteenth-Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 82 (Winter 1983), 1-18; "World War I as Galloping Gertie," *Journal of Modern History* 44 (September 1972), 319-45; "The Nineteenth-Century Balance of Power: Language and Theory," paper delivered at the 1977 meeting of the American Political Science Association; "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics* 39 (October 1986), 1-26. Also see Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations," *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1982), 1-30.

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status quo and in avoiding conflict, it never acted to limit or control dangerous shifts in the Balkans. Others also failed to maintain the necessary balance, although their behavior was logical to the extent that they were willing to tolerate a high risk of war. After showing how much Austria was weakened by Rumania's realignment in 1913, Schroeder stresses that despite its importance,

> no government addressed itself to the most obvious and critical question of all: how was this new, crucial development to be managed? How, that is, could it be harmonized with the overall European balance, incorporated into the prevailing international system without raising the already fearful strains to the point of explosion? No one thought about this problem or suggested doing anything about it.[88]

Without conscious management—without at least some states seeking the common interest of the members of the system—stability, peace, and the best interests of the individual states could not be maintained. A similar argument was made by Lord Salisbury, later to become Foreign Secretary, when he criticized the refusal of the British government to counteract the harsh terms Prussia imposed on defeated France:

> If [the leaders'] intention is . . . to draw all the profit they can from the arrangements of the greater international republic, and yet to bear no share of the cost and dangers of its government, we doubt not that they are preparing themselves for a severe condemnation from the English people. We only trust that they are not also preparing for England the national doom that always waits for the selfish and timid.[89]

A parallel point arises from one of Axelrod's computer simulations. He finds that stable cooperation is much more likely to occur when actors follow "metanorms" that call for punishing those who fail to enforce norms. In other words, actors must not only be prepared to punish those who defect, but also to act against those who fail to punish them.[90] In the same way, cooperation can be powerfully reinforced by injunctions to help others, or at least to limit the harm done to them. Thus "although prescriptive morality is not usually expressed in laws, in a number of Eu-

[88] Paul Schroeder, "Romania and the Great Powers before 1914," *Revue Roumaine D'Histoire* 14 (No. 1, 1975), 52-53. As Schroeder puts it in "World War I as Galloping Gertie": "Everyone wanted a payoff; no one wanted to pay" (fn. 87), 345.

[89] Salisbury (fn. 84), 556. During the Eastern Crisis of 1877, William Gladstone asked: "What is to be the consequence to civilisation and humanity, to public order, if British interests are to be the rule for British agents all over the world, and are to be for them the measure of right or wrong?" (Quoted in Seton-Watson, fn. 72, p. 69.) For a related general argument, see Armatya Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavior Foundations of Economic Theory," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (Summer 1977), 326-41.

[90] Robert Axelrod, "Modeling the Evolution of Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1095-1111.

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ropean countries and now also in some [American] states . . . , helping others in certain kinds of extreme need is required by law."[91]

Applying the same reasoning, Robert Trivers argues that evolution should select for people who reciprocate altruism. Emotions such as anger at those who do not reciprocate, and guilt over one's own cheating are also functional because they bolster reciprocity. Short-run calculations might lead people to ignore the transgressions of others (or to reply to them only mildly), or to shirk reparations when they have been caught cheating. But over the long run, such behavior is destructive. Disproportionate retribution for cheating, called up by anger, can induce future compliance: "it seems plausible . . . that the emotion of guilt has been selected for in humans partly in order to motivate the cheater to compensate his misdeed and . . . thus to prevent the rupture of reciprocal relationships." Because these emotions may sustain long-run cooperation more than calculation would,

> selection may favor distrusting those who perform altruistic acts without the emotional basis of generosity or guilt because the altruistic tendencies of such individuals may be less reliable in the future. One can imagine, for example, compensating for a misdeed without any emotional basis but with a calculating, self-serving motive. Such an individual should be distrusted because the calculating spirit that leads this subtle cheater now to compensate may in the future lead him to cheat when circumstances seem more advantageous.[92]

The issue is by no means closed. It is possible that narrow self-interest may be able to explain most instances of cooperation in the absence of binding authority. But we should note that in Gouldner's classic article, reciprocity is not only a common empirical pattern and a way out of a dilemma; it is also a moral imperative: "people *should* help those who have helped them."[93] Such a sense of obligation—if shared—may well

[91] Ervin Staub, *Positive Social Behavior and Morality*, I (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 3.

[92] Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," *Quarterly Journal of Biology* 46 (March 1971), 50-51. On p. 52, Trivers anticipates Axelrod's arguments about metanorms. A similar argument about deterrence is made by Dean Pruitt, "Some Relationships Between Interpersonal and International Conflict," in Axelrod et al. (fn. 3).

[93] Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," *American Sociological Review* 25 (April 1960), 169-71 (emphasis added); also see Larson (fn. 50), 20-22. For a nice summary of the normative hold of reciprocity, see Robert Cialdini, *Influence* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1985), 20-34, and especially the marvelous story on page 27. Staub notes that experiments indicate "that willingness to ask for help is reduced when people do not expect to have an opportunity to provide help in return" (fn. 91, p. 346). The reverse should have been found if rational calculation were the driving force. Also see Charles Kindleberger's review of *After Hegemony*, "Hierarchy vs. Inertial Cooperation," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986), 844-46.

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have great "practical value," as John Mackie notes.[94] Considerations of morality, fairness, and obligation are almost surely large parts of the explanation for the fact that individuals in society cooperate much more than the Prisoners' Dilemma would lead us to expect. Only economists behave as the theory says they should; others are likely to contribute to public goods, especially when they believe that fairness calls for them to do so.[95] Indeed, it is possible that morality provides the *only* way to reach many mutual cooperative outcomes. In part because of the tendency for people to be self-righteous and to see their own acts as cooperative and those of others as hostile, temptations and fears may produce mutually undesired outcomes as long as narrow self-interest is dominant. At a minimum, the feeling that one is morally obligated to reciprocate cooperation—and that others live under the same code—permits a wider range and scope for mutually beneficial exchanges. In fact, the actors may gain most when they do not regard the interaction as one of self-interested exchange at all. Even if this extreme is not approached (and it is not likely to be in international politics), without the power of at least some shared values, without some identification with the other, without norms that carry moral force, cooperation may be difficult to sustain.[96]

Conclusions

The queries and objections raised here are not all of the same type. Some are assertions that the anarchy framework leads us to concentrate

[94] John Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1977), 119-20; see also Keohane (fn. 58), 126-27, and Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), 20-24.

[95] Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames, "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?" *Journal of Public Economics* 15 (June 1981), 295-310. I am grateful to Joanne Gowa for referring me to this instructive article. Also see Charlan Nemeth, "A Critical Analysis of Research Utilizing the Prisoner's Dilemma Paradigm for the Study of Bargaining," in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, VI (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 203-34; Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," *Journal of Business* 59 (October 1986), S285-300; Sen (fn. 89). Transcripts of the deliberations during the Cuban missile crisis reveal President Kennedy's concern with perceived fairness: McGeorge Bundy, transcriber, and James Blight, editor, "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the meetings of the ExComm," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88), 30-92.

[96] In his presidential address to the Public Choice Society, Dennis Mueller made a similar point: contrary to the logic of PD, in these situations

> most of us choose the cooperative strategy most of the time. Why? Because we were taught to do so. . . . One is almost embarrassed to make these observations were it not that so many of us who work with rational egoist models continually build our models on assumptions that ignore these truisms from psychology and everyday life.

Mueller, "Rational Egoism vs. Adaptive Egoism as a Fundamental Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior," *Public Choice* 51 (No. 1, 1986), 5-6.

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on questions that are not central. That is true for the discussion of preferences. Even if my arguments about the importance of the preference orders and of changes in them are correct, the framework can still be applied, albeit at the cost of requiring us to treat as given what may be crucial and problematical. But if this objection is not fatal, it also applies more broadly to the use of game-theory models in general rather than to Prisoners' Dilemma in particular. Other problems complicate the picture. Basic concepts such as cooperation, offense, and power are not as straightforward as they appear in many analyses, and we may lose a great deal when we squeeze behavior into the categories the former two provide. Strong perceptual biases also undermine many of the central predictions derived from the PD. Although the national behavior that actually occurs is often consistent with the general Realist emphasis on conflict, the reasons are different from those stressed by this tradition. Game theory can accommodate both uncertainty and differences between the perceptions of the two sides,[97] but we must know what these perceptions are; they may be more important and difficult to understand than the resulting interaction. Problems that are even more fundamental arise if narrow self-interest is not the driving force behind national behavior: although game-theory models could be built around different premises, many of the Realist arguments about anarchy would be undermined.

While I have discussed the problems inherent in the anarchy framework, I have said little about its numerous strengths. To do so would be to recapitulate familiar arguments; but I do want to note that the framework is useful for reminding us that human action is often driven by the twin impulses of fear and temptation. It provides tools for analyzing how these impulses can be harnessed (if not tamed) in a way that leaves all parties better off. The concepts of anarchy and the security dilemma lead us to see that the international system not only permits conflict, but can create it: actors may refuse to cooperate with others, not so much because they seek the positive gains of exploitation, but because they fear that their own cooperative initiatives will be mistreated. For purposes of both analysis and prescription, the framework yields significant propositions on the conditions and strategies that increase the likelihood of cooperative behavior and outcomes. But its simplifications can be misleading, its assumptions require scrutiny, and it relegates many important questions to the background. Understanding and exploring both the uses of the approach and its limitations, without being overwhelmed by either, will lead to a better grasp of world politics.

[97] See, for example, John Harsany, "Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponent's Utility Function," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 (March 1962).

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TRADING PLACES: Industries for Free Trade

By HELEN MILNER*

Introduction

TODAY, protectionism is once again a central political issue in the United States. Pressures for protectionism have captured the national attention several times during the 20th century. In the 1920s, U.S. trade policy made a U-turn. Protectionism had declined from the Dingley tariff bill in 1897 until the Fordney-McCumber tariff law of 1922, as the average value of tariffs on dutiable goods fell from 45 percent to 28 percent.[1] But this downward trend was reversed during the 1920s: between 1922 and 1930, the United States closed its market dramatically, with tariffs attaining an ad valorem average of 53 percent.[2] This level, set by the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff, was one of the highest ever, and the highest so far in the 20th century.

Beginning in the 1930s, protectionism in the U.S. once again abated. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (R.T.A.A.), which was introduced in 1934 and served as a model for future trade acts, initiated the opening of the American market. Between 1934 and 1972, average U.S. tariff levels declined by some 70 percent.[3] By 1972, tariffs averaged a mere 9.9 percent.[4]

In the early 1970s, the course of U.S. trade policy again became a source of heated debate. Among the questions that were raised about the future of American trade policy was what direction trade policy would take in the 1970s and beyond. Many observers and scholars feared a resurgence of rapidly rising protectionism and international trade wars.[5] Extrapolat-

* I would like to thank David Baldwin, Jeffry Frieden, Stephen Haggard, Robert Keohane, and the participants at the Ford Foundation Conference on Blending Political and Economic Analysis of International Trade Policies for their helpful comments.

[1] Robert Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), Table 3, p. 78; David Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 517-43, Table 2, p. 534.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] U.S. Tariff Commission, *Trade Barriers: An Overview*, No. 665 (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1974), 81-82.

[4] Pastor (fn. 1), Table 6, p. 119.

[5] Harald Malmgren, "Coming Trade Wars?" *Foreign Policy* 1 (Winter 1970), 115-43; C. Fred Bergsten, "The Crisis in US Trade Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 49 (July 1971), 619-35; June

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ing from previous historical periods of rising and falling protectionism, these analysts expected the 1970s and 1980s to look much more like the 1920s than like the period between 1934 and 1970. In fact, the 1920s were offered frequently as the example for the decade after 1973. For many, the threat of a significant closure of the U.S. market evoked a repetition of the dismal interwar years.

In this article, I challenge that view of the current period. There were sizable differences in trade policy outcomes between the 1920s and the 1970s; these differences are puzzling because they belie the predictions of other theories. I maintain that a primary reason for these different policy outcomes was the growth of international economic interdependence after World War II. By the 1970s, the expansion of these international economic ties helped to dampen pressures for trade barriers as the preferences of industries turned against protectionism. Using evidence from a number of industries in the 1920s and the 1970s, I shall show how the internationalization of firms reduced their interest in protection even in difficult economic times, and thus helped the United States to resist protectionism in the 1970s.

The Puzzle

Two common elements, which distinguish the 1920s and the 1970s from the intervening years, seem central in this comparison between their trade policies. First, both the 1920s and the 1970s were times of serious economic distress and instability. Such difficult conditions have been seen as a key precondition for rising protectionist activity. One economist noted:

> It is generally agreed that in a modern industrial economy the cyclical state of the economy and the country's competitive position internationally are the principal determinants of the degree of protectionist pressure. Low levels of economic activity, high unemployment, unused capacity, trade deficits, rapid increases in imports, and increases in import penetration all op-

Kronholz, "Trade and Currency Wars Deepen the Depression," *Wall Street Journal*, October 23, 1979, p. 1.

Hegemonic stability theorists have also predicted such a resurgence. See Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), esp. 307-8; Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. 258-62. For more skeptical views, see Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 317-47; Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 131-62.

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erate to increase the temptation to protect domestic industries from import competition.[6]

Economic difficulties were similar in the two periods, which were marked by relatively high unemployment rates and sizable agricultural and industrial overcapacity. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the U.S. economy suffered two major downturns—one in 1920-1923 and one in 1929-1933. Price deflation, labor unrest, and international monetary problems created further economic instability.[7] In the 1970s, the U.S. economy experienced deep recessions during 1973-1975 and 1978-1982. Sparked by the oil shocks, these recessions were aggravated by rapidly shifting trade patterns, price instability, and a confused international monetary situation. These high levels of economic distress and instability that were felt in the 1920s and 1970s might be expected to generate similar widespread protection.

Indeed, in view of the absolute levels of economic distress during the two periods, the 1970s might have generated even greater levels of market closure than the 1920s.[8] The averages for three major economic indicators all are worse in the 1970s than in the 1920s, as Table 1 indicates.

TABLE 1
AVERAGES FOR THREE MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS
(percent)

	1923-1929	*1973-1979*
Average annual growth in real GNP	3.1	2.3
Average mean value of unemployment rate	3.5	6.8
Average value of non-residential fixed investment to GNP	11.2	10.2

All data from Feldstein (fn.7), 104-5.

[6] Wendy Takacs, "Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis," *Economic Inquiry* 19 (October 1981), 687-93, at 687. In general, see Timothy McKeown, "Firms and Tariff Regime Change: Explaining the Demand for Protectionism," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984), 215-33; Giulio Gallarotti, "Toward a Business Cycle Model of Tariffs," *International Organization* 39 (Winter 1985), 155-87; Susan Strange and Roger Tooze, eds., *The International Politics of Surplus Capacity* (London: Butterworths, 1980).

[7] W. Arthur Lewis, *Economic Survey, 1919-1939* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949); U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, various issues, 1919-1930 (Washington, DC: G.P.O.); U.S. Census Bureau, *Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to the Present* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1975); Kindleberger (fn. 5), esp. chaps. 5-8; League of Nations, *Economic Fluctuations in the U.S. and U.K., 1918-1942* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942); Martin Feldstein, ed., *The American Economy in Transition* (Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1980), 12.

[8] Sidney Ratner, James Soltow, and Richard Sylla, *The Evolution of the American Economy*

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Since the U.S. economy performed more poorly in the 1970s, one might expect that, if economic difficulty were a precursor to protectionism, this period should have experienced protectionism with a vengeance.

A second similarity between the 1920s and 1970s that has been linked to protectionism is the declining power of the world's hegemonic state. This change in the international distribution of power has been cited as a major factor leading to the closure of the world's markets. Robert Gilpin has stated that

> Today, . . . the dominant economy is itself in relative decline and is being challenged by rising centers of economic power. With the decline of the dominant economic power, the world economy may be following the pattern of the late nineteenth century and of the 1930s: it may be fragmenting into regional trading blocs, exclusive economic alliances, and economic nationalism.[9]

In the 1920s, Great Britain, the hegemon of the 19th century, was losing its status. From a peak of 24 percent in 1870, Great Britain's share of world trade had fallen to 14 percent before World War I.[10] Furthermore, its share of the world's manufacturing output tumbled from a dominant 32 percent in 1870 to a third-rate level of 14 percent in 1913.[11] Germany and the United States overtook it in industrial competitiveness in certain critical, advanced sectors.[12] In addition, Britain's control over the international monetary system was declining. Its problems in returning to and maintaining the gold standard in the 1920s and its final abandonment of that system in 1931 signaled this loss of influence.[13] By the 1920s, then, Britain's hegemony had seriously eroded.

The situation was fairly similar in the 1970s. By the early part of the decade, the global dominance that the United States had exercised in the 1950s and 1960s had been reduced as other nations mounted a challenge.

(New York: Basic Books, 1979), 482, 502-3. The worst economic difficulties of the Great Depression followed (rather than preceded) the tariff increases, occurring in the early 1930s: unemployment averaged 3% in 1930, the year Smoot-Hawley was passed, but rose to 25% by 1933, the year before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

[9] Gilpin (fn. 5), 258-59. Also see Kindleberger (fn. 5), esp. 307-8; Krasner (fn. 5), 317-47; Keohane (fn. 5), 131-62; David Lake, "Structure and Strategy: The International Sources of American Trade Policy, 1887-1939" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1983); Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1981), 242-54; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[10] Lake (fn. 1), Table 1, p. 525.

[11] Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 385.

[12] Lake (fn. 1); Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), chaps. 1 and 2; Samuel Hays, *The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), chaps. 1, 7, 8.

[13] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 70; Kindleberger (fn. 5), 63-68, 146-70.

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America's share of world trade dropped from 18.4 percent in 1950 to 13.4 percent in 1977.[14] More tellingly, its share of the world's manufactured exports plummeted from nearly 30 percent in 1953 to about 13 percent in the late 1970s.[15] Its share of the world's manufacturing output also lost ground, dropping from 62 percent in 1950 to 44 percent in 1977.[16] Many U.S. industries had lost their economic advantage and faced bitter competition both at home and abroad. In addition, the United States was no longer as dominant in the international monetary system. By 1973, it had scuttled the monetary system it had created and found itself unable to fashion a new, stable one. American hegemony in monetary relations in the 1970s, however, was not as reduced as Britain's had been in the 1920s and early 1930s.[17] But it had declined substantially, especially in trade and production, leaving the international distribution of power in the 1970s more closely resembling that of the interwar period than that of the immediate post-World War II period. This eclipse of hegemony might have been expected to produce widespread protectionism, as it had in the 1920s.

Although both periods experienced the decline of a hegemon, this may be less important to American policy than the relative position of the United States. The striking fact is how similar the relative international position of the U.S. appears to be in the late 1920s and the late 1970s, and how different it was in the 1950s and 1960s. America's share of the world's manufacturing output reached 42 percent in 1929 and had leveled off at 44 percent in 1977. In contrast, the U.S. had dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, with 62 percent in 1950 and 51 percent in 1960. In the trade area, the United States was more dominant in the 1920s than in the 1970s, but nowhere near as dominant as in the 1950s. In the 1920s, it was the world's largest exporter and biggest foreign investor, and ranked second only to Britain in its imports.[18] By the late 1970s, it had become the world's second-largest exporter of manufactures—West Germany led with almost 16 percent compared to America's 13 percent—and was being challenged for that spot by Japan (11 percent). In 1953, by contrast, the U.S. had reigned supreme in trade, controlling nearly 30 percent of all manufactured exports.[19]

[14] Lake (fn. 1), Table 3, p. 541; Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), 141.
[15] Feldstein (fn. 7), 193, 196. [16] *Ibid.*, 191.
[17] U.S. hegemony in money was diminished less than in trade. Its ending of the Bretton Woods system was more an act of power than of weakness, according to many analysts. See Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), 141, 165-86; John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 4, esp. p. 219.
[18] Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 464; Feldstein (fn. 7), 191.
[19] Feldstein (fn. 7), 196.

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A similar story is told by changes in relative economic size and productivity. According to Lake, who uses these two measures in his analysis of international economic structures, the position of the United States was almost identical in 1929 and 1977.[20] This contrasts with its clear predominance in 1950. Moreover, in both 1929 and 1977, the U.S. appeared similarly situated relative to its nearest rivals. In 1929, it led all countries on these two indicators, barely edging out Britain while retaining a substantial lead over France and Germany. In 1977, its relative position was comparable: it was almost even with West Germany, but still outdistanced Japan and France.

Hence, two strong similarities in the international distribution of economic power existed in the 1920s and 1970s. In both, a hegemon was in decline, and in both the relative position of the United States was slightly superior to *all* others—but, most importantly, was being challenged by several nations. These conditions in the international economic structure have been linked to rising protectionism, and thus might have been expected to engender similar protectionist responses in the two periods.[21]

The argument here is *not* that the 1920s and the 1970s were alike in all respects. Two important differences, at least, may attenuate the comparison. First, the United States was a rising hegemon in the 1920s and a declining one in the 1970s. Although hegemonic stability arguments provide no theoretical reason to expect this difference to affect a hegemon's trade policy, the notion of a lag has been introduced to account for this.[22] A rising hegemon may fail to appreciate its own significance, while a declining one may fail to understand its weakness and need for closure. This difference may account for dissimilarities between the two periods. But the reason for such a lag is obscure.

Second, there was a difference in the monetary systems operating at the two times. In the 1920s, a shift occurred from the controlled flexible exchange-rate system that had been in effect before 1925, to a fixed gold-standard system which was in effect until 1931. In the 1970s, the movement was in the opposite direction: from a fixed, dollar-gold standard to a managed flexible rate system after 1973. The consequences of these two different systems for trade policy are unclear, however; the effects of different exchange-rate systems on trade are not well understood. It has been asserted by some that flexible rates should hinder protectionism be-

[20] David Lake, "Beneath the Commerce of Nations," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), Figs. 5 and 6, pp. 143-70.

[21] I do not agree with Lake's interpretation of these two structures and their differences; see fn. 20.

[22] Kindleberger (fn. 5); Krasner (fn. 5).

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cause such barriers are nullified by exchange-rate changes.[23] Others maintain that flexible rates augment protectionist pressures by increasing risk, and that fixed rates are best for ensuring free trade.[24] It seems fair to say that the exchange-rate systems operating in both periods did little to provide a stable environment for international trade.

A related issue is whether the value of U.S. exchange rates had a different effect on trade policy in the two periods. The argument is that the level of exchange rates was driving trade policy, especially in the 1970s. Thus, the relative undervaluation of the dollar in the late 1970s weakened protectionist pressures, while its overvaluation in the early 1980s led to new pressures for barriers.[25] The problem with this argument is that the 1920s look similar: after World War I, the U.S. dollar appeared to be undervalued, supposedly mitigating protectionist pressures. But later in the decade, the dollar seemed overvalued relative to the mark, lira, franc, and gold, although undervalued relative to sterling.[26] Differences in exchange-rate levels, then, do *not* seem to distinguish the two periods.

Despite these differences, the similarities between the 1920s and 1970s in terms of economic difficulties and the relative economic position of the United States might lead one to expect that U.S. trade policy in the 1970s would look like that of the 1920s. The 1970s, however, were not marked by the extensive closure of the U.S. market that occurred in the 1920s. American trade policy remained oriented toward a relatively open market. Although it is commonly believed that protectionism grew substantially in the 1970s and the early 1980s, U.S. trade policy actually had mixed currents. Overall, there was probably a small net increase in trade barriers relative to the 1960s, but these new barriers never reached levels near those attained in the 1920s. Moreover, unlike in the 1930s, these barriers had little effect on the volume of trade: global and U.S. trade continued to grow throughout the decade of the 1970s, and to grow faster than production. In addition, tariffs had been reduced to their lowest levels, about 5 percent on average, through the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations.[27]

On the other hand, some non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were growing.

[23] Herbert Grubel, *International Economics* (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1977), chap. 22; Charles Kindleberger and Peter Lindert, *International Economics*, 6th ed. (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1978), chap. 21; Robert Baldwin and J. David Richardson, *International Trade and Finance*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), chap. 21.

[24] C. Fred Bergsten and William Cline, "Overview," in William Cline, ed., *Trade Policy in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).

[25] Kindleberger and Lindert (fn. 23), chap. 21, esp. Fig. 21.5.

[26] *Ibid.*, chap. 21, Fig. 21.3. Note how all other currencies rise in value against the dollar after the change in 1931.

[27] U.S. Tariff Commission (fn. 3), 81-82.

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These are difficult to measure (and were generally not measured while tariffs remained high), but their relative importance increased in the late 1970s. By that time, nearly 30 percent of all categories (not values) of American manufactured imports were affected by them.[28] One empirical study concludes, however, that these new NTBs have had only limited protectionist effects; as the authors point out, "on average over a full range of manufactured products, the protection given by NTBs that may limit or reduce imports . . . is not nearly as large as the protection afforded by tariffs . . . or natural barriers to trade. . . ."[29] They project that, "if the United States continues on its present policy course, the U.S. economy will be considerably more open in 1985 than it was in 1976."[30] Thus the erection of NTBs in the 1970s and 1980s may have produced a small net increase in protection. But this increase did not approach the levels of the 1920s even though two key preconditions—serious economic distress and declining hegemony—characterized both periods. Given the fertile ground of the late 1970s, protectionism could have grown rampantly, as it did in the 1920s. For some reason, it did not.

Other Explanations

The question, then, is why trade policy was different in the 1920s and 1970s even though key pressures influencing it were similar. This puzzle has been addressed by a number of studies. Three answers, all of which focus on aspects of the international or domestic system that are different from the one central to this study, require examination. They should be seen less as competing than as being pitched at different levels of analysis. I maintain that the argument developed in this study has been neglected and that it is more basic than these others.

One type of explanation looks at the international distribution of power, usually in terms of economic capabilities. It involves modifications of the hegemonic stability thesis, which, as has been shown, cannot in its original form explain the differences in policy outcomes between the 1920s and the 1970s.[31] Three modified arguments have been presented. First, it has been asserted that American hegemony has not declined enough to set off the expected protectionist response.[32] Even though other

[28] Robert Reich, "Beyond Free Trade," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Spring 1983), 773-804, at 786.

[29] Peter Morici and Laura Megna, *U.S. Economic Policies Affecting Industrial Trade: A Quantitative Assessment* (Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1983), 11.

[30] *Ibid.*, 103.

[31] Krasner (fn. 5).

[32] Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 207-32; Susan Strange, "Still An Extraordinary Power," in Raymond Lombra and Willard Witte, *Political Economy of International and Domestic Monetary Relations* (Ames: Iowa State University, 1982).

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countries have caught up with the United States, it still remains the strongest, especially when its military might is considered. Thus, this argument depends on military capabilities being an important factor in trade policy considerations. However, the fungibility of these power resources is questionable.[33] In fact, the second type of hegemonic stability argument denies this fungibility. Considering only trade-related power resources, it suggests that U.S. hegemony has not declined enough to evoke extensive protectionism.[34] But in comparison to its trade position in the 1920s, the U.S. held a similar, or even less dominant, position in the 1970s. One explanation for this disparity is the lag phenomenon discussed earlier. A third argument modifying the thesis of hegemonic stability holds that different configurations of states in terms of their relative economic power lead to different outcomes in trade policy. But this argument is not able to explain the differences between the 1920s and 1970s, since the configuration of states at those two points (1929 and 1977) was very similar.[35]

A second type of explanation focuses on the existence of an international regime in trade. In this view, the creation of the GATT system after World War II and its continued functioning have been partially responsible for the maintenance of a relatively open international economy. In the 1920s, the lack of any such regime helped to spread protectionism. GATT is seen as working against protectionism in numerous ways. Some analysts argue that it operates through the externalization of a norm—i.e., "embedded liberalism"—which promotes trade but also minimizes its domestic costs and, with it, protectionist demands.[36] Others suggest that the regime and its norms are embodied in domestic policies and practices and that it is effective through constraining and shaping domestic behavior.[37] Still others see the regime as encouraging international com-

[33] David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Politics," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), 161-94; Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), chap. 2.

[34] *Ibid.*, chap. 3; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chaps. 4, 9; Vinod Aggarwal, *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), chaps. 2, 7.

[35] Lake (fns. 1, 9, and 20). To overcome this difficulty, Lake makes two points: first, that due to the disruption caused by World War I, much greater uncertainty existed in the 1920s, which prompted more protectionist activity. Second, he implies that the height of protectionism globally was in the 1930s, not the 1920s, when the structure was somewhat different. Protectionism, however, was rising world-wide throughout the 1920s; it hit its peak in the U.S. by 1930 and elsewhere by 1933 or 1934. This explanation of trade policy outcomes is more sophisticated and perhaps more accurate than other hegemonic stability arguments, but it still has difficulty accounting for the differences between the 1920s and the 1970s.

[36] John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 379-415.

[37] Charles Lipson, "The Transformation of Trade," *International Organization* 36 (Spring

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merce by increasing its efficiency.[38] Differences thus exist over exactly how the GATT has worked to abate protectionism, but generally it is seen as exerting a brake on domestic pressures for protection.

In all of these views, however, regimes play only an intermediate role. They are acknowledged as an intervening variable, influencing the preferences, pressures, and practices already established at the domestic and international levels.[39] In order to judge the effect of the regime, it is necessary to examine these pre-existing factors. Regime analysis thus needs to be supplemented with analyses of other domestic and international forces, which this study provides.

A third type of explanation focuses on the structure of the domestic policy-making system. The argument here is that, despite the pressures for protection in the 1970s, a different policy structure existed which helped defuse these pressures. This structure insulated political actors, especially Congress, from societal pressures for protection. Hence, the state was able to resist such pressures in the 1970s, but not in the 1920s. Explanations differ on the specific way this insulation occurred. Most scholars acknowledge the importance of the shift in tariff-making authority from Congress to the President as being central.[40] Others point to the nature of the relationship between Congress and the executive;[41] some to the way trade policy is made within the executive branch;[42] some to the lessons of the 1930s and the norms and ideology now surrounding those lessons;[43] and yet others to the way Congress functions and responds to societal pressures.[44]

This proliferation of domestic policy "structures" indicates that trade policy is not made within one structure. Many economic actors are involved, and they bring their complaints and pressures to bear on different political actors. Moreover, no single, coherent national trade policy exists. The policy relating to one sector of the economy may differ completely

1982), 417-56; Stephanie Lenway, *The Politics of U.S. International Trade* (Boston: Pitman, 1985).

[38] Lipson (fn. 37).

[39] See *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), esp. the introduction by Stephen Krasner.

[40] Pastor (fn. 1); Judith Goldstein, "The Political Economy of Trade," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1986), 161-84; I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics: System Under Stress* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986).

[41] Pastor (fn. 1).

[42] Roger Porter, *Presidential Decision-Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Gilbert Winham, "Robert Strauss, The MTN, and the Control of Faction," *Journal of World Trade Law* 14 (September-October, 1980), 377-97.

[43] Goldstein (fn. 40); Judith Goldstein, "A Reexamination of American Commercial Policy" (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1983).

[44] E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1935); Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).

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from that concerning another. Thus, the policy for automobiles may differ greatly from the policies for wheat, textiles, or telecommunications equipment. Moreover, for each of these industries, the influence of Congress, the executive, and the International Trade Commission varies. A knowledge of the relevant domestic actors and their trade preferences is essential to understanding the influence of the particular policy structure for that sector on the policy outcome.

The Argument

My argument operates on a different level of analysis. I maintain that the increased international economic interdependence of the post-World War II period has been a major reason why protectionism did not spread widely in the 1970s and early 1980s. By altering domestic actors' preferences, aspects of America's greater integration into the international economy worked against recourse to protectionism. Specifically, while increased interdependence has subjected some areas of the economy to new foreign competition, it has also greatly augmented international economic ties for some firms in the form of exports, imports of critical inputs, multinational production, and global intrafirm trade. Despite pressures for closure, the growth of these international ties is a major reason for the maintenance of a relatively open market in the 1970s.

Evidence of the growth of these international ties is abundant. American trade grew phenomenally between the 1920s and the 1980s.[45] More goods and more different types of goods were traded. Specifically, America's trade dependence grew substantially. U.S. export dependence (exports as a percentage of total domestic production) rose from about 2 percent in 1923 to 9 percent in 1960, and to about 20 percent by the late 1970s. Likewise, imports climbed from 2.5 percent of total domestic consumption in 1921 to 5 percent in 1960, and to over 20 percent in 1980.[46] The multinationality of American firms also rose substantially over these five decades. The total of American direct foreign investment abroad grew from about $5.5 billion in 1923 to $11.8 billion in 1950, and to over $86 billion in 1970.[47] Moreover, the internationalization of American industry

[45] Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 463-66.

[46] For the 1920s, see Robert Lipsey, *Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the U.S.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 434-35; for the period from 1960 on, see Report of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, *Global Competition: The New Reality*, Vol. I (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1985), 36.

[47] Robert Dunn, *American Foreign Investments* (New York: Viking, 1926), 182; Kent Hughes, *Trade, Taxes, and Transnationals* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 94. Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 464, show it grew to $17.2 billion in the 1920s and then retreated to $11.5 billion by the end of the 1930s. According to Robert Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the*

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grew in relative terms. Foreign assets of U.S. industry accounted for only 2.5 percent of total industrial assets in 1929, but for over 20 percent in the 1970s.[48] In addition, the global operations of these firms intensified, leading to the creation of webs of international trade flows within firms. Exports by American multinationals from foreign production sites back to the U.S. market have grown immensely. This practice was almost unknown before the 1940s; at present, these types of transfers account for somewhere between 15 and 50 percent of all U.S. industrial imports.[49] In sum, the integration of the United States into the international economy through both trade and multinationality has deepened considerably since the 1920s.

This aspect of increased interdependence has lessened pressures for protection in domestic industries. I hypothesize that firms with greater international ties in the form of exports, multinationality, and global intrafirm trade will be less interested in protection than firms that are more domestically oriented. The former will view protection as undesirable, since it will be more costly for them than for the latter, for five reasons. First, firms that export or produce abroad will be concerned about foreign retaliation and its costs. Demanding protection at home may prompt greater protection abroad, which may lead to a reduction of exports or to new restrictions on foreign operations and their trade flows, thus reducing profitability. Second, protection in one market may hurt a firm's exports to third markets as other exporters divert their products to these markets to compensate for market closure elsewhere.

Third, firms with a global web of production and trade will view trade barriers, even at home, as a new cost—one that may undermine their competitiveness. For these firms, protection will be disruptive and costly. Fourth, for firms dependent on imports—whether from subsidiaries, subcontractors, or foreign firms—new trade barriers will increase costs and thus erode competitiveness. Finally, intra-industry rivalries will create opposition to protectionism. Trade barriers will put internationally oriented firms at a disadvantage relative to their domestically oriented

Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 205, U.S. direct foreign investments dropped to their lowest point in the century so far in 1946.

[48] For the 1920s, see U.S. Congress, Senate, *American Branch Factories Abroad*, S. Doc. No. 258, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., 1931, p. 27, on the value of U.S. direct foreign investment in manufacturing, and Lipsey (fn. 46), 424, on the value of U.S. manufacturing GNP. For the 1970s, see U.S. Department of Commerce, *1977 Enterprise Statistics* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1981).

[49] The figures vary widely. See Joseph Grunwald and Kenneth Flamm, *Global Factory* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 7; Gerald Helleiner and Real Lavergne, "Intra-firm Trade and Industrial Exports to the U.S.," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 41 (November 1979), 297-312; Gerald Helleiner, "Transnational Corporations and the Trade Structure," in Herbert Giersch, *On the Economics of Intra-Firm Trade* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1979), 159-84.

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competitors. Such barriers impose new costs on international firms while providing benefits to domestic ones. These different relative costs and benefits within an industry may lead international firms to oppose protection. For all these reasons, firms with strong international ties will find protection of the home market very costly and will be likely to resist appeals for it, even when faced with severe import competition.

While containing an international element, this argument is similar to those concerning domestic interest groups. Most interest-group analyses, however, focus on the forces pushing *for* protection.[50] One reason is the assumption of a collective action problem in trade politics. Small groups of producers (management and labor) facing import competition are seen as more likely to press actively for help since it will bring them concentrated and substantial benefits, while larger groups (other industries, consumers) opposing protection will be less likely to act since the benefits of openness will be diffuse and less tangible.[51] But some small groups may also suffer from the high costs of protection and receive important tangible benefits from openness.

Increasingly, the interest-group literature has focused on the variables examined here. Several aggregate-level studies of U.S. industries have shown that high levels of export dependence reduce industries' preferences for protection and lead to lower trade barriers for these industries.[52] Other studies reveal that, even in the 1920s, the growth of an export sector contributed to attempts to open American and foreign markets.[53] Some have also linked the adoption of the R.T.A.A. in 1934, with its antiprotectionist bent, to the influence of American exporters and multinationals.[54] These studies have lent credence to the idea that export-dependent industries may not prefer protection and may even advocate the dismantling of trade barriers.

[50] Examples are Richard Caves, "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," *Canadian Journal of Economics* 9 (May 1976), 278-300; William Brock and Stephen Magee, "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: Case of the Tariff," *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 68 (May 1978), 246-50; Robert Baldwin, *The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986); Jonathan Pincus, *Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Edward Ray, "Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the U.S.," *Journal of Political Economy* 81 (No. 1, 1981), 105-21; Real Lavergne, *The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs* (Toronto: Academic Press, 1983).

[51] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), for the classic treatment; also see Brock and Magee (fn. 50).

[52] Glenn Fong, "Export Dependence and the New Protectionism" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1982) supports this contention. So does Robert Baldwin (fn. 50). Lavergne (fn. 50) and Goldstein (fn. 43) provide mixed evidence for this assertion.

[53] Joan H. Wilson, *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-33* (Boston: Beacon, 1971); William Becker, *The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[54] Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 40-94.

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Scholars have also examined how multinationality and its related intrafirm trade affect trade policy. On the one hand, the idea that the spread of multinational firms would reduce trade barriers has been challenged because these firms often enter a market to circumvent such barriers, and thus come to see them as a brake against other foreign competitors; on the other hand, the growth of global intrafirm trading has led to the idea that firms with such trade would be adverse to protection in their markets.[55] Analysis at the aggregate industry level has produced mixed evidence for both of these arguments.[56]

In this study, I do not adopt an aggregate approach; rather, I examine a set of industries and their firms in detail. This method permits the consideration of firms who are the chief actors experiencing the particular costs and benefits of protection. It thus overcomes a central problem of aggregate studies; that is, that they mask the distribution of international ties within an industry, and with it the intra-industry divisions over protectionism. The poor results of aggregate analyses concerning export dependence and multinationality are partly due to these divisions within industries. An industry that is highly multinational may actually contain only one or two large multinational firms, who may or may not be able to impose their preferences against protection on the industry and/or on state actors. These intra-industry differences and their effects on trade policy will be examined in the present study.

This focus corrects for another problem. Unlike arguments based on international systems, regimes, or domestic structures, my argument can account for differences in trade policy outcomes among industries during the same period. Why some industries demand and receive protection, while at the same time others do not, is hard to explain parsimoniously with these other arguments. For example, the fact that 60 percent of all imports entered the U.S. duty-free in the 1920s is not easily explicable if one asserts that the international structure, the lack of any regime, or the domestic political structure encouraged the adoption of widespread protectionism at that time.[57] The argument here is better able to address such differences among industries at any one time and to account for differences over time. It should not be seen, however, as directly competing

[55] Gerald Helleiner, "Transnational Enterprise and the New Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy," *Oxford Economic Papers* 29 (March 1977), 102-16; also Helleiner (fn. 49). See Lipson (fn. 37) for a discussion of the effect of intra-industry trade on industry trade preferences.

[56] Baldwin (fn. 50) and Lavergne (fn. 50) do not find much influence exercised by these variables, but Thomas Pugel and Ingo Walter, "U.S. Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade Policy," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 67 (August 1985), 465-73, do find multinationality to be an important brake on protectionist preferences.

[57] Lake (fn. 9), chap. 5, p. 8 and Table 5-1.

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with the other explanations, which operate at different levels of analysis and may all have some validity. The point is that examinations of trade politics have missed antiprotectionist interests, and that a domestic politics view of the pressures for and against trade barriers is the place where one should start to understand trade policy.

The Case Studies

The industries examined were those experiencing the greatest growth in import penetration among those already having high levels of import penetration in the two decades.[58] In addition, these industries showed evidence of other economic difficulties: unemployment, profit problems, overcapacity, and so forth. Since studies have demonstrated that high levels of import penetration are strongly associated with demands for protection and high actual levels of protection, the industries selected should be the least likely to confirm my argument;[59] they should have been most likely to desire protection. Indeed, it would be surprising to find that these import-threatened industries did *not* prefer new trade barriers.

Once these "hard" cases were chosen, I explored the extent of their integration into the international economy and their trade policy preferences. To measure their integration, data on their export dependence, import requirements, multinationality, and global intrafirm trade were collected for both the industry and its firms. In order to understand their preferences, I surveyed their activities in a number of political arenas. In the 1920s, these were (1) the U.S. Congress, which handled most issues related to tariff levels; (2) the U.S. Tariff Commission, which investigated industry complaints about trade matters; and (3) industry trade associations, whose internal deliberations over trade issues were reported in various newspapers and industry trade journals. For the 1970s, the arenas were slightly different: (1) the U.S. Congress, which authorized general tariff level changes and introduced bills to help particular industries; (2) the U.S. International Trade Commission (I.T.C.), which investigated industry trade complaints; (3) the U.S. Special Trade Representative (S.T.R.) and other executive agencies, who decided on and implemented solutions to industry trade complaints while also managing U.S. activities in the GATT negotiations; and (4) the industry trade associations, which developed industry-wide positions on trade.

[58] Eighteen industries were examined in detail; see Helen Milner, "Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry Politics and Trade Policy in France and the US in the 1920s and 1970s" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986).

[59] Many studies have found that high levels or high rates of increase in import penetration are strongly correlated with high levels of demand for protection and high actual levels of protection. See, for example, Baldwin (fn. 50); Lavergne (fn. 50); Goldstein (fn. 43).

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The investigation of the industries chosen revealed a strong correlation between their firms' international ties and their trade policy preferences. (See Table 2.) In the face of mounting import competition, firms that lacked ties to the international economy voiced rising demands for extensive protection. By contrast, firms with well-developed multinational operations, *including integrated global production and trade flows*, and strong exports did *not* seek protection even when imports rose to high levels. In fact, these firms often desired that markets at home and abroad be opened further still. Firms with substantial export dependence but no multinational production also did not desire protection as long as import competition did not swamp their exports. Finally, firms with some foreign production but no U.S. exports or intrafirm trade often resorted to limited protectionism when facing import competition. These firms sometimes sought selective protection; that is, they attempted to curb their strongest competitors through limited protection against a particular country or product line while leaving undisturbed the main foreign markets in which they were involved. Overall, the cases revealed that the more integrated a firm was into the international economy, the less likely it was to seek import restraints even when imports rose significantly.

U.S. manufacturers of woolen goods in the 1920s and producers of footwear in the 1970s were typical of industries lacking international economic ties. Most firms in the woolen goods sector were domestically oriented, with few exports and no multinationality. After World War I, when import competition resumed and other difficulties set in, the majority of firms in this industry began lobbying for closure of the U.S. market.[60] They demanded and received increased tariffs through the 1921 Emergency Tariff bill; later, during the Fordney-McCumber tariff hearings, they called for a 130 percent rise in their duties and were granted a sizable increase. They lobbied for even higher tariffs before and during the Smoot-Hawley hearings after problems arose in the late 1920s. Success with Congress did not satisfy them, however: they fought against changes in tariff-making rules that could have made tariff reductions easier. They also pressured the U.S. Tariff Commission for greater protection. Thus, the woolens manufacturers' demands were voiced in all possible political arenas and were focused on obtaining global protection for all segments of the industry. In view of their economic problems and lack of international ties, their intense and unified advocacy for closure of the home market was not surprising.

Like the woolen goods manufacturers, the American (non-rubber) footwear producers had largely domestic operations in the 1970s. Begin-

[60] For the full story, see Milner (fn. 58), 138-63.

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TABLE 2

THE INDUSTRIES, THEIR PREFERENCES, AND POLICY OUTCOMES

International Ties		*Industry*	*Expected Preferences*	*Actual Preferences*	*Policy Outcomes*
Export Dependence	*Multinational and Global Intrafirm Trade*				
Low	Low	Woolens, 1920s	Protectionist	Protectionist	High, increasing tarrifs
		Watches and Clocks, 1920s	Protectionist	Protectionist	High, rising tariffs
		Footwear, 1970s	Protectionist	Protectionist	Some protection via voluntary export restraints in mid-1970s
High	Low	Textile Machinery, 1920s	Open markets, esp. abroad	Divided; some free trade and some moderate protection	Low tariffs in early 1920s; some increases later
		Machine Tools, 1970s	Open markets, esp. abroad	Free trade in 1970s; Protectionist in early 1980s	Tariff reductions in 1970s; voluntary export restraints in mid-1980s

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Low	High	Newsprint, 1920s	Selective protection, if any	Free trade	Duty-free
		Tires, 1970s	Selective protection, if any	Free trade, some complaints of unfair trade	Tariff reductions
		Watches & Clocks, 1970s	Selective protection, if any	Divided; some free trade, some selective protection	Some tariff reductions
		Radios & Television sets, 1970s	Selective protection	Some selective protection; some free trade	Some tariff reductions; voluntary export restraints in mid-1970s
High	High	Fertilizer, 1920s	Free trade	Free trade	Duty-free
		Photo Equipment, 1920s	Free trade	Moderate protection; increasing free trade	Some tariff increases in early 1920s; some decreases in late 1920s
		Semiconductors, 1970s	Free trade	Free trade in 1970s; strategic trade demands in 1980s	Tariff reductions, but export pricing agreement with Japan in mid-1980s

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ning in the late 1960s, when shoe imports began flooding the U.S. market, the industry association—backed by almost all of the producers—launched a campaign to obtain tariff protection.[61] After the early 1970s, the association and the firms pursued this goal with increasing intensity. The association filed numerous trade complaints with the I.T.C.; it lobbied Congress for help and formed a coalition of congressmen to promote the industry's cause; and it launched a public relations campaign to generate public support. These activities forced President Carter to negotiate voluntary export restraints with several East Asian competitors; even those restraints were not restrictive enough for many of the firms who sought global quotas. By the early 1980s, however, the industry's unity over trade matters began to decline. A growing number of producers started to oppose renewed protection as they began importing or producing offshore. This opposition weakened the association's appeals for help and contributed to its more limited political success since then. Overall, the firms' waxing and waning protectionist demands were related to the level of their international economic ties.

By contrast, large multinationals with extensive international trade flows and exports from the United States avoided protection as a solution to their import problems largely because of the costly effects it would have on the firms' global operations. U.S. fertilizer producers in the 1920s and the semiconductor producers in the 1970s were characteristic. By the early 1920s, for example, the large fertilizer producers were highly export-dependent and multinational. Despite their economic problems, they preferred freer trade.[62] In the 1921 tariff hearings, they requested and received the retention of the duty-free status of their products. During the Smoot-Hawley hearings, this preference prevailed among most of the firms, although certain producers advocated demanding protection on certain goods if they did not receive tariff reductions on others. This strategy was aimed at, and resulted in, greater openness of the U.S. market, since no tariffs were imposed on fertilizers, and some were reduced. Finally, throughout the 1920s, the major producers—i.e., those with international operations—opposed the demands of some small domestic producers for higher tariffs on various fertilizer products. In general, the internationally oriented fertilizer manufacturers wanted to preserve the U.S. market's openness and, despite mounting foreign competition, opposed attempts to erect new barriers around it.

During the 1970s, the American semiconductor industry faced serious competition for the first time. The largest firms in this industry—I.B.M.,

[61] *Ibid.*, 300-19.

[62] *Ibid.*, 244-70.

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Texas Instruments, and Motorola—had widespread foreign operations and intrafirm trade flows, while the remainder were more domestically oriented. Most of the firms favored trade liberalization throughout the 1970s; despite rising foreign competition, demands for aid or protection were nonexistent before the late 1970s.[63] Later in the decade, the smaller firms, united in the new Semiconductor Industry Association (S.I.A.), began formulating a trade complaint against Japan. Due to the opposition of the large firms—mainly I.B.M. and T.I.—this complaint was not formalized at the time. Instead, I.B.M. joined the S.I.A. and helped turn its attention toward negotiations with Japan over further tariff *reductions*. These negotiations, impelled by the industry, resulted in lower tariffs for semiconductors; other negotiations, to open the Japanese market further, continued as well. In the early 1980s, however, the S.I.A. and some firms within the industry filed several trade complaints against the Japanese, as did the Reagan administration itself.[64] These complaints resulted in intensified efforts to open the Japanese market and in a pact to regulate export prices of Japanese semiconductors, which was intended to alleviate illegal dumping. On the whole, however, American firms resisted the strong pressures for protection; their international economic ties made protection less desirable than the further opening of markets at home and abroad.

Like these trade-oriented multinationals, firms with extensive export dependence (but not multinationality) tended to avoid protectionist demands in times of difficulty. Examples are the U.S. textile machinery builders in the 1920s and machine tool manufacturers in the 1970s. The former, while having significant export dependence in the aggregate, were divided: the producers of cotton machinery had become substantial exporters since World War I, while those of woolen machinery were still domestically oriented.[65] This division, as well as the novelty and volatility of the producers' exports, rendered the industry unable to develop a unified trade policy preference. In the early 1920s, when exports were most significant, the producers did not lobby Congress for any change in their tariffs despite severe economic distress and rising imports. Over the decade, the export interests of some firms declined, and so did the capacity of these firms to forestall protectionist demands. In the 1929 Smoot-Hawley hearings, firms from the woolen machinery sector pressed for and received moderate tariff increases on their machines; the more

[63] *Ibid.*, 343-71.
[64] *Boston Globe*, April 13, 1986, Business section, pp. A-1, A-9; *Wall Street Journal*, March 12, 1986, p. 7; *Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 1986, p. 2.
[65] Milner (fn. 58), 190-215.

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export-oriented firms remained silent. Even though they were besieged by imports, these exporters refrained from demanding protection for much of the decade and remained moderate and divided in their later requests.

The American machine tool builders were sizable although declining exporters in the 1970s. During this decade, these producers lost major market shares to imports and experienced other economic difficulties. Their response, however, was not a resort to demands for protection; rather, the industry association—backed by most producers—favored tariff reductions during the GATT negotiations and lobbied Congress to obtain aid for their exports.[66] In particular, the builders wanted to open major foreign markets—especially those of the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries. By the late 1970s, the failure of these export initiatives, the continuing decline of the industry's export trade, and the rising import tide pushed some in the industry to seek relief from imports. Pressure for protection rose in the late 1970s; but it was not formalized into a public complaint until the early 1980s, when the tide of imports overwhelmed the firms' exports. The Reagan administration responded to this trade complaint against several countries' imports—mainly Japan's—by negotiating a set of voluntary export restraints.[67] The case of the machine tool builders thus shows how sizable export dependence may promote an interest in freer trade and dampen pressures for protection even when imports surge. But, when the firms' export orientation declined, their trade preferences shifted as well.

Industries with firms that had foreign production but no intrafirm or export trade showed some resistance to protection when imports grew, but it was often weaker than that of export-oriented industries. In many of these industries, growing foreign competition was met by calls for limited protection because the costs of this protection could be minimized. Two examples are the American newsprint producers in the 1920s and U.S. television makers in the 1970s. Newsprint producers in the 1920s were multinational but had only minor U.S. exports. Their foreign operations were concentrated almost exclusively in Canada; from there, they exported heavily back to the United States. The industry thus had substantial intrafirm trade. Throughout the 1920s, the newsprint producers actively supported freer trade of their products, and did not try to have the duty-free status of newsprint altered in either the 1921 or the 1929 tariff revisions.[68] In 1921, several manufacturers did attempt to make their status conditional on other countries' treatment of imports

[66] *Ibid.*, 320-42.
[67] *New York Times*, February 3, 1986, p. D-2; *New York Times*, March 6, 1986, p. D-3.
[68] Milner (fn. 58), 271-97.

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and exports. But this strategic maneuver was distasteful to many firms and was never adopted as part of U.S. policy. As their trade between Canada and the U.S. grew in the 1920s, interest in protection waned even more. During the Smoot-Hawley tariff revision, when most tariffs reached their highest levels ever, the newsprint manufacturers uniformly supported the continuing duty-free status of their products. Not even rising imports could induce these international producers to think about protection.

American television makers had some foreign operations in the 1970s; but, unlike the newsprint producers, they were not very trade-oriented. The industry was, in fact, divided in two: the largest producers, RCA and General Electric, were multinationals with global trading operations, while the rest, including Zenith, Magnavox, and GTE-Sylvania, were domestic producers. In the 1970s, imports started pouring into the United States, and the domestically oriented firms, led by Zenith, initiated a series of trade complaints on several specific products, targeted against a few East Asian countries.[69] These complaints met with varying success, but they were opposed by RCA, the industry's giant multinational. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, much of this protectionist activity had abated as the domestically oriented American firms moved production abroad, left the industry, or were bought by foreign interests. This international adjustment process eroded support for even the limited, selective protection that some had desired earlier.

In all of these cases, then, the existence or creation of extensive international economic ties prompted firms to resist seeking protection even in times of severe import competition. Conversely, the lack or loss of these ties was associated with rising demands for protection. This pattern occurred both in the 1920s and the 1970s. In both decades, increased integration into the international economy was experienced similarly by firms in spite of their different historical contexts. This pattern helps to explain the varied nature of trade policy *within* each time period. At each point, industries that were dominated by firms with extensive international ties were less protectionist than those that were not.

In addition to accounting for variation in preferences *within* each period, the argument and the cases suggest why trade policy varied *between* the two periods. On a macro level, the evidence implies that in periods like the 1970s, when such international economic ties are widespread and well-developed, pressure for protection by industries will be reduced.

Although the growth of international ties contributed to the mainte-

[69] *Ibid.*, 372-96.

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nance of free trade in the 1970s and early 1980s, it must be noted that the internationalization of U.S. industry went hand in hand with trade liberalization in the postwar period. The liberalization of trade in the 1950s and 1960s was one factor promoting the growth of these international ties. But much of this expansion had occurred before the two most significant reductions in trade barriers. U.S. export dependence, and especially U.S. multinationality, had grown significantly before the phasing in of the Kennedy Round tariff cuts in the early 1970s. America's industrial export dependence (exports as a percent of total domestic production) rose 33 percent between 1960 and 1970, while the value of U.S. direct foreign investment in manufacturing increased nearly 800 percent between 1950 and 1970.[70] The growth of these international ties cannot be separated from the liberalization of trade occurring at the same time. But, since industries with international ties were in place prior to the 1970s, they probably contributed to the liberalization that occurred during that decade. In any case, by the 1970s there were many more firms that were willing to resist protectionist pressures. Despite higher levels of import penetration, demands for protection were less widespread than they had been in the 1920s. This provides a partial answer to our central puzzle.

Industry Divisions, Context, and Policy Outcomes

The argument raises three further issues. The first deals with intra-industry divisions on trade issues. One notable feature of the growing internationalization of U.S. industries has been its uneven character. Within an industry, some firms—usually the largest—have become international, while the smaller ones have often remained dependent on the domestic market. This difference has tended to divide industries on trade politics: a pattern of large multinationals opposing the more numerous but smaller domestic-centered firms is evident in the cases.

Two consequences of this political division stand out. First, it makes developing an industry-wide stand difficult. As seen in the textile machinery case, internal divisions created by different international interests can leave an industry without the capacity to develop a political position on trade. Second, the attempt to create an "industry" position in a divided industry may lead to the fashioning of compromises that are not as pro-

[70] Consistent data series on export dependence and multinationality as a percent of GNP from 1945 on are not available. The export dependence data come from Report of the President's Commission (fn. 46), 36. The data on direct foreign investment come from Feldstein (fn. 7), Table 3.30, p. 240.

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tectionist as the majority of firms may prefer, as was evident in the semiconductor case. Both results may reduce protectionist demands even more than the extent of internationalization of the industry would suggest. Thus, the creation of these intra-industry divisions through unevenly rising interdependence may further reduce pressures for protection.

In the 1920s, these internal divisions were less apparent than in the 1970s, because internationalization was less widespread.[71] Moreover, existing divisions tended to be only the initial breach in an industry's unity—a consequence of recent internationalization. The textile machinery industry is a good example. Thus, intra-industry divisions, another counterweight to protectionist pressures, were also weaker in the 1920s.

Second, contextual differences between the two periods have been alleged to undercut any comparison between them.[72] But contextual differences did not override the powerful influence that a firm's international position exerted on its trade preferences. In both periods, internationally oriented firms opposed protectionist solutions to their problems. This finding suggests that the broad differences between the two periods—e.g., in macroeconomic circumstances, political structures, and economic ideology—did not greatly affect the way firms calculated their preferences. The similarities in preferences in the two periods imply that factors differentiating the two times may have only a minor impact on demands for protection by industries at any time.

Moreover, firms often did not take these contextual features as given. In both periods, some firms worked to alter domestic political structures responsible for trade policy. In the 1920s, for example, several industries attempted to make U.S. procedures more free-trade oriented, opposing the American valuation plan and supporting flexible tariff provisions; other industries, including the domestically oriented woolen goods one, took the opposite stance.[73] In the 1970s, those footwear and television manufacturers who pursued protection lobbied to change U.S. procedures in order to make them more open to protectionist outcomes. This involved efforts—most of which were successful—to loosen U.S. trade laws and to shift their enforcement to agencies more favorable to domestic industry.[74] Certain contextual features, such as the domestic political process for trade issues, may thus not be exogenous; rather, the structures

[71] Milner (fn. 58), chap. 8.

[72] For example, see Kenneth A. Oye, "The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary Diplomacy 1929-1937," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 173-99, at 199.

[73] Milner (fn. 58), chap. 4.

[74] *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

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in which firms are assumed to operate may be responsive to the influence of firms.

A final issue involves the question of trade policy outcomes. I have focused more on explaining firms' preferences than on policy decisions. The influence of such preferences on policy outcomes has been largely assumed. The cases presented here provide support for this assumption. In almost all of the cases, the industries' demands for protection or for freer trade had some effect upon policy.[75] (See Table 2.) First, in none of the cases were industries accorded protection when they did not demand it. This suggests that the issue of protection was usually placed on the political agenda by the industries themselves. Second, industries desiring the maintenance of low trade barriers or reductions of restraints were successful in all the cases, as the fertilizer, newsprint, and semiconductor industries show. Thus, no systematic bias against low or reduced trade barriers appears to have existed even in the 1920s.

Finally, industries seeking increases in trade barriers also tended to be successful. Where an industry was divided, however, its capacity for effective political influence was reduced, as exemplified by the limited success of the domestically oriented television makers in the 1970s. In contrast, where industries were united in favor of protection, they generally received it. This was true for all cases in the 1920s and for all but two in the 1970s. Although the footwear producers failed throughout the early 1970s to have new trade barriers erected, their efforts met with some success in the late 1970s, when the Carter administration negotiated voluntary export restraints for them. Likewise, the early efforts of the machine tool builders in the late 1970s and early 1980s failed to produce any response from the government. By the mid-1980s, however, the Reagan administration was pressing the industry's case and negotiating export restraints with foreign governments.

In neither period did industries always get exactly what they wanted when they wanted it. But their demands tended in time to move policy in the desired direction. The greater difficulty that industries experienced in attaining their demands for protection in the 1970s may reflect both the greater awareness among industry and government officials of the international problems caused by protection and the more limited responsiveness to domestic pressures of the executive (now in control of more trade issues) as opposed to Congress (which played a larger role in the 1920s). Some bias in the trade policy system against protection appears evident in

[75] *Ibid.*, see cases and chap. 8.

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the 1970s. Unlike firms' preferences then, trade policy outcomes may depend more on factors that differed in the two contexts, such as policy-making structures and ideology.

In both periods, industries were able over time to realize trade policies close to the ones they desired. Thus, their preferences seemed to count in the policy process. Other influences on trade policy, such as the interests of labor or the ideologies of decision makers, were also likely to be important. The evidence presented here simply shows that, by itself, reduced interest in protection by internationally oriented industries in the 1970s was one important reason for the resistance to protectionism in the United States.

Conclusion

Why did trade policy outcomes differ between the 1920s and the 1970s when a number of conditions influencing trade politics were similar? Why was protectionism resisted in the 1970s when economic difficulties were severe and U.S. hegemony was in decline? While noting other answers to this puzzle—such as the influence of the international distribution of power, international regimes, and domestic political structures—I maintain that aspects of rising international economic interdependence in the post-World War II period led to changes in the trade policy preferences of domestic actors. Rising interdependence meant, in part, the growth of firms' ties to the international economy through exports, multinationality, and global intrafirm trade; because of these ties, protectionism had become a more costly policy. The new interdependence made protectionism a less viable option for many firms facing serious import competition. Consequently, it dampened the demand for protection.

Examination of a set of industries from the 1920s and 1970s supports the contention that internationally oriented firms were less likely to demand protection than were domestically oriented ones, even if both faced high levels of import penetration. The cases also pointed to the importance of firm-level analysis. International ties conditioned firms' preferences, and divergences in these ties *within* the industry created important political divisions over trade. These intra-industry divisions also helped to dampen pressures for protectionism.

Differences in the historical context between the 1920s and 1970s did not override the argument. Despite differences in the international and domestic structures, internationally oriented firms in both periods were less protectionist than their domestic counterparts. In fact, features often

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considered contextual were responsive to influence by firms. Moreover, trade preferences among the firms examined mattered. Policy outcomes often reflected the desires of firms. Thus, reduced demand for protection in the 1970s may be one important, but not the only, reason why U.S. trade policy differed in the two periods.

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Review Articles

PARADIGM LOST: Dependence to Democracy

By DANIEL H. LEVINE*

Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 710 pp.

I

THIS essay is about the proper study of transitions to democracy. In particular, I explore the relation between analysis of transitions and attention to democracy itself as a coherent system of social relations, politics, and government. I argue that the two are joined in practice and should not be held apart in analytical terms. This means that predominant or exclusive attention to transitions will not suffice. Full understanding requires that study of transitions to democracy be rooted in consideration of democracy's own characteristic motivations, organizational resources, and operative patterns of leadership and legitimacy.

The reflections that follow arise out of the practical and theoretical consequences of recent political change. The noteworthy upsurge of democratic politics in Southern Europe and Latin America over the last dozen years underscores democracy's continuing vigor and popular appeal. Moreover, the specific ways in which these democracies emerged challenge a number of assumptions and expectations that have recently been advanced with great vigor in the study of comparative politics, most notably in dependency theory.

Perhaps the most remarkable challenge comes from the very presence of democracy in countries once thought doomed to endless authoritarianism as a byproduct of the political dynamics of peripheral capitalism. Further, as we shall see, a close inspection of recent political transformations points up the central role of variables once confidently dismissed as epiphenomenal by scholars working within dependency theory. Ele-

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ments such as effective leadership, organizational strength, deliberate consensus building, and close attention to institutionalization have combined in case after case to take center stage in the creation and consolidation of democracies. In the process, creative and committed political actors have repeatedly underscored the centrality of national-level politics, countering deterministic expectations according to which national patterns are ineluctably set by the play of global or regional forces.[1]

The whole process has attracted considerable public and scholarly interest. The work under review here, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, is just one of many studies on the growth, restoration, and consolidation of democracy to come out in recent years.[2] The scale of the present enterprise, however (one cloth edition of over seven hundred pages, four separate paperback volumes, three editors and twenty-two other contributors, seven years in the making from conferences to publication) and the prominence of the editors, together with the central role some of them played in elaborating earlier dependency paradigms, makes this a fit occasion for more general commentary.

The argument of this essay is developed around four related issues. The first is an exploration of the context in which dependency theory arose. I note its fit to concepts of democracy and democratization and to the political changes of the last decade. A distinction between political liberalization and a broader definition of democratization (embracing social relations, economic equity, and politics) that runs throughout the *Transitions* series, has consistently led editors and authors to undervalue the appeal of liberal democracy. A second issue concerns the nature and status of pacts and accommodations. Such arrangements commonly reflect efforts to reduce risk and uncertainty by extending mutual guarantees and devising operative rules of the game acceptable to key political actors. In the *Transitions* volumes, such pacts are depicted mostly as matters of elite self-protection and behind-the-scenes manipulation, but this view fails to address popular support for pacts. By the same token, the stress

[1] In Tony Smith's apt phrase, they thereby reassert "the autonomy of the peripheral state." See Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late Industrializing World Since 1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 68-84.

[2] Relevant collections include Enrique Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-85* (La Jolla, CA: Institute of the Americas, 1986); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Nations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 1988); and James M. Malloy and Mitchell Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

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on pacts as antidemocratic manipulation ignores the ties that link the elites who make the pacts to popular groups, and thus obscures the reasons why the latter give them a grant of legitimacy.

The links between elites and popular groups constitute the third point for reflection. Such links are built and maintained in many ways; political parties often play a central role in articulating these relationships. But parties are notable in these volumes mostly by their absence. Instead, the editors highlight the nature of civil society and its overall relation to the process of political change. But their discussion is unsatisfactory, for with rare exceptions, civil society is treated in general and abstract terms, with insufficient attention to specific groups and to the *organized* relations that bind sectors and movements to the leaders, structures, and institutions of national life.

Fourth, the conclusion presents some general comments on the reasons why scholars working out of dependency theory have so hard a time (as evidenced in these volumes) dealing with democracy. The crux of the matter lies in a pervasive discomfort with liberal democracy itself. Dependency theory in general, and the *Transitions* series in particular, rest on a notion of critical theory which in the matter at hand leads analysis to reach beyond political democracy (with its characteristic cautions, compromises, and accommodations) to something better—presumably involving dramatically expanded popular participation in the context of some form of socialism. Throughout these volumes, democracy appears mostly as the absence of negatives: better than the regimes it replaces, but with limited appeal of its own. By this account, democracies emerge out of mutual fear among opponents rather than as the deliberate outcome of concerted commitments to make democratic political arrangements work. The result is analysis that has more to say about transitions than about democracy, and little light to shed on the reasons for democracy's resurgent vigor in the contemporary period.

II

A few words on recent intellectual and political history are appropriate at this point, to set the context for the commentary that follows. Over the past few decades, scholars working with concepts of dependence and political economy have crafted an innovative paradigm for comparative political analysis. Important insights were developed and a generation of fruitful research was launched to work out the contours of this perspective and to solve the puzzles it identified. This new paradigm emerged

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first within Latin America; over time, it has expanded to cover broader issues of social, economic, and political change, moving in the process to Africa, Asia, and, as these volumes show, to Southern Europe.[3]

The basic ideas are familiar by now. The overthrow of democracies in Latin America and the creation of supposedly "new authoritarianisms" was attributed to the elective affinity between an expanding security apparatus, an assertive civil-military technocratic elite, and a development strategy intended to promote capitalism on the periphery through long-term investment in industrialization. Authoritarian rule was said to emerge in order to secure these policies, making repression of the popular sector an integral part of the package.[4] Domestic actors, institutions, and priorities are occasionally conceded to have played an important intervening or mediating role, but in general terms regional and national structures (with their characteristic range of likely outcomes) can be understood from this perspective only in a historically contingent relation with the global political economy.

The problems addressed in this literature stem from the appearance of authoritarianism in the most developed societies of Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay).[5] This localization of the theory's origins and application points up a major early contribution, which, O'Donnell argues, exploded the "optimistic equation" according to which democracy was a natural concomitant of development.[6] From this new vantage point authoritarianism became the norm, and democracy an anomaly requiring explanation.

[3] Note the reversal of longstanding patterns of intellectual transfer. This body of theory emerged within Latin America, determined to make sense of the Latin American experience without simply borrowing terms of reference from Europe or North America. In the process, it challenged many key tenets of social science theory, and gradually spread to order research and reflection elsewhere in the Third World, and now in Europe itself. The well-known case of Liberation Theology offers important parallels, suggesting notable intellectual vigor in contemporary Latin America.

[4] For a still useful overview, see David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). See also Alejandro Foxeley, *Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), and Joseph Ramos, *Neo-Conservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin America, 1973-1983* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[5] The position is not well adapted to the study of agrarian or ethnically divided societies. It thus has little specific relevance to the revolutionary upsurge in Central America, despite notable parallels between agrarian change in this region and industrialization elsewhere. On the link between agrarian transformation and political change, see Enrique Baloyra, "Reactionary Despotism in Central America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 15 (November 1983), 295-319. The position is also ill-suited to the analysis of countries in the middle range of development, leaving them in a residual category.

[6] See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Pattern of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13 (No. 1, 1978), 3-38, and also his *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1973).

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But history did not end with the fall of Southern Cone democracies over the last two decades. Lately, authoritarian regimes have themselves disappeared throughout South America, remaining firm only in the extreme case of Chile and in traditional holdouts like Paraguay. As major Latin American nations returned to democratic politics, they have been joined by older authoritarian systems like Spain and Portugal, and by Southern European variants of the Latin American model such as Greece. In the early 1980s, scholars working within the dependency paradigm began to reflect on these experiences. New concepts and concerns attracted their attention: authoritarianism's presumed inevitability (overdetermined, according to earlier analysis) is no longer emphasized. Instead, stress is placed on failures of political leadership and organization, which undermined democracies and paved the way for military rule in the first place.

These conceptual reorientations gained added impetus from the way the political process evolved.[7] As a practical matter, most of the transitions and democratic consolidations that concern us here have been dominated by a liberal political agenda, one in which civil liberties and political rights, elections and a general concern with due process and procedure take center stage. Key leaders have focused attention and energies on such issues, extending mutual guarantees and trying to draw old enemies together in support of democratic political arrangements. Such efforts have also had wide popular support. Radicals consistently falter in the founding elections of the new democracies, and do little better afterwards.[8]

[7] One becomes accustomed after a while to hearing specialists state that "we used to believe *A* was true, now we know it is really *B*." The *Transitions* editors approach this position, but as we shall see, attribute their conceptual shift more to changing circumstances than to theoretical reevaluation. O'Donnell and Schmitter state the matter as follows:

> Our exploration took a rather different turn from those which have attempted to explain the advent of the very authoritarian regimes whose demise—actual or potential—was the object of our interest. This is somewhat ironic, given the fact that several of the protagonists in our project (one of the coauthors included) were active protagonists in the research and discussions generated by attempts to account for the emergence of those authoritarian regimes. This may be a sign of intellectual flexibility—or of theoretical fuzziness. But in our opinion it is basically a recognition that political and social processes are neither symmetric or reversible. What brings down a democracy is not the inverse of those factors that bring down an authoritarian regime (Vol. 4, p. 18).

[8] The editors treat this largely as the result of "necessary" manipulations of the electoral system. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter:

> Put in a nutshell, parties of the Right-Center and Right must be "helped" to do well, and parties of the Left-Center and Left should not win by an overwhelming majority. This often happens either "artificially," by rigging the rules—for example, by overrepresenting rural districts or small peripheral constituencies—or "naturally," by fragmenting the partisan choices of the Left (usually not a difficult task) and by consolidating those of the

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This should be no surprise. Truly radical or revolutionary change is rare, occurring most often in the wake of the previous regime's total disintegration. In the absence of such collapse or of overwhelming military power on one side, balance and accommodation are the order of the day, and these are the very stuff of liberal democracy. In any event, liberal democracy's characteristic stress on due process and procedural guarantees is bound to look good after lengthy bouts of abuse and arbitrary rule. It may not be very surprising, but the process nonetheless disappoints those who see the demise of authoritarian rule as a chance for thorough reorganization of class relations, of power, and of state and society generally. Przeworski's formulation echoes through the four *Transitions* volumes:

> . . . unfortunately, authoritarian regimes often produce as a counterreaction the romanticization of a limited model of democracy. Democracy restricted to the political realm has historically coexisted with exploitation and oppression at the workplace, within the schools, within bureaucracies, and within families. Struggle for political power is necessary because without it all attempts to transform the society are vulnerable to brutal repression. Yet what we need, and do not have, is a more comprehensive, integral project of antiauthoritarianism that would encompass the totality of social life. (Vol. 3, p. 63.)

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule is of course not the first effort to grapple with issues of authoritarianism, democracy, or transitions after a period of political transformation. Without going all the way back to de Tocqueville, to Weber's great address on "Politics as a Vocation," or to Schumpeter's classic *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, we can still identify a number of significant scholarly efforts. Dahl and Lipset come immediately to mind, along with Lijphart, and Linz and Stepan.[9] The

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Center and Right (sometimes possible thanks to the incumbency resources of those in government) (Vol. 4, p. 62).

This formulation assumes that victory by the Left is somehow normal and natural; a leftist defeat is presented as an anomaly to be explained. The empirical grounds for such an assumption are not clear.

[9] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (New York: Schocken, 1961); Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in W. G. Runciman, ed., *Max Weber: Selections in Translation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 212-25; Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961); Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Dahl, *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), and Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Seymour M. Lipset, "Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959), 69-105, Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), and Lipset, *The First Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and Lijphart, *Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Breakdowns of Dem-*

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analysis in *Breakdowns of Democratic Regimes* by Linz, Stepan, and their collaborators gave particular emphasis to the autonomous role of political variables. Their studies of regime collapse shed considerable light (as in a mirror) on what might make for firmer and more stable democratic politics. In this way, they provided a kind of reverse primer on how to build more viable political agendas while avoiding crises and untenable situations wherever possible.

The concepts of democracy and democratization as used in *Transitions* warrant separate mention. Contemporary discussions of "democracy" generally reflect Schumpeter's lasting influence by their agreement on a few basic defining traits: a national political system characterized by free and open elections, choice between competing slates of leaders, genuine competition, protection of civil liberties, and relatively low barriers to participation. Political arrangements need not be wholly egalitarian or completely participatory to merit the term "democracy": equity in procedure and expandable rules for access and participation, rather than substantive equality, are predominant in this view.

In common usage, "democratization" has several related senses, each with notable implications for democracy. The first is temporal: democratization as a stage in the creation and maintenance of democracy. Relevant phases may run from initial decay of the old regime and inauguration of a new system, through consolidation to (hoped-for) maturity. The second sense of democratization refers to the creation, nurture, and spread of more egalitarian social relations and norms of leadership and authority. These are rooted in greater social and economic equity, and worked out in associational life, especially through encouragement of participation, the development of new sources and styles of leadership, and generally in the way group life is linked to the big structures of national politics.[10] In the volume under review, the label "democratization" is reserved for this second sense; a number of other terms, such as "transitions" and "liberalization," are used more or less interchangeably for the first.

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ocratic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). The wealth of relevant precedents makes the scarcity and inward-looking character of notes and references in the O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead series all the more surprising. Many internal references are to one or another of the editors' "original" formulations of the matter, presumably derived from the series of conferences held between 1979 and 1981 at the Woodrow Wilson Center, where papers were first presented. The *Transitions* volumes have no individual or collective bibliography or index.

[10] Ties like these undergird formal legitimations of democracy with a generalized experience of competition and association in all walks of life. They also provide a concrete basis for the diffusion of norms of accountability. De Tocqueville (fn. 9) and John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), remain classic statements of the issue.

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The editors of *Transitions* repeatedly criticize earlier reliance on static and uncritical concepts of political culture, or on simple correlations with rates of growth or levels of socioeconomic development. Thus, Whitehead properly notes that such formulations made democracy appear to be inevitable and automatic, and in this way hampered efforts to account for the uncertainties and reversals possible in any real historical situation (Vol. 3, p. 38). All this is unexceptionable, but the editors go further to assert that the circumstances that led to earlier democratic breakdowns (as discussed, for example, by Linz and Stepan) are *different in kind* from those that underlie the transitions they wish to address. Thus, O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that what "actors do and do not do seems much less tightly determined by 'macro' structural factors during the transitions we study here than during the breakdown of democratic regimes" (Vol. 4, p. 19).

This large claim rests mostly on the editors' impression of the difference between the apparent "dismayed impotence" of earlier democratic actors caught in a web of closing spaces and reduced opportunities and the "exultant feeling" of openness and expanding opportunities that accompanies the end of authoritarian rule (Vol. 4, p. 19). They also argue that, while democracies are brought down by conspiracies involving few actors, the opening and eventual fall of authoritarian regimes has a "crucial component" of large-scale popular mobilization (Vol. 4, p. 18). They believe that such elements dramatically reduce the determining role of external factors in the political process, thereby enhancing the autonomy of national-level actors in new and unique ways.

On closer inspection, these assertions do not hold up very well; the evidence is at best mixed for all cases and periods. Popular mobilizations are not exclusive to opposition to authoritarian rule. Massive mobilizations have also hastened the fall of democracies; Chile is perhaps the most notable recent case in point. The economic and military difficulties that presaged the collapse of many interwar European democracies are well known. Economic and fiscal crises also spurred the fall of Latin American democracies during the 1960s and 1970s. Similar problems have undermined recent authoritarian regimes, driving some military elites from office (Greece, Argentina) while encouraging others (Peru, Brazil, Uruguay) to negotiate a way out of power. In all these cases, new governments were left to deal with the consequences of failed economic policies and armed adventures.[11] These observations suggest that the relative

[11] John Sheahan's unfortunately brief contribution discusses the difficult economic legacy of recent authoritarian regimes and outlines a sensible agenda for the future (Vol. 3, pp. 154-64).

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weight of political variables and intra-national circumstances is most likely constant.

Throughout the *Transitions* series, the editors affirm a normative bias for democracy, but a closer look turns up a curiously empty set of concepts. Political democracy appears in these volumes mostly as a temporary, second-best solution. Democratic political arrangements are painted in neutral colors, characterized at best by the absence of negatives, with few positive virtues of their own. Thus, O'Donnell and Schmitter:

> . . . political democracy is produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than by prior unity and consensus. . . . Transition toward democracy is by no means a linear or rational process. There is simply too much uncertainty about capabilities and too much suspicion about intentions for that. Only once the transition has passed and citizens have learned to tolerate its contingent compromises can one expect political democracy to induce a more reliable awareness of convergent interests and to create a less suspicious attitude toward each others' purposes, ideas, and ideals (Vol. 4, p. 72).

These are the last lines of the entire series; together, they sum up much of what the editors and contributors have to offer. They reveal an empirical focus more concerned with transitions than with either authoritarianism or democracy. This heightens awareness of uncertainties and makes short-term tactical maneuvering central to analysis. In theoretical terms, the passage just cited assumes that agreements reached (often reluctantly) under crisis conditions tend to diffuse slowly, with great difficulty and notable social costs to society at large. Average people are excluded from this analysis, as if they had not been involved all along; they simply remain in the wings, waiting for the transition to be complete. But this will not do. It divorces the process from those involved, as if elite maneuvers were the only point at issue. It also ignores the many ties that bind leaders to mass publics, for example through political parties, trade unions, and secondary associations of all kinds.

When regimes change, rules of the game are in flux, new leadership groups emerge, and different kinds of issues, demands, and interests clamor for a place in the political sun. In circumstances like these, a central task for political leaders is to order the transition in ways that ensure minimal loss and maximum possibilities for future growth and consolidation. Creation of durable methods for dealing with uncertainty is critical to the whole process. The uncertainties characteristic of democratic politics are not limitless; rather, they are *institutionalized*. If these incipient democracies are to have any hope of achieving durable legitimacy, structures and operating procedures cannot be uncertain in the same way outcomes are. Legitimacy, in turn, involves commitment to operative

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rules that make conflict, change, and conciliation possible without institutional collapse. The central role of dealing with uncertainty is recognized by Przeworski, who describes democracy as a "contingent institutional compromise" (Vol. 3, p. 59). He goes on to note that

> What is possible are institutional agreements, that is, compromises about the institutions that shape prior possibilities of the realization of group-specific interests. If a peaceful transition to democracy is to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse this process. The solutions to the democratic compromise consist of institutions (Vol. 3, p. 60).

These considerations suggest that transitions are a time for working out basic issues about the character and conduct of public affairs. It is thus not surprising that much early regime-building effort hinges on pacts, agreements, constituent assemblies, and constitution making—all of which provide forums for negotiating the terms of present and future political life. Classic questions of legitimacy and representation surface repeatedly. What makes representation legitimate? What makes legitimacy durable and institutions effective? No clear guidelines or answers are provided in these volumes, but the editors' general stance emerges in the way they distinguish "mere liberalization" from "full democratization."

The broad outlines of this distinction are indicated by Przeworski's call, cited above, for the development of an anti-authoritarian project embracing the totality of social life. Liberalization has more modest goals, and is depicted in these volumes as a combination of loosened restrictions and expanded individual and group rights. Democratization goes beyond conventionally political categories of rights to include "social democracy" and "economic democracy." O'Donnell and Schmitter state that "their simultaneous presence or attainment is what is meant here by 'socialization,' and this remains a powerful hope for many actors" (Vol. 4, p. 12). In this vein, they go on to affirm that "in the contemporary world, these two transitions—to political democracy and to socialism—are simultaneously on the agenda" (Vol. 4, p. 13).

The distinction of liberalization from democratization raises issues of sequence and substance at one and the same time. The editors believe that, in the absence of overwhelming external force, stabilizing a political transition requires leaders to accommodate interests and extend guarantees of protection to property. Such agreements help to pull elements of the old regime out of previous alliances and to assure them that the new democracy poses little threat to their basic interests. This type of accommodation may enhance the survivability of transitional regimes, but the cost can be high. Class and property relations are typically frozen

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(Przeworski, Vol. 3, pp. 61-63; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Vol. 4, p. 69), and radical challengers and their programs are effectively made marginal if not eliminated altogether. Movement away from such "limited democracies" toward what the editors see as "more advanced forms" (Vol. 4, pp. 42, 43) is likely to come slowly, "on the installment plan" (Vol. 4, p. 45), with these initial agreements providing a foundation onto which a series of piecemeal reforms can be added.

Arrangements of this kind are well known in the literature. They may be concluded among outgoing and incoming leaders, and also between political challengers, in an effort to control the tenor of post-authoritarian politics, regardless of the wishes of those leaving power.[12] The agreements in question can take many specific forms, ranging from informal understandings about rules of the game to explicit pacts between groups and parties, and formal constitutions. All these pacts, agreements, and rules have a curious status in the *Transitions* series. They are recognized as common, but disliked for the accommodation and deferral of popular interests they entail. Editors and contributors repeatedly suggest that the trade-offs which undergird these arrangements cost more than they are worth (O'Donnell, Vol. 2, pp. 9, 12-13). Accepted as occasionally desirable and possibly necessary in the short term, they are criticized as elitist manipulations, negotiated behind the backs of mass publics.[13] The point is stated most boldly by Terry Karl, who argues that elite pact-making "represents the construction of democracy by antidemocratic means" and is an "inherently antidemocratic form of interest representation" (Vol. 2, pp. 198, 218). The matter is of some moment: as noted earlier, many recent transitions to democracy (including the most durable) are controlled by Center or Center Right coalitions, where the kinds of pacts just described play a significant role. To assume that such experiences are by nature elitist and antidemocratic sidesteps the issue of representation, and avoids the question how elites are linked to mass publics in the first place.

[12] This suggests that O'Donnell and Schmitter may be too quick to see rulers' potential refusal to negotiate as a negative index of the necessity of pacts (Vol. 4, p. 39). Pacts can be negotiated among challengers themselves; in any event, exiting rulers may lack the capacity to enforce agreements insisted upon with great tenacity. In his contribution to Volume 2, Gillespie makes this point for the case of Uruguay. Pacts can cover a wide range of situations, including some in which group interests may be sacrificed indefinitely for the goal of long-term consolidation. A case in point is Togliatti's famous *svolta di Salerno*, which committed Italian communists to work within a liberal political framework. There is an extensive scholarly literature on pacts. In addition to the sources cited in fn. 10, see Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975), 477-505, and Arend Lijphart's still influential "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21 (January 1969), 207-25.

[13] This sort of critique has become common lately. Another recent example is John Peeler, *Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

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These reflections suggest the need to give classic notions of representation their due, and not to insist on some ultimate test according to which institutions and political systems generally can be democratic only if each component part is egalitarian and democratic. The editors underscore the manipulative and exclusionary character of pacts, but they rarely ask why the political leaders had elite status in the first place. This question would require serious attention to the social foundations of political parties, and to how leaders find roots in the transformations through which parties and other mediating structures emerge and take hold.

Leaders and followers cannot be examined in isolation, but must be grasped through the construction of organized social and political relationships, and through the day-to-day struggle whereby issues are framed and legitimating arguments advanced in concrete societies and social groups. As a practical matter, such links are commonly maintained by political parties, which often manage to retain popular support even in the face of extended repression.[14] But political parties are not much in evidence here. The editors remain content to call for parties "rooted in the popular sector" (Vol. 1, p. 13) while rejecting any particular party that might claim such rootedness through support at the ballot box. Thus, we are left with reified social forces moving at one level, and leaders interacting at another.

These general comments suggest the extent to which many of the central themes in these volumes rest on assumptions about civil society and the role of popular groups. The editors and authors use the concept of civil society to denote the emergence of groups independent of state tutelage and control. Such groups develop and ultimately press claims of collective identity and autonomous action against states and social elites long accustomed to dominate through corporatist or patrimonial manipulations. The editors emphasize that the "resurrection of civil society" (Vol. 4, p. 26) helps to spur and empower transitions to democracy. They also note that the proliferation of popular "spaces" (through new organizations and demands) can force regimes to alter policy agendas and to lay the ground work for more enduring decentralization and democratization (Vol. 4, p. 53). Indeed, civil society is a sufficiently important category here for Schmitter to attribute much of the strength of incipient Southern European democracies to the greater "civicness" of civil society in these cases (Vol. 1, pp. 6-8).

All this makes one look for systematic treatment of specific elements

[14] Cf. Karen Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of Bureaucratic Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 17 (April 1985), 253-75.

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that develop such a life or press such claims. Such studies would have to consider changes in social structure and cultural norms that help create and nurture new groups, and that shape their links to the state and other dominant institutions. They could shed light on the way new ideas are worked out in practice, through the ordinary structuring and routines of group life. Analysis of this kind would be especially welcome now, in view of how rich recent experience is in relevant instances: neighborhood groups, food price protests, churches, human rights networks, mothers' groups, ecological movements, and independent peasant groups and trade unions, to name only a few.[15] But, apart from a handful of case studies (Garretón on Chile is a notable instance), there is very little here. O'Donnell and Schmitter discuss civil society and political change in the concluding volume (Vol. 4, pp. 48-56), but their treatment is too quick and schematic to do more than give a rough overview and broach the subject in general terms. Among the general and comparative chapters, only Cardoso's account of Brazilian entrepreneurs takes up the matter of civil society in concrete terms.

To this point, I have underscored the need to give greater value to the pacts and accommodations typical of liberal democracy. I have also argued for incorporating civil society into analysis in more specific and systematic ways. The tension between these two arguments can be resolved in theory as it is in practice, by close attention to linkages. The editors' criticisms of previous work on "correlates of democracy" (e.g., economic, social, cultural) is generally well taken. But their own inadequate analysis of the linkages between leaders and followers suggests that much remains to be learned from close inspection of the "social bases" of democratic politics—the organized relations among mass publics, social movements and groups, and elements of leadership, motivation, and legitimacy. Without careful attention to these issues, little insight is possible into how democratic life can be built in open systems, why it is valued by elites and average citizens, or the specific ways in which it can be reinforced (or undermined) in daily practice.

These considerations are pertinent to the analysis of pacts. Pacts are possible only where several conditions hold. Leaders must want to make them happen. They also need to trust one another to respect any agreements reached. Such desire and trust often come only as a result of learning from bitter failures in the past. Although inter-elite agreement is nec-

[15] Cf. the studies collected in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 1988); Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, "New Social Movements, Political Culture, and Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," *Telos*, No. 61 (Fall 1984), 17-52; and Richard Sklar, "Developmental Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29 (October 1987), 686-714.

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essary, it is not a sufficient condition. Leaders must also be able to bring their followers along, convincing them that pacts are worthwhile, and that short-term sacrifices are necessary for long-term institutional survival. The whole package works only if elites and popular groups are linked in mutually valued and enduring ways. Of course, the ties between leaders and followers are neither inevitable nor automatic. They reflect continuous organizational effort, a measure of accountability, and participation by popular sectors in ways that grant legitimacy to the leaders whose actions and stated goals resonate with their own needs and aspirations.

In this regard, the editors' concern for democracy and democratization isolates a real problem, but poses the issue in misleading terms. As de Tocqueville pointed out, the lessons learned, the skills acquired, and the habits developed in one sphere of life can spill over to shape perception and action elsewhere.[16] But the process cannot be grasped in abstract terms. For analysis to have any hope of accuracy or completeness, it is vital to deal with real people, not simply "the people." To say that analysis must deal with real people affirms neither voluntarism nor some extreme form of methodological individualism. Rather, it underscores the need to address how specific groups continuously renegotiate their ties to dominant institutions, and in the process rework their understanding of what these relations are all about and what, if anything, makes them legitimate. Such analysis would put human agents at the center of attention, and address particular issues like class, injustice, exploitation, or equality as they are worked through by real people in concrete historical circumstances. An excellent recent example of this kind of study is James Scott's *Weapons of the Weak*, which shows in fine detail that legitimacy, acquiescence, and resistance come in many forms.[17] As Scott demonstrates, vo-

[16] A concrete instance much stressed by de Tocqueville is the relation of associational life to politics. He argued that experience in political associations gave Americans habits, skills, and models of proper action that they then put to use in other walks of life, thereby giving political democracy a firm base in everyday discourse and action. For this reason, he saw the art of association as "the mother of all action," and described political associations as "large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association" (de Tocqueville, fn. 9, pp. 139-40).

The title given to Chapter 9 of the first volume of *Democracy in America* is suggestive: "The Laws Contribute More to the Maintenance of the Democratic Republic in the United States Than Do the Physical Circumstances of the Country, and Mores Do More than Laws." By "mores," de Tocqueville meant to denote much of what is considered here under the rubric of civil society: manners and styles of social interaction, patterns of family life, prevailing norms about hierarchy, equality, and authority, and the mutually reinforcing links between civil and political associations.

[17] Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). See in particular Scott's discussions of the need to put human agents at the center of analysis (pp. 41-47), of ideology and ideological work (pp. 184-240), and of the concept of hegemony (pp. 304-50).

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cabularies of class or democratization do not exhaust the possibilities of understanding, motivation, or action.

III

Limitations of space preclude detailed assessment of the individual essays, but a few points may nonetheless be noted. The specific case studies vary enormously in time frame, scope of coverage, and core issues. They run the gamut from vast, generalizing analyses of change around the Mediterranean (Giner) to detailed accounts of a democracy's genesis and subsequent consolidation (Diamandouros on Greece, Gillespie on Uruguay). Some of the strongest contributions (Cavarozzi on Argentina, Maxwell on Portugal, Cotler on Peru) are distinctly Linzian in tone. This means that they look closely at the independent role that political variables—such as effective leadership, organizational strength or weakness, ideology, and specific institutional configurations—play in determining political outcomes. Others (Karl on Venezuela, Martins on Brazil) hold more or less to the dependence paradigm, stressing the critical part of class interests and economic constraints and opportunities in the transition to democracy.

There is, understandably, much concern with change and transformation. Occasionally this leads to creative and useful analyses. A case in point is Cavarozzi's chapter on Argentine political cycles, which illuminates the reasons for that nation's many political failures and shows how each failure changed the subsequent balance of forces and outlooks. In other studies, change appears more as movement from one stable point to another than as a process of continuing conflict and struggle. This static vision emerges most clearly in Martins's chapter on Brazil, which presents the fact of change within authoritarian regimes as a major discovery. Only a handful of contributors stick to the editors' general themes (Sunar and Sayari on Turkey, Maravall and Santamaria on Spain), while others (Middlebrook on Mexico) are simply straightforward (though well-done) descriptive accounts of recent political history.

As noted earlier, the conceptual move from dependence to democratization entails a shift in levels of analysis, away from global or regional elements and toward enhanced concern with the play of forces within national societies. Indeed, Whitehead argues that in recent transitions, local political forces have operated with "an untypically high degree of autonomy" (Vol. 3, pp. 4-5). This new emphasis on internal forces and contexts underscores the role leaders play in shaping alternatives, managing crises, and putting creative solutions together, rather than passively awaiting the

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operation of automatic forces or the arrival of marching orders from abroad.

The editors' concern with political variables and intranational forces is welcome, but on the evidence presented here, external influences may be underplayed. For example, Italy's democratic consolidation was clearly guaranteed by Allied military occupation, leaving only the details of regime form to be decided.[18] Military events also played a decisive role in discrediting authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal, and Argentina. Other relevant external forces include the allure (and conditions) of membership in the E.E.C., the role of organizations like the Socialist International (detailed by Whitehead), and the economic disasters that convinced several Latin American militaries to quit office in as good order as they could manage. These reflections suggest that the issue is not so much internal versus external forces as why and how alternatives take the form they do in given societies. Although the editors have apparently come, over time, to value the autonomy of internal politics, they remain unsatisfied with the outcomes. They are also unwilling to draw the obvious lessons from experience: that conservative transitions are more durable, that it is wise to avoid polarization wherever possible, that the left rarely has massive electoral support, and that popular groups often value civil liberties and political democracy as much as they prize issues of equity or redistribution.[19]

IV

Why does liberal democracy appear to be so little loved by these observers despite its apparent vigor and popular backing? Why is it so often accepted only with grudging ill grace, as "mere liberalization," "bourgeois," "semi-," "quasi-," or "restricted" democracy, to be distinguished at every turn from a supposedly truer and more pervasive "democratization"? The matter has complex theoretical roots that stem from how the editors define the task at hand, and also from their view of what theory is all about in the first place.

The studies collected in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* focus more on conjunctures and moments of transition than on the dynamic characteristics of any system in particular. A mo-

[18] In a similar vein, it seems at the very least inadequate to attribute postwar restoration of French democracy to the effects of "armed struggle" (Vol. 1, p. 14).

[19] Cf. Paul Cammack and Philip O'Brien, *Generals in Retreat* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1985); Cammack, "Democratisation: A Review of the Issues," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 4 (No. 2, 1985), 39-46; Juan Rial, "The Uruguayan Elections of 1984: A Triumph of the Center," in Drake and Silva (fn. 2), 245-72.

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ment's reflection suggests how curious it is to pretend to study "prospects for democracy" without serious consideration of democracy itself. A focus on transitions alone is unlikely to get to the heart of the matter. Complete understanding requires that transitions be set in the larger context of democracy's social, economic, cultural, and institutional bases. Only then can the relation between transitions and the possibilities for subsequent democratic politics be elaborated in full and convincing fashion. But, as we have seen, little of this is done. Inadequate specification of civil society and the marginalization of political parties are especially crippling in this regard.

Part of the problem grows from a commitment to critical theory that undergirds the *Transitions* volumes. According to this general position, theory must do more than just clarify and sort out causes, effects, and relationships. Such a position would leave reality unchallenged and unchanged. In contrast, a critical theory is committed to change and provides social agents with theoretical tools for understanding and altering conditions of oppression. Dependency theory has long stressed the need for practical critical action and the importance of remaining open to alternatives beyond those visible in any given situation.[20] Commitment to a critical vision of theory puts the *Transition* editors in a quandary. They hope to grasp the dynamics of transitions and subsequent "prospects for democracy," but pay little heed to democracy as a coherent political system. They are unhappy with the outcomes democracies produce, and consistently look beyond existing or likely democracies to better alternatives—presumably some form of socialism. They echo Przeworski's warning against undue romanticization of liberal democracy, but fail to recognize their own romanticization of popular groups or to see the danger of attributing support for radical alternatives to such groups in an automatic way.

Without a more adequate concept of democracy, the whole effort stalls. A purportedly critical theory is self-defeating if it cannot address the operative principles of a system. It is not enough to state preferences for democracy; any social or political theory or body of explanation that claims to study and promote democracy must articulate concepts that

[20] As one classic formulation has it, verification of this theory

> depends on the capacity of social movements to implement what are perceived as structural possibilities [which in turn depend on] real social and political struggle. So the "demonstration" of an interpretation . . . depends to some extent on its own ability to show socio-political actors the possible solutions to contradictory situations.

Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependence and Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), xiv.

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make effective action within political structures possible, even if only to change them. Machiavelli observed that "men always commit the error of not knowing where to limit their hopes, and by trusting to these rather than to a just measure of their resources, they are generally ruined."[21] The point holds as much for theories of politics as for politics itself. There are simply too many theoretical and empirical gaps in the *Transitions* volumes for analysis or prescription to be of much help. The difficulty lies not in a lack of will, but in a weak concept of democracy.

The editors and many of the contributors seem to consider the major motivation behind transitions to democracy to be fear and a healthy respect for opponents. Although these are important, they are insufficient to explain the commitments to institutionalized compromise, accommodation, and mutual guarantees typical of democratic political systems. Reading through these volumes, one would (with rare exceptions) have no idea of why or how democracy as an ideal has inspired generations of political struggle to get it started and make it last. There is much conflict in these pages and lots of tactical maneuvering, but little passion or commitment. But reducing democracy to the temporary outcome of uncertainty and stalemate short-changes the people who have fought so long and hard in so many times and places to turn it from hope into reality. Those who treat democracy as little more than the absence of negatives forget that there is no democracy without democrats, at least not for very long.

[21] Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1950), Second Book, chap. xxvii, p. 378.

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A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY: The "German Question" in Atlantic Alliance Relations

By JOYCE MARIE MUSHABEN

James A. Cooney, Gordon A. Craig, Hans-Peter Schwarz, and Fritz Stern, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States—Changing Political, Social and Economic Relations*. Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 1984, 253 pp.

Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds., *The Public and Atlantic Defense*. Totowa, NJ, and London: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, 398 pp.

Eberhard Schulz and Peter Danylow, *Bewegung in der deutschen Frage? Die ausländischen Besorgnisse über die Entwicklung in den beiden deutschen Staaten* [Movement in the German question? International apprehensions regarding developments in the two German states]. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1984, 166 pp.

Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* [The tamed Germans: From power as obsession to power in abeyance]. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985, 191 pp.

Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Die Identität der Deutschen* [The identity of the Germans]. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1983, 355 pp.

I. Redefining the German Question

PRESIDENT Richard von Weizsäcker of the German Federal Republic observed in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of the collapse of the Third Reich that "a question does not simply cease to exist because no one has an answer for it, especially when the state of affairs is such that it keeps raising the question anew."[1] What, exactly, constitutes the core of the German question? The countries of Europe, including the two Germanys, have managed to avoid the ravages of war for four decades. Both the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic have assumed positions of political and economic preeminence within their respective blocs. As separate entities, they have cultivated a degree of internal security and social solidarity never before witnessed in German history. Other industrial states look to German economic and technological achievements in the postwar era with a mixture of respect, envy,

[1] Von Weizsäcker, *Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter* [German history goes on] (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 8. Unless noted otherwise, all translations are by the present author.

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and—inevitably—trepidation. Does the problem of a resurgent *furor teutonicus*, capable of reinflicting its insatiable quest for power and *Lebensraum* on the weaker states of Europe, exist mainly in the minds of the beholders? Does the current constellation of political, economic, and military forces dictate that what was and is conceivably good for the Germans is and will necessarily remain bad for everyone else?

The posture of conscious ambivalence manifested by members of both the Eastern and Western camps since at least the early 1980s is due in part to the general uncertainty as to what the Germans really want, either in the short or the long run. This uncertainty does not preclude other international actors from making assumptions about what the two states should and could aspire to after forty years of division. Neither the uncertainty nor the corresponding assumptions reflect the extent to which the German question has been transformed over the last decade-and-a-half, largely as a result of *Ostpolitik* developments initiated by then-Chancellor Willy Brandt. But the very success of earlier *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* initiatives in reducing the tensions between the FRG and the GDR has created domestic demands for a "pacification" of the two Germanys that balance-of-power advocates also find unsettling. Improvements in FRG-GDR relations have, moreover, given birth to a set of political paradoxes that compel the German states themselves to adopt a posture of conscious ambivalence regarding their common "future perspectives."

The German question has been transformed into *many* German questions whose resolution depends upon a number of ostensibly contradictory or mutually exclusive prerequisites. In order to comprehend what it is that the Germans could possibly want and reasonably hope to attain by way of collective security policies, I have devised an analytical framework consisting of four paradoxes. These paradoxes reflect the inconsistent, if not irreconcilable, nature of prevailing political visions, official state policies, and the collective *modus vivendi* determining the West German role in the Atlantic Alliance. Although I recognize that the German Democratic Republic constitutes at least half of the equation, this essay's emphasis on the Atlantic Alliance precludes more than summary references to the paradoxes evolving "over there."

The analyses presented in the volumes under review are representative of the different paradoxes that emerge—depending on which German questions are posed and which are accorded priority by forces inside and outside the two Germanys. For simplicity's sake, I will ascribe a single paradox to each of four works cited above, using the fifth to frame my conclusions; that is not to deny the importance of cross-cutting arguments

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and interactive effects, however. The four paradoxes may be described as follows: (1) the nation/state identity paradox; (2) the reunification/integration paradox; (3) the stability/security paradox; and (4) the lessons of history/normalcy paradox. Although each deserves serious consideration by other members of NATO, not all call for decisive action on the part of the collective security system. Of the four, the stability/security paradox appears to be the most salient, raising the more problematic issues with regard to future Atlantic Alliance relations. Certain courses of action that might have been pursued three decades earlier to alleviate contradictory German stability and security needs have lost their relevance (for example, reunification through neutralization, as proposed in the Stalin Note of 1952). New approaches, better suited to a possible shift in the prevailing security paradigm, have yet to be devised.[2] An assessment of the significance of the German question thus transformed, and possible reverberations in the larger field of East-West relations, will be reserved for the concluding section of the essay.

On the premise that the transformation of the German question is largely the result of dramatic changes that have occurred in the domestic and global political-economic and geostrategic environments since the end of World War II, it may be useful to summarize the more important of these changes before examining each paradox. What factors or developments are responsible for a renaissance of interest in a pan-Germanism that is not yet clearly defined but nonetheless hotly debated? From the Germans' perspective, two significant changes have *not* come to pass: first, "the Six," then "the Nine" (and probably "the Twelve") member-states have failed to bring about the permanent, supranational integration of Europe foreseen by the founding fathers of the Common Market. Especially among the younger generations, the European Community is more likely to be perceived as a bureaucratic monolith in its own right rather than as an alternative to the regulation, hierarchy, and ineffective use of resources found within the national boundaries. Second, deterrence strategies and protracted arms control negotiations have failed to eradicate the sources of antipathy and distrust between nations. Recent NATO and Warsaw Pact modernizations have not succeeded in providing the ultimate clients of their respective alliance systems with a sense of more rather than less security—although the Geneva and Reykjavik

[2] Among those who have long hinted that such a shift in paradigms may be occurring are Donald Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970's: The Search for a Perspective," *International Organization* 28 (Spring 1974), reprinted in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, eds., *Globalism versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 37-56.

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summits have raised new hopes that arms reductions are possible if not imminent.

In addition to these non-developments, five changes *have* occurred that also appear to have contributed to a renewed interest in the German question. First, under the labels of interdependence and postindustrialism, the nation-state has lost many of its traditional functions—only to acquire new ones that are often more difficult to balance and to fulfill.[3] The state's former capacity for imposing internal order and regulating relations between its own people and those of other systems has been undermined by a democratic commitment to self-determination, rising educational levels, and a corresponding increase in citizen demands, combined with the advent of mass communication and popular access to international travel, among other things. The state's ability to determine the character of its economy and define its culture has been superseded by the reality of transnational investment and production and the inescapable influences of Coca-Cola, McDonalds, blue jeans, and "Dallas." Moreover, because of bipolarization and nuclear armaments, the nation-state's power to secure its sovereignty and its survival by means of bilateral and regional defense accords has been rendered more or less symbolic. The new functions of the state focus on expanded responsibilities for citizens' welfare and the negotiation of conditions at the international level that pertain ever more directly to citizens' livelihood, such as the reduction of unemployment based on export competition, or the avoidance of future Chernobyls.

The 1970s witnessed a reemphasis on the importance of national interests in the wake of resource shortages and rapid fluctuations in the international climate, as manifested, for example, in protectionist trends and in the expansion of the French *force de frappe*. No state wishes to make its ability to survive completely dependent upon the goodwill of the collective, especially in the event of a serious deterioration in East-West or superpower relations. By the end of the 1970s, a second development gathered momentum, involving a growing consciousness of (and dissatisfaction with) the lack of symmetry between the reality of West German *economic* strength and influence, on the one hand, and the artificial limi-

[3] Two German scholars attempting to redefine the functions of the nation-state are Peter Alter, *Nationalismus* [Nationalism] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), and Reinhard Kühnl, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage* [Nation, nationalism, national question] (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1986). Diverse positions in the American debate over whether or not "interdependence" is on the rise are represented by Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); and Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" *World Politics* 26 (October 1973), 1-27.

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tations upon the FRG's exercise of *political* power in regional and international affairs, on the other.[4] This rejection of a longstanding "political dwarf/economic giant" characterization goes hand in hand with West Germany's evolving interest in wielding greater influence abroad: both can be interpreted as a sign of normalization and of the FRG's coming of political age under a set of firmly established liberal-democratic institutions.

Third, after forty years of unquestioning loyalty to the Alliance, the West Germans have begun to voice the expectation that they have earned a more sympathetic hearing with regard to their unique security plight. They seek more active support for their efforts to alleviate the human costs (that is, the separation of families) associated with the ongoing division of Europe.[5] In light of the disproportionately heavy risks now associated with the collective security requirements to which they "voluntarily" ascribe, they would like to be appreciated rather than feared.

A fourth, generation-linked value change is becoming evident among the younger, better-educated segments of the population that are no longer inclined toward uncritical acceptance of American dominance in European affairs. The U.S. image has changed in Europe; in part, this is due to the different attitudes of Americans toward Europe, and in part to the Europeans' altered assessment of themselves and their capacity for independent diplomatic action. Europe's changing perceptions of the United States, in particular, have precipitated a crisis of confidence among the Western allies, bolstered by military-technological developments that render a decoupling of American and European/German security interests possible if not probable. Finally, popular acceptance of *Ostpolitik* and the politics of negotiation seem to be irreversibly entrenched in the FRG, geared toward improving relations with "the other Germany." Detente constitutes an important plank in the platform of all four parliamentary parties. Treaties, accords, and negotiations between the two Germanys have acquired a dynamic of their own; concrete gains

[4] Though not exactly "mainstream," one politician who has occasionally been quite vocal in this regard is Bavarian Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauss. The view that Bonn is compelled to play a world-political role but is denied that which would enable it to do so is presented by Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Die Bundesrepublik—Eine heimliche Grossmacht?" [The Federal Republic—A secret superpower?] in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B26/79 (June 1979), 3-19.

[5] Such sentiments are expressed most directly in the context of major diplomatic gaffes, usually on the part of the United States. One fairly notorious example involved Richard Perle, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security. In an interview with an Osnabrück newspaper in mid-December 1986, Perle unleashed a bevy of protests in conservative as well as in liberal and left circles by suggesting that Bonn curtail its special loans and credits to the G.D.R. in order to increase its financial contributions to NATO. *Der Spiegel* 52, December 22, 1986, pp. 28-29.

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will not be traded lightly for abstract promises by alliance partners. Public support for rapproachement has remained stable through good- and bad-weather periods in East-West relations.[6]

Although many of these changes were rooted in the policies of the SPD-FDP coalition (1969-1982), the trends have thus far persisted under Chancellor Kohl's Christian-Liberal government. Still, all of the developments and non-developments cited above offer only partial explanations as to why the German question has been transformed, and why it is making its way back onto the European political agenda. More important for our purposes is how the various German questions have been modified, and how they relate to each other.

II. The Nation/State Identity Paradox

For those bold enough to enter the historical thicket of German nationalism, Werner Weidenfield's edited volume provides a politically provocative and critically self-reflective overview of the many paths to be taken in search of the German identity. The definition of identity applied throughout these essays by prominent (and predominantly) German academics rests upon Erik Erikson's concept of a reciprocal relationship between a permanent, self-contained consciousness and a continuous, if partial, participation in a collective, group-specific orientation (p. 18). The array of topics covered in fifteen separate analyses is consistent with Weidenfeld's threefold aim: to treat the past and the present more or less equally as constituent elements of the German identity; to balance the negative against the positive aspects of the German character in its various developmental phases; and to allow for the interplay of three potentially competitive identities, rooted in the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and the all-German nation, respectively.

The specific German question addressed in this work can be broken down into three points of inquiry. The first—what do the Germans really want?—is easily answered in the form of a generally accepted proposition: they are searching for a new identity that will liberate them from the pre-1945 profile of the "guilty Nazi" and the postwar image of "vassals" in an occupied state.[7] The second and third queries—namely, which identity do they mean, and what shall comprise its substance? and why do they need it, and what will they do with it?—find no definitive answer either among these authors or within the Federal Republic at large. Con-

[6] Richard Löwenthal, "The German Question Transformed," *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Winter 1984-85), 313.
[7] *Ibid.*, 302.

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stitutional imperatives introduced in 1949, when juxtaposed against the political realities of the 1970s and 1980s, give rise to the nation/state identity paradox that renders these questions unanswerable in either the short or the long run.

The parameters of the nation/state identity paradox are specified by the Preamble to the West Germany *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) that serves as the provisional constitution until that day when it shall be replaced by one "freely decided upon" by all Germans, not just those residing in the western zones [Article 146/GG]. Eberhard Schulz has noted, however, that the imperative contained in the Preamble is in fact addressed to *das deutsche Volk*, not to the government of the Federal Republic. Moreover, it does not specify the eventual creation of a unified set of state institutions. The emphasis falls not on unity *per se* but on "unity in freedom."[8] Looking to the once-and-future nation, the Federal Republic is not free to cultivate an identity in the form of self-contained state consciousness that would be more deep-seated than mere system-affect, for fear of overriding or excluding the prospects for a new national consciousness. Yet, Willy Brandt's formula for "two states in one nation," when coupled with Egon Bahr's prescription for *Wandel durch Annäherung* (a "moving closer" to East Germany intended to produce in the GDR the internal changes necessary to allow for the free determination of a new, shared constitution), implies that citizens of the Federal Republic would have to identify first with their own state as a stepping stone to an eventual identification with the other, and thence, with the reunified nation.[9]

The GDR, having largely disassociated itself from the fascist past, has avoided the nation/state identity paradox by assuming a more positive orientation toward its own nationhood. In a concerted effort to legitimize its own existence internally by elevating its status in the court of other nation-states, it dropped its 1968 title of "socialist state of the German nation" in 1974, and redesignated itself "the socialist German nation-state." The past ten years have witnessed a conscious attempt on the part of the

[8] The German word *Volk* is a much more holistic or organic concept than its English translation "folk" or "people" would imply; I therefore prefer to use the original. For a further elaboration of the Preamble, see Eberhard Schulz, *Die deutsche Nation in Europa. Internationale und historische Dimensionen* [The German nation in Europe: International and historical dimensions] (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1982), 166ff.

[9] The formulation of "two states in Germany" was first used by Brandt in his Inaugural Address (October 28, 1969) and elaborated as the two-states-in-one-nation theme in his Report on the Condition of the Nation to the West German Bundestag (January 14, 1970). Bahr introduced the concept of *Wandel durch Annäherung* in his Lecture at the Evangelical Academy in Tützingen (July 15, 1963). Relevant excerpts from all three addresses are reprinted in Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, eds., *Die Linke und die nationale Frage. Dokumente zur deutschen Einheit seit 1945* [The Left and the national question: Documents on German unity since 1945] (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981), 302-5, 235-40.

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SED's leadership to "de-Germanize" its half of the former Reich by replacing the adjective *deutsch* with the label *DDR-national* in the names of various organizations and publications.[10] Constitutional and statutory revisions undertaken in 1974 were part of a bold campaign to confront the problem head-on with the formula, "citizenship: GDR; nationality: German." While the leadership may have escaped the identity paradox at the official level, it is nonetheless a long way from resolving the split image, double life and non-identification problems witnessed at the grassroots level, as illustrated in the chapters by Rudolph and Grunenberg.

It is conceivable that national reunification need not be structured in terms of "blood, soil, and iron," or a shared set of governing institutions with mutually binding political processes and policies. Its longstanding *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) policy notwithstanding, the East German leadership is suddenly rediscovering a common history, rehabilitating the likes of Luther, Bismarck, and even Frederick the Great. Is there a new, constitutionally permissible German identity waiting to be forged within the framework of a "culture-nation" as opposed to a "state-nation"? The image becomes no clearer with this distinction. The historical treatments in the Weidenfeld volume by von Thadden, Bussmann, Stürmer, von Bredow, and Rovan illustrate that the German *Volk* needs to know where it has come from in order to determine where it is going. But the return to a common historical foundation provides no guarantee that a divided people will interpret this history in the same light or derive common lessons for the future. "For the Germans of the GDR," von Thadden notes, "the Reformation took place in Wittenberg, for the Germans of the FRG in Worms; [it is] only unfortunate that in both cities it was the same Luther" (p. 57). Reliance on the culture-nation concept alone results in "commonality without identity" (p. 84).

The Federal Republic is thus left to its own devices. Three contributors to the Weidenfeld volume, Rausch, von Krockow, and Mommsen, ascertain that the West German identity is in flux—or at least, that the political consciousness and social values seem to be. But are these not the core elements of a new, FRG-national identity that Schweigler discerned over a decade ago?[11] What becomes of the "two states in one nation" minus one state (the GDR)? Are we left with one state plus one nation, or do we get two nations in the longer run? Weidenfeld's prognosis is that the Germans will learn to live with an identity of many layers, and that separate FRG- and GDR- "state consciousnesses" will move into the foreground;

[10] Schulz (fn. 8), 409.

[11] Gebhard Schweigler, *National Consciousness in a Divided Germany* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1975).

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the desire for self-determination will persist, as will the diffuse, psychological support for the reunification mandate found in the Basic Law. The Preamble functions as a *Bekenntnis ohne Bedürfnis*—a profession of faith, not a call to action.[12] The national consciousness will consist of a "passionless" but nonetheless stable acceptance of democratic values and institutions. The new "homeland feeling" will be more social than nationalistic.

In sum, the nation/state identity paradox requires no immediate action: the passage of time will provide the ultimate resolution. The Federal Republic is less "provisional" than the rhetoric of politicians implies. Those who would argue that reunification remains the charge for later generations no longer find a positive echo among the public, for "the FRG is accepted by her citizens as their state."[13] What the population actually perceives as open is not the all-German, but the inter-German question: "How the relationship of the Germans in the two German states to each other is to be shaped, that is the question that currently and intensely moves these human beings, not the question of a new state formation."[14]

The Federal Republic by itself is unable and unwilling to pursue "the special German way" against which Hättich, Hassner, and Sontheimer caution in the Weidenfeld book. The possibility that the two Germanys *together* might embark upon a special course—for example, in search of neutralism—is fraught with even more contradictions and qualifications against which the complexity of the nation/state paradox begins to pale. After all, the German question "is not the property of the Germans" (p. 84).

III. The Reunification/Integration Paradox

The German question is, and in fact always has been, a European question. Both questions became an American responsibility as a matter of military necessity rather than by virtue of political choice. Emerging relatively unscathed from the devastation of World War II, the United States "in a splendid act of practical, self-serving idealism," established

[12] Schulz (fn. 8), 186. More recent survey results show a striking majority in favor of maintaining the Preamble in its present form. Noelle-Neumann found 79% for, 7% against in October-November, 1983. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Im Wartesaal der Geschichte. Bleibt das Bewusstsein der deutschen Einheit lebendig?" [In the waiting room of history: Does the consciousness of German unity still live?], in Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Nachdenken über Deutschland. Materialien zur politischen Kultur der deutschen Frage* [Reflections on Germany: Materials on the political culture of the German question] (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985), 137.

[13] Schulz (fn. 8), 175.

[14] *Ibid.*

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the Marshall Plan and related assistance mechanisms to secure the rapid economic reconstruction of a liberal-democratic Europe (Stern, in Cooney et al., 237). American support for moves toward the creation of a United States of Europe was grounded in the twofold belief, first, that a Germany thus integrated would be a Germany democratized and demilitarized; and second, that a recovered Europe would assume ever more responsibility for its own defense while providing a growing, cooperative market for the disposition of American exports. What developed instead was a Europe that has remained militarily dependent while becoming economically ever more competitive.

Cooney's study of relations between the Federal Republic and the United States, considered in the larger context of European-American relations, is a story of mutual disappointment and cultural estrangement. This compilation of essays summarizes the deliberations of some forty social theorists and political practitioners invited by the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1983 to examine the growing divergencies in economic policies and security preferences as a function of value changes that have begun to occur on both sides of the Atlantic. A sense of undefined urgency underlies their collective appeal for a search for policy alternatives to sustain and strengthen the "special relationship" that is seen to exist between the FRG and the U.S.

Gordon Craig argues that what is special about this relationship is not only the fact that it has lasted some 300 years. Historically, Germans and Americans have both been considered "outsiders" (the latter by choice); they developed a sense of "exceptionalism" and came to manifest a certain xenophobia vis-à-vis Europe. In recent years, both have been plagued by a crisis of confidence in their respective economic miracles, as discussed in the chapters by Cooney and Jones. The essays by Löwenthal and Moltmann emphasize that America's national "identity" (as well as its image abroad) has been shaken in recent years by the traumatic experiences of Vietnam and Iran. While the Federal Republic and the United States share a forty-year commitment to the preservation of the free market and to military containment, the differences in their preferred styles and strategies for pursuing these goals have now moved into the foreground. Their respective searches for identity and for a return to power appear to be leading them in substantially different directions.

The German question as a European question that emerges in this context is multidimensional in character: What are the specific political, economic, and security prerequisites that must be met in order to permit the eventual reunification of Germany? The fact that the official pronouncements refer more frequently to *Einheit* (unity) than to *Wieder-*

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vereinigung (reunification) raises the corollary question: What does the Federal Republic really want from the United States as a means of enhancing its prospects for overcoming the postwar division?

Many intellectuals and politicians preoccupied with the question of national unity are fond of repeating that "Germany is divided because Europe is divided."[15] But that is only one of *two* main reasons underlying the German division. The breakdown in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that resulted in the formation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, along with the overarching ideological conflict between East and West, must bear the responsibility for the official creation and maintenance of two separate German states. But, as emphasized in von Weizsäcker's eloquent appeal, it is not the *end* of the war that provided the catalyst for division. The source of the many human hardships facing the peoples of both states in the postwar era "lies in the beginning of that regime of violence that led to war. We cannot separate the 8th of May, 1945, from the 30th of January, 1933."[16]

German was divided to ensure its denazification, its democratization, and its pacification; there was little agreement between the competing occupational powers of East and West as to the best strategy for achieving these objectives. By 1955, divided Germany had become the symbol as well as the stage for a dramatic heightening of tensions between the superpowers. Much of the confusion and controversy over the "openness" of the German question now stems from the emphasis placed by different actors, at different times, on one or the other of the reasons for the existence of the two Germanys. This confusion is manifested in the paradoxical conditions set down for German reunification within the framework of European integration.

The reunification/integration paradox has its origins in the incomplete nature of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. The lack of a final peace treaty and the collective nature of four-power responsibility during the occupation years kept the dream of reunification alive for the inhabitants of "the zones." But the deeper the division became between the superpowers, the more committed to Western values the Federal Republic appeared to be; and the more actively prepared the Germans were to accept the necessity of a defense contribution of their own, "the sooner the Western powers could tolerate their claimed right to reunification, even in contractual terms, 1952-1954."[17] Germany cannot hope to reunify with-

[15] See, *inter alia*, von Weizsäcker (fn. 1), and Schulz (fn. 8).

[16] Richard von Weizsäcker, "Gedenkstunde des Deutschen Bundestages zum 40. Jahrestag der Beendigung des zweiten Weltkrieges" [Commemoration by the German Parliament on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II], *Europa Archiv* 40 (No. 10, May 1985), 265.

[17] Schulz (fn. 8), 159.

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out the active support of its European neighbors and without the concurrence of the Soviet Union. (Official U.S. policy allows the FRG to presume American support.) The more thoroughly integrated the Federal Republic strives to become in the West European Community, the more it expects to win trust and support for its efforts to move closer to the GDR. One should recall, however, that it was France's desire *not* to see Germany reunited that led to de Gaulle's early push for European integration. Furthermore, the more institutionalized and permanent the FRG's commitment to the West, the more unacceptable her efforts to integrate or combine with the GDR will become to the countries of Eastern Europe, such as Poland.

A thirty-year identification with the European Community has complicated, if not strained, the Federal Republic's ties to the United States, whose approval and security guarantee are absolutely essential to the FRG's desire to avoid an "integration by force" with the East. What the West Germans ostensibly seek from the United States is an end to the further "Americanization" of their economy and culture—the loudest demands being posed by the peace and "alternative" movements that are criticized sharply by Schwarz (for example, p. 65). This is paralleled by the call for a halt to the Europeanization of the political and economic costs for security-related policies no longer viewed as sensitive to German interests. The U.S. has responded with hurt surprise to (alleged) manifestations of anti-Americanism, especially in the FRG; yet it overlooks the adverse impact of its own "seemingly erratic impositions of egocentrism" on the European economies, e.g., in the form of high interest rates and protectionist measures, as described by Jochimsen and Biedenkopf (Cooney et al., 148ff). The fact that the Federal Republic remains "a net importer of security" imposes other domestic economic costs as well, according to Joffe and May (p. 181). Schlesinger admits that American fears of an ultimate Soviet takeover are probably no more realistic or unrealistic than European watchfulness-mixed-with-faith that the economic enticements growing out of the detente era will subdue the "hordes of Soviet manpower" (p. 227). Stern warns that Bonn should not be forced to choose either between the United States and Europe or between Western Europe and German-German rapprochement. The trick is to find strategies that permit as much congruence as possible, as much diversity as necessary. Finally, the United States is exhorted to adopt a more flexible response to the change in European economic interests and security preferences.

The attainment of economic stability based on liberal market principles and an unshakable commitment to democratic institutions are but

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two of the prerequisites West Germany must fulfill if the Preamble is ever to become a political reality. Inevitably, however, the reestablishment of national unity will only become possible "when it appears to the Germans and all other powers who determine the fate of Europe to be less dangerous than the maintenance of division."[18] In other words, not even time will resolve this paradox—until East-West antagonisms are permanently laid to rest.

IV. The Stability/Security Paradox

Nowhere are the differences between American and European needs and interests more apparent than in the area of military and strategic defense policy. While a majority of West German political, industrial, and military elites continues to support nuclear deterrence as the best defense against possible Soviet aggression, a critical, vociferous segment of the public has shifted in favor of detente and disarmament as the key to European security.[19] As inconsistent and sporadic as its involvement in foreign policy deliberations has been since the 1950s, the often uninformed public has emerged as a participant in and an object of current national security debates. This was nowhere more evident than during the "hot autumn of 1983" when peace movement organizers succeeded in mobilizing an estimated two to three million demonstrators and sympathizers in opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

The ostensible "demobilization" that followed in the wake of actual deployments suggests, however, that the public's role in these debates has yet to stabilize; as a result, the policy maker's role becomes more complicated. On the one hand, the political leadership bears responsibility for "designing and pursuing defense and security policies that promise to be effective according to established military and strategic criteria, while simultaneously taking into account new realities of the social context surrounding national security. . . ." On the other hand, it cannot ignore a possible erosion of public support for the Atlantic Alliance, which holds "deep implications regarding the process of legitimizing defense and military strategy in Western democracies" (Flynn and Rattinger, 102).

The question of the public's future role in foreign policy formation poses new research challenges to international relations experts and decision-making theorists alike. We have little understanding as to how public attitudes toward foreign policy in general and national security is-

[18] *Ibid.*, 111.

[19] For an early appraisal, see Dietmar Schössler and Erich Weede, *West German Elite Views on National Security and Foreign Policy Issues* (Königstein/Ts: Athenäum Verlag, 1978).

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sues in particular are formed. We are even less capable of determining what influences or components remain stable over time, or what degree of personal importance citizens attach to foreign as opposed to domestic items. Nor can we distinguish cognitive from affective or from behavioral factors, much less assess the significance of historical or geographic variables, when attempting to compare public attitudes toward foreign policy across cultures.

Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger have undertaken an important first step in identifying the need for a conceptual inventory that links the public with foreign policy decision-makers. Their recent edited volume reviews national public attitudes toward defense, with special emphasis on mass orientations since the mid-seventies (when foreign policy was at last discovered as an important subfield by survey researchers). The analyses of public-opinion data compiled from a variety of sources in Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States are organized and developed around four axes or "images." The first, "Images of the Soviet Union," looks to differences in the Soviet "threat" as perceived by American and European citizens at large. The second, "Images of Security," juxtaposes internal against external, economic against military factors, as a source of increasing popular uncertainty and discontent. The third set of concerns involves "Images of Deterrence," in light of growing public suspicion that the "cure" of nuclear war might be worse than the disease of Soviet encroachment. The final axis, "Images of Allies," is applied to problems of reliability, trust, and meaningful communication between the United States, on the one hand, and its European partners, on the other.

The analysis of polls conducted in the FRG reveals an extremely complicated set of internal and external security concerns that is unique to a divided Germany. The most important questions that arise in this context pertain to the current and future status of the Federal Republic in the Western military alliance. First, one needs to inquire whether the specters of pacifism and neutro-nationalism raised by discussions within the peace movement have fundamentally altered the nature or strength of the West Germans' commitment to NATO. What do the citizens of the Federal Republic expect and demand from the Alliance? Second, do their expectations differ significantly from those of other NATO members? Third, what price are the Germans prepared to pay in terms of security risks, especially if neutralization and nonalignment are presented as the preconditions for reunification?

Recent empirical efforts to test the waters of German public opinion demonstrate that the tide has not yet shifted against Alliance membership

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per se—even when the sample contains a significant number of peace movement supporters.[20] Some 56 percent of those affiliated with the Green Party in May 1983 considered NATO "necessary" despite their rejection of the pending Pershing II and cruise missile deployments (pp. 166-67). There appears to be little disagreement regarding the overall importance of American security guarantees; when respondents are faced with a direct choice between NATO membership and neutrality, the former prevails over the latter by a significant margin: 70 versus 17 percent (February 1982), and 72 percent for continuing membership versus 9 percent for withdrawal (August 1983) (p. 144).

Thus, the first question is answered more easily than the second. The West Germans evince no inclination to withdraw from a collective defense system that, up to now, has guaranteed them a historically unprecedented degree of internal stability and external security. They nevertheless appear to be interested in redefining their status in NATO in such a way as to permit them to play a more active, participatory role in Alliance decision making. The call is for more prior consultation rather than for briefing or *ex post facto* appeals for support. Interviews with thirty members of the *Bundestag*, conducted by this author in 1986, reveal that where the choice of tactical weapons systems and regional defense strategies is involved, attitudes are somewhat ambivalent as to the desirability of genuine co-determination.[21] On the other hand, an overwhelming majority would prefer greater autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy where German interests are involved. Co-determination and autonomy are no doubt rights that the Bonn government would exercise only with great caution, trapped as it is in a unique security paradox.

The stability/security paradox finds expression in an article by Richard Löwenthal, who holds that the German Federal Republic, some thirty-five years after its founding, has become the most stable of the larger Eu-

[20] See esp., Karl-Heinz Reuband, "Demoskopische Verwirrungen in der Nachrüstungsfrage: Was halten die Bundesbürger vom Nachrüstungsbeschluss?" [Misinterpretations of survey data regarding the deployment question: What do FRG citizens think about the NATO deployment resolution?] *Vorgänge* 66 (1983), 64-80; Reuband, "Die Friedensbewegung vor und nach den 'Aktionswochen' im Herbst 1983" [The Peace Movement before and after the action weeks of fall 1983] *Vorgänge* 67 (1984), 12-25; Reuband, "Die Friedensbewegung nach Stationierungsbeginn: Soziale Unterstützung in der Bevölkerung als Handlungspotential" [The Peace Movement since the beginning of deployment: Social support in the population as a basis for action potential], *Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden* 3 (No. 3, 1985), 147-56; Reuband, "Antiamerikanismus—ein deutsches Problem?" [Anti-Americanism—A German problem?], *Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden* 3 (No. 1, 1985), 46-52.

[21] These interviews, of about 60-90 minutes each, were conducted in German, June through December, 1986, under a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, for a forthcoming book, *Security Conceptions and Successor Generations: Changing Attitudes towards the National Question and Changing Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance in Postwar Germany*.

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ropean states when measured by such objective standards as price stability, unemployment rates, and electoral succession. The problem is, the West Germans cannot believe it. Objective stability is not matched by subjective security: "The self-conception of the Federal Germans lacks the ability to take itself for granted."[22] The reasons for this perceived insecurity derive as much from the present as from the past: in order to demonstrate fidelity to the ideological precepts imposed by their respective superpowers, the two German states were compelled, during the first twenty years of their existence, to engage in frequent, often vehement public disavowals of each other's domestic and foreign policy achievements. Efforts to secure the political-economic survival of one German state were perceived to pose an existential threat to the other. Yet, the very division of Germany that has held the two states hostage to a provisional condition of insecurity has itself become one of the stablest elements in the ongoing, globally destabilizing confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs.

History and geography make it impossible for both German states to divorce questions of national security—and the issue of their postwar national identity—from the dialectic of international relations. The Federal Republic seeks "maximal coupling with minimal provocation" (Joffe, in Cooney et al., 190). While the general perception of the overall East-West military balance has not undergone a significant change in recent years, the public's main worry has shifted from military strength to keeping the peace. Neither defense spending nor the expansion of the *Bundeswehr* are viewed as "extremely important;" the peace movement draws sympathy, but not necessarily active commitment. In short, "military defense is endorsed by public opinion much more easily as an abstract principle than its burdensome practice . . ."; when the "ugly label," nuclear weapons, is affixed, "it has no chance if it is up against more 'civilized' concepts such as negotiation and détente" (Flynn and Rattinger, 127).

The Federal Republic is shown to possess a rather stable set of images both of the Soviet Union and of its own internal and external security imperatives—albeit with a new sensitivity to the inherent dangers of reliance on deterrence. It is the last set, "Images of Allies," that provides evidence of subtle but significant changes in the public's orientation and yields at least a partial answer to the question of German "different-ness" from other Alliance partners.

The conclusion drawn by Flynn and Rattinger is that the West Ger-

[22] Löwenthal, "Stabilität ohne Sicherheit—Vom Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [Stability without security—On the self-conception of the Federal Republic of Germany"], *Der Monat* (1978), 75.

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man public thinks pretty much like other European publics, but perhaps "more so." The real differences lie between European and American perceptions. The Europeans are now inclined to view the Soviet Union as a more "normal adversary," one to be lived with and negotiated with rather than to be wiped out in a messianic confrontation between the superpowers. Security defined primarily in military terms is judged inadequate, as more weapons on *either* side mean decreased prospects for peace. Declining confidence in the "rationality" of either a graduated or an extended deterrence strategy is linked to the public's loss of faith in the "expert" character of decisions made by political/technical elites. The ever more attentive publics are prepared to pay the social and financial price of European security only to the extent that Alliance policies are perceived to be defensive ("structural, non-offensive capacities"); otherwise, they will impose political costs of their own. Even the craziest or most "chaotic" peace protester one might encounter in the FRG is no less "rational," no more "aberrant" than the citizens of other Alliance states in rejecting the proposition that one's own country may have to be destroyed in order to be defended.

V. The Lessons of History/Normalcy Paradox

Divided or reunified, neutralized or allied, the two German states will remain physically, and therefore politically, in the middle of the East-West conflict. In no position to drop out of the international, bipolarized system, both Germanys appear to have but one other option for securing their mutual survival—namely, to cast aside the political sackcloth-and-ashes roles they donned in 1945 and to assume the cloak of power accorded to other "normal" sovereign states. This alternative, seeking to ensure that the security needs of one's own country prevail through the responsible exercise of power, is likely to resurrect the original German question, albeit adapted to the constraints of the 1980s. Do the calls for a community of responsibility, a coalition of reason, and a security partnership mean that borders will be maintained while the character of the two states is radically altered? Or are the two parts again moving to reestablish something bigger, a *Gesamtdeutschland* (federated Germany), through confederation and reunification? Have the Germans sufficiently atoned for sins of the past—now three generations removed—or does "original sin" leave its black mark on their souls forever? What evidence can they deliver "that will convince the rest of the world that they have learned their lesson and have become all the better for it"? (Schwarz, 23).

The question of pan-Germanism has lost its relevance, but the need to

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conquer the past remains a salient issue. In a two-part work on power politics and the style of West German foreign policy making, Hans-Peter Schwarz argues that postwar Germans have truly become different. He holds that their proclivity for too little attention to power politics has become almost as bad as too much. Once obsessed with power, the Germans have banned its use from the collective political memory, and have thus deprived themselves of a capacity for pragmatic-purposive maximization of their own interests. "The tamed Germans of the Federal Republic have traveled much farther than the German Reich with its nervous striving for a place in the sun" (p. 39). Bonn's initiatives over the last fifteen years have resulted in a network of diplomatic and economic engagements that allows its representatives to move with self-assurance into regions and states that were closed to the previous two generations. But Schwarz admonishes that the Federal Republic manifests both anxiety and arrogance (especially vis-à-vis the United States) in scorning a power-political approach to foreign policy making. Instead, "the cured alcoholic as the preacher of universal sobriety" has adopted an antistatist, naively moralistic dream role as harmonizer and peacemonger (p. 56).

It appears that "the Germans more than many other peoples cultivate extremes in the style of their international activity: sometimes berserk, sometimes the friendly household pet lacking any instincts against danger" (p. 58). Whatever "taming" of the Germans remained to be done subsequent to the experiences of the capitulation and the occupation years was eventually effected by group pressure and the imperatives of routinized adaptation to multinational foreign policy entanglements. Schwarz maintains that "adherents to the so-called peace movement" who demand a denuclearized, bloc-free Germany are "without appreciation for the disciplinary and behaviorally stabilizing effect of the multilateral system" (pp. 41, 47). Yet the general thrust of his own argument is to urge that the Federal Republic simultaneously "do more" and "do less" to render its geopolitical position less vulnerable and to combat growing domestic resentment over its condemnation to a state of permanent provisionalism. "Without a hard core of patriotic responsibility toward their own country, toward their own liberal way of life, for the welfare and power interests of their own state," the Germans have become "politicians and citizens who predominantly lay their sacrifices on the altar of international order and cooperation, and forget that their own land will sooner or later be punished by the gods" (p. 151).

The concurrent, rather contradictory calls for more multilateral cooperation and a stronger emphasis on Germany's "own" interests—even

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to the point of possible withdrawal from NATO—reflect a growing gap between the successor generations. In undertaking delayed efforts to conquer Germany's past, members of the "economic miracle" and "long march through the institutions" generations have drawn very different conclusions for West Germany's present and future foreign policy course. These conclusions find expression in the "lessons of history"/return to normalcy paradox.[23]

"We have learned the lessons of history" is a declaration oft repeated by Helmut Kohl who, at age 57, is the first Chancellor of the FRG with no direct experiential link to the events of 1933–1945; he refers to this condition as "the blessing of having been born late." By contrast, Premier Erich Honecker of the GDR spent the years 1935-1945 in a Nazi prison; he is therefore inclined to view the division of Germany as a barrier against resurgent fascism, just as he refers to the "antifascist protection wall" in Berlin. In either case, one can argue that the national shock of shifting from major-power to no-power status has produced internal political asymmetries in both states, which in turn lead to errors of judgment and behavior that the Germans themselves mistakenly perceive to be "normal."

The Alliance partners would like to believe that the Germans have thoroughly mastered the lessons of history and that they have indeed become "better"; they are sympathetic to the two states' desire to avoid serving as a potential Ground Zero. But if the two were to attempt to disentangle themselves from the never-ending risk of a major superpower confrontation, the "tamed" Germans would immediately be suspected of trying to establish a new German federation. Their common efforts to solidify their respective dream roles as harmonizers and peace mediators—even at the rhetorical level of a security partnership—raises the world's anxiety level and generates counterpressures abroad. From this, one concludes that neither the Federal Republic nor its Eastern counterpart have yet to be perceived as normal states. Schwarz contends that "even the self-torturing efforts to conquer the past should soon belong to the past" (p. 141). Nevertheless, the lesson of history, the acceptance and mastery of which was and is expected to result in a return to normalcy in

[23] Stephen F. Szabo's earlier work in this area looks primarily at the postwar generation that began to make its political influence felt in the 1970s. I have attempted elsewhere to distinguish analytically among *three* successor generations; the last two of these have contributed significantly to the "alternative politics" and new social movements of the 1980s. Compare Szabo, ed., *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans* (London and Boston: Butterworths, 1983), and Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Anti-Politics and Successor Generations: The Role of Youth in the West and East German Peace Movements," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 12 (Spring 1984), 171-90.

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subsequent generations, is that the Germans never have been "normal"—and probably will not be treated as such for a long time to come.

VI. Questions for the Alliance: Division and Defense Postures

In being transformed from one into many, the German questions may have acquired new meaning for the future course of the Atlantic Alliance. For neighboring and partner states, the most important question entails a mixture of old and new elements—namely, the issue of unity and those issues variously known as the "Dutch question," the "Austrian solution," and fears of "Finlandization." Schulz and Danylow suggest that, instead of reacting rashly to potential threats to their national security, which they attribute to too much inter-German rapprochement, the Western powers face an obligation to lay the old German question permanently to rest: they should offer a more attractive alternative, coupled with real political concessions (Schulz and Danylow, 15). One possibility would be to permit the creation of chemical- and nuclear-free zones of a limited but expandable nature, as already agreed upon by the SED and the SPD in behind-the-scene negotiations.

For the citizens of East and West Germany, the fundamental task ahead is to find ways to resolving the new *German-German* question which promote an optimal balance among "unity," "freedom," "security," "peace," and "autonomy." The governments in Bonn and East Berlin must clearly and publicly divorce their shared objective of overcoming the negative human costs of division from the anachronistic aim of reunification. In order to achieve this, policy makers on both sides will have to adhere to five important ground rules. First, German-German dialogues need to begin with an emphasis on *common* interests; this would replace the traditional method of focusing initially on conflicts of principle without compelling either state to lose sight of the "real existing difference." Second, the expression of common FRG-GDR security interests will have to be couched in terms of European responsibility. Third, policy makers articulating these interests will have to refrain from directly challenging each other's loyalty to either alliance system. Fourth, the dialogue between the two polities will have to be conducted with greater transparency in order to establish confidence-building mechanisms among the neighboring states. Finally, whatever measures the two sides jointly resolve to implement will have to rest upon the principles of balance, territorial integrity, verifiability, and predictability. The power to assume

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greater direct responsibility for their own defense might serve both states in rechanneling over-reactive neutralist or national aspirations, while stabilizing and domesticating internally divisive debates over security policy.[24]

With regard to possible long-term consequences, the stability/security paradox appears to outweigh the other three issues because of its direct link to collective defense strategies. The conflicting interests inherent in this paradox become even more significant in view of the new arms-control proposals that have been set forth by the superpowers since the 1986 Reykjavik summit. In theory, the leadership in both German states should rejoice over any move to reduce the number of longer-range intermediate nuclear forces that hold them hostage on the East-West fault line. In practice, they fear they will be rendered more vulnerable to imbalances in the conventional arena or to asymmetries at the shorter-range end of the I.N.F. spectrum—even though it was at Bonn's suggestion that NATO proposed the original "zero solution" to Euromissiles in 1981.[25]

The conscious ambivalence that characterizes the demand for reunification is also reflected in the German hopes for disarmament: it is easy for Bonn to appeal publicly for dramatic policy changes as long as they are judged unacceptable to the superpowers, especially to the Soviet Union. It is incumbent upon the two Germanys that they develop new approaches to the peculiar identity problems and security dilemmas they share. Not only should the international community encourage them to make use of whatever opportunities arise outside the arena of traditional power politics: it is imperative that they convey the full range of negotiation successes and failures to their respective allies. The principles best suited to normalization, rapprochement, and good neighborly relations between the two are the same as the prerequisites for effective East-West arms control and disarmament: balance, territorial integrity, confidence building, verifiability, and predictability. The two Germanys can become a laboratory for positive, responsible, peaceful East-West change.

Must the older German question—with its emphasis on the elimination of the psychological and physical walls that divide the nation—be

[24] Schulz and Danylow (pp. 112-13) borrow from Holmes on this point: cf. Kim R. Holmes, *The West German Peace Movement and the National Question* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984), 70ff. I have found much food for thought along these lines in a working paper by Wilhelm Bruns, "Der Beitrag der beiden deutschen Staaten zur Sicherheits- und Entspannungspolitik" [The contribution of the two German states to a policy of security and reduction of tension] (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, January 1986).

[25] Elizabeth Pond, "Europe Does Want Arms Deal Despite Unease," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 5, 1987, p. 1.

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resolved in formal legal terms in order to guarantee the strength and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance? For the United States, Britain, France, and the smaller partner states, the answer is *no*. As Grosser defines the situation, "the Western allies only want reunification as long as it is impossible," while an American source notes that "we are not being asked to do anything about the German question, and we prefer not be asked."[26] Is the Federal Republic's loyalty to the Alliance jeopardized by, or dependent upon, a *de jure* solution to the German question? In the short term, the answer is *for the most part, no*—as long as the FRG is not compelled to choose between the United States and Europe, between Western integration and the improvement or intensification of German-German relations. The longer-range answer also is *probably not*; it is conceivable, however, that the FRG could later insist upon some compensation (for example, in the form of a veto over theater nuclear missile release, or of greater tactical flexibility within its own borders) in exchange for "voluntary" renunciation of the right to national reunification.

Movement in the search for a new, post-postwar German identity can be construed as evidence that the citizens of the Federal Republic have begun to develop confidence in themselves and in their own "free-democratic basic order"—a development meriting the active support of the Western partners. The emergence of independent peace and ecology groups, along with Erich Honecker's own "damage-limitation" activism since the 1983 commencement of the NATO deployments, indicates that *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement) has occurred in the GDR as well as in the FRG. Moreover, both states have become subject to *Annäherung durch Wandel* (rapprochement through change) in the global economic and strategic environment.

If one accepts the verity of the French axiom, *c'est seulement le provisoire qui dure*, then the members of the Alliance will have to consider the extent to which a strengthening and deepening of ties between the two German Republics can and must contribute to the future stability of the region (Schulz and Danylow, 99ff). If it is not true that only the provisional—namely, the existence of two states in search of nationhood—will prove to be the most permanent feature of the postwar global order, then one would be well advised to heed the warning of Richard von Weiz-

[26] Alfred Grosser is casually cited by von Weizsäcker (fn. 1). For an elaboration of Grosser's position, see P.-J. Franceschini, "Sept regards sur l'Allemagne" [Seven observations on Germany], review of Gérard Sandoz, ed., *Les Allemands sans miracle* [The Germans without a miracle], in *Le Monde*, October 2, 1983. The American quote derives from an interview conducted by this author at the U.S. Mission in West Berlin on January 3, 1986; my source prefers to remain anonymous.

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säcker: "The German Question will remain open as long as the Brandenburg Gate remains closed."[27] The opening of the Brandenburg Gate and the demolition of the Wall of which it has become an integral part will constitute a necessary but not, I contend, a sufficient condition for the closing of the German question.

[27] Von Weizsäcker, "Die deutsche Frage aus der Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [The German question from the perspective of the German Federal Republic"] speech (June 8, 1985), reprinted in *Europa Archiv* 40 (July 1985), 398.

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Bulletin of Peace Proposals



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